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An office near the Poultry Association of Zambia, which is located at the agricultural show 
grounds on the Great East Road in Lusaka, Zambia, is the base of a veterinary doctor who 
serves the agricultural community. She consults independently, but is the official vet of the 
Zambian National Farmers’ Union. She unexpectedly gave me more insight into Zambia’s food 
system than I anticipated when she forgot about an appointment with me and left me standing 
outside her office. Outside the office was a stack of cardboard boxed trays, tied together with 
twine. Inside each box there were ten day-old chicks. An elderly man came inside, took two 
boxes, looked inside them, and left. Eventually I followed the man, who by now had strapped 
his chicks to the back of his bicycle and was about to leave the show grounds. He has a small 
farm enterprise in a compound in Lusaka and sells live grown chickens at a local market in that 
compound. 
 
Figure 1 Man with his bicycle 
I also later found out that the vet was also an agent for one of the largest  breeding companies in 
Zambia. She offered a one-stop-shop – chicks and the vaccines for small-scale rearing. And 
business was great; she had standing orders from over twenty small agribusinesses in the area, 
and because she is also a vet who could offer other services to smallholders, she is one of the 
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preferred agents for the breeding company. The breeding company relies on agents like her. 
These agents buy day-old chicks at a discounted rate in bulk from the breeder near Lusaka (the 
breeder often delivers) and supply an entire network of smallholders all across Zambia. This 
food system fascinated me. It was similar to what a typical ‘value chain’ is, yet the idea of a 
‘chain’ just was not suitable. And a ‘network’ only described how small-scale farmers link to 
large breeding companies through intermediaries, but does not give us insight about why it 
works this way.  
 
Zambia's food system is an eclectic mix of formal, high value industry based on the oversight of 
the Zambian National Farmers’ Union (an agribusiness association), large capital investments, 
informal markets with its array of traders and vendors, and enterprise along this spectrum. 
Depending on which part of the spectrum is the object of inquiry, one could be faced with very 
different worlds. On the one hand, there are highly formalised contractual arrangements and large 
economies of scale in the poultry industry. International agribusinesses invest in the Zambian 
economy, recognising the buying potential of its growing urban middle class, and the country’s 
openness to foreign investment. On the other hand, there is an interesting mix of formalised 
enterprise and informal supply chains which incorporates intermediary traders, or ‘agents’ who 
work without commission selling the company’s product, or sourcing material for production. 
There are also large informal markets (wholesale and retail), which make up the larger proportion 
of urban food supply chains in Zambia. Urban food markets in Lusaka are hives of activity where 
farmers find a daily supply chain for their produce and consumers find accessible retail outlets. 
Traders are also integral players in linking farmers to markets and distributing food through their 
networks in and around the city. Small, medium and emerging commercial farmers use the 
informal market as their preferred supply chain. And although returns may not be as lucrative as 
formal contractual work, which itself is hard to come by, the urban market is a regular and more 
secure source of income, which of course encourages the growing proportion of enterprising 
small farmers in Lusaka. I had two questions, and they persisted wherever I went in Zambia: Why 
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ABSTRACT  
This thesis contributes to research on agrifood systems in Africa. The research agenda is especially 
relevant in the context of revived developmental interest in agrifood sectors in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Existing scholarship has tended to focus on economic restructuring and the way 
supermarkets and agribusiness firms increasingly transform African food economies. This 
thesis is an empirically grounded research endeavour that presents insights about key dynamics 
in the domestic food system in urban Sub-Saharan Africa, as seen through the case of Lusaka, 
Zambia. It also challenges existing scholarship by looking at transformations in domestic 
political economy contexts in Africa that promote the development of agrifood systems. The 
thesis is concerned with (1) what shapes Lusaka’s urban food system or what the key 
influencing factors are; (2) the institutions that are critical to the functioning of the urban food 
system; and (3) whether agribusiness firms and retailers govern economic interaction in Zambia 
or whether these firms and their economic interaction are governed by other institutions, and/or 
determined by the domestic political economy context. The thesis considers the changes in 
Zambia’s food system which point to growth paths that are intentionally pursued to strengthen the 
domestic economy so that it meets domestic priorities. Unexpectedly, this is not the concern of the 
state alone, but also of agribusiness firms. Other fascinating contradictions also became apparent in 
the course of the fieldwork, which looked at large agribusiness in the poultry sector, the Zambian 
National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU), the South African supermarket, Shoprite, urban markets, market 
traders and small-scale farmers, between January and November 2007. For instance, contractual 
arrangements between small-scale farmers and agribusiness firms are common, but the supply chain 
almost always incorporates intermediary traders; urban markets are formalising at management 
levels; and the supermarket faces growing pressure by the state to source locally. The methods 
consisted of in-depth interviews with the ZNFU, firms, farmers, traders, managers of urban markets 
and supermarkets, and the Ministry of Trade and Commerce. In sum, the thesis argues that urban 
food systems in Africa can be seen as situated or located in a domestic political economy, 
influenced by domestic and regional processes, and that they are the result of intersecting forms 
of governance by different firms and non-firm institutions. In offering a detailed case study of 
localised food systems in Africa, these findings lend to a robust research agenda on food studies and 
economic growth in Africa, and are well-placed to contribute to work on food security.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization was supposed to eliminate this kind of recurring disaster. With economists 
radiating confidence about the new efficiencies of the global market, the need for food self-
sufficiency seemed almost archaic. … But it turned out that globalization did not really work 
for food. Mauritania [for instance] knows it must bear more of its own food burden. … 
"Everyone is out there protecting their own right now," said Joachim von Braun, director 
general of the District-based International Food Policy Research Institute. "And that isn't the 
way globalization is meant to work."  
 
Washington Post, 28 April, 2008   
‘Africa: Where every meal is a sacrifice. Report for the Global Food’ 
  
 
I happen to believe this country must retain its ability to grow its own food. All too 
many people think that we can survive by relying totally on the world market. But we 
must learn the lessons of history - now, it seems to me in these currently dangerous 
times, more than ever. To sacrifice long-term security for short-term convenience 
would be utter madness, it seems to me.  
 
Prince Charles quoted in BBC News, 12 November 2001 
‘Prince backs ‘Buy Local Campaign’ 
 
The dominant narrative about the agrifood sector in Africa states that recent changes in Africa’s 
agrifood economies are rooted in the reorganization and restructuring of the global economy, 
and therefore bound up with larger narratives about globalisation. In this context, it is surprising 
that even though academic scholars have highlighted the various ways that African economies 
have integrated and are integrating into the global economy, the same tropes that placed African 
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(agrifood) economies in an ‘exceptional’ category as compared to the rest of the world seem to 
be resurfacing. This thesis is concerned with domestic food systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 
within a broader understanding of how economies in the south are profoundly transformed by 
changes in the domestic political economy, the increasing importance of domestic institutions, 
and agrifood restructuring. The thesis shares an argument made recently by Economic 
Geography scholars that ‘sweeping statements and general explanatory frameworks do little to 
uncover the variety of different processes actually taking place ‘on the ground’ in African 
economies during this present phase of globalization’ (Larsen and Fold, 2008:9). Indeed as seen 
in the light of the recent food crisis, sweeping statements and general explanatory frameworks 
are not only contentious, but exceptionalise African economies.  
 
For instance, where the ‘turn to the local’ and community supported agriculture resurfaced in 
the north, it was heralded as being able to revive economic growth in the north or to 
‘compensate politically active consumers for losses in their purchasing power caused by higher 
food prices’ (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009:xi, Foreward to Clapp and Cohen, 2009). In the south, 
acute awareness of the need for food self-sufficiency in African countries and those in the 
global south is seen as an ‘archaic’ concern, understandable in the era of crisis, but in the words 
of IFPRI’s president quoted above, just not ‘the way globalization is meant to work’. And 
where comments like that of the Prince of Wales, although spoken in 2001, are applauded in the 
north perhaps resonating with the justification to bail out northern corporations, a similar 
comment by the political elite of the south might illicit the kind of response written in a special 
issue of The Economist, ‘How to Feed the World’ (21-27 November 2009) when a number of 
countries in the south instituted import substitution programmes:  
The most important activity…is taking place at the national level. Here, the price rises 
of 2007-08 have unleashed an unprecedented pack of policies. Practically every 
developing country, however cash-strapped, has done something (often a lot) to help 
farmers…yet there are worrying signs that all is not well. For alongside the increases in 
investment and attention is something more insidious: a turn away from trade, markets 
and efficiency (The Economist, 2009: 77).  
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The justification by Malawi’s President, one of the leaders who instituted a successful import 
substitution programme and who advocates a similar notion of self-sufficiency as the Prince of 
Wales, does not sounds ‘insidious’ at all.  
The [Malawian] President did say one time that he never, never ever again wanted to 
suffer the indignity of begging for food around the world and he has succeeded in doing 





Understanding the domestic agrifood system in Sub-Saharan Africa  
It is evident that there is both revived developmental interest in agrifood sectors in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and a renewed commitment by public and private sectors in African countries to focus 
on self-sufficiency and growing the domestic economy. Renewed interest in agrifood sectors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa parallels growing attention on domestic political economies in emerging 
markets, and particularly in Africa (see Van Agtmael, 2008). Research on domestic political 
economies in African countries, institutional governance and the crucial role of these 
economies and institutions in food provisioning, economic development and poverty reduction 
is thus an increasingly pertinent concern.  
 
How then should we think about domestic food systems in urban Africa? What are the changes 
in African urban food systems and what are the factors that have influenced these changes? And 
once we have unpacked the answers to these questions, what will this tell us about how urban 
food systems are governed and the institutions that govern economic interaction? In light of 
these questions, empirically grounded studies of agrifood systems in Africa at the domestic 
level are imperative. This thesis takes on the challenge of presenting an empirically grounded 
                                                 
1 On the receipt of the Best Agricultural Development award at the Second African Business-CBC Annual Awards 
in London, 2009 [referenced as African Business, 2009]).  
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research endeavour, and providing insights about key dynamics in the domestic food system in 
urban Africa. It is concerned with (1) what shapes Lusaka’s urban food system or what the key 
influencing factors are; (2) the institutions that are critical to the functioning of the urban food 
system; and (3) whether agribusiness firms and retailers govern economic interaction in Zambia 
or whether these firms and their economic interaction are governed by other institutions, and/or 
determined by the domestic political economy context.  
 
The considerations listed above are important in the context of dealing with issues of access to 
food, investment in agrifood systems, and domestic economic growth in the agrifood sector – 
some of the most pressing questions that African states and other stakeholders are faced with. 
Indeed answering these questions is increasingly important if African countries take on the 
challenge of food self-sufficiency and growing the local economy.  These considerations frame 
the research design and analysis in the thesis and allow me to assert, in this thesis, that there are 
significant transitions in Zambia's urban food system that (1) are rooted in the domestic 
political economy; (2) draw attention to multiple sites of power in the agrifood system; and (3) 
appear to be ‘governed’ by processes in the domestic context. I show, for instance, how the 
urban food system, with its many eclectic and juxtaposed facets, is the result of different 
historical processes and objectives or rationalisation, and cannot be confined to a single 
normative imaginary of how it will develop. It is neither formal or informal, nor modern or 
traditional. Indeed these dualisms are unhelpful because there are elements of informality or 
formality in the various economic interactions that are alluded to in the thesis, and for this 
reason, the term ‘urban food system’ is used. I also draw attention to those institutions that are 
central to domestic food economies in Africa but that are overlooked in recent scholarship on 
agrifood systems in urban Africa. These domestic institutions in turn have profound 
implications for how the agrifood system is governed influencing the strength and resilience of 
the domestic food system. 
 
The focus on the domestic level, should not suggest that international restructuring of trade is 
not happening or that it matters any less. Indeed there is a wealth of scholarship on international 
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trade restructuring and agrifood globalisation, which I draw on in brief, since the ‘domestic’ or 
the ‘local’ is not a reified aspect isolated from ‘the global’. The rationale for focusing on 
domestic food system is to show particular processes at work and therefore highlight pertinent 
issues that are increasingly on centre-stage in policy circles because of the perceived failures of 
the global trade complex and the growing imperative to nurture the domestic economy. Since it 
is not the purpose of this thesis to engage with debates that critique a reading of the domestic 
economy which either privileges or sets itself against neoliberal globalisation discourses, one 
which is taken on by scholars such as Gillian Hart and Patrick Bond, the specific focus here is 
the domestic food system in African cities – what shapes it, what cultivates it, and what 
transforms it. The next section explains how I have framed this research project. 
 
Engaging with academic debates, and original contribution 
While the thesis is about understanding the domestic agrifood system in Sub-Saharan Africa, as 
seen through the case of Lusaka, the capital city of Zambia, I situate the study within a broader 
debate in Economic Geography on agrifood economies in African countries. I draw on different 
bodies of work to situate the research focus, given the focus on domestic agrifood systems, but 
a necessary point of departure is the literature on the spread of supermarkets and retail capital in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which is an increasingly normative school of thought that has come to 
frame transitions in African economies. The overarching point of the supermarkets literature, 
which I expand upon later, is that because of global economic restructuring, increasingly open 
economies in the south and greater purchasing power of supermarket retail, urban food 
economies in the south are reorganised from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ because of the rapid 
spread of supermarkets, thereby transforming the economic landscape in cities and changing the 
way people provision food and the way producers operate.  
 
According to scholars, the reorganisation and transformation have to do essentially with (1) 
changes in supply chain practises and how supermarkets source foodstuff or commodities 
thereby becoming a sophisticated and often preferred end retail market for producers in the 
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south; and (2) the demise of tradition urban markets and the tendency for supermarkets to 
succeed them (McCullough et al., 2008; Neven and Reardon, 2008; Louw et al., 2007). 
Although work on the spread of supermarkets in the developing south was undertaken in 
earnest after 2000, the past four years, since, 2007 has seen a significant tempering of 
enthusiastic claims that supermarkets transform the global south, or ‘more cautious voices’ as 
Tschirley (2009:3) terms it. The caution has come about in part because the ‘rapid spread’ of 
supermarkets in urban Africa has not been as wide-scale as first anticipated; in part because it 
had been ‘over anticipated’ (Humphrey, 2007:433); and in part because there is renewed 
interest in urban markets and this dominant form of food provisioning the African cities 
(Abrahams, 2010; Tschirley, 2009; Jayne, 2008; Minten, 2007) 
 
The work presented in this thesis aims to investigate the ‘transformation’ of the urban food 
system by looking at the spread of supermarkets and agribusiness firms, and the urban market in 
the Zambian political economy context, by drawing on important bodies of academic scholarship 
to support the assertions in the thesis. This Introduction  draws attention to bodies of work on 
food/commodity studies based in the discipline. These bodies of work either (1) form the basis of 
other studies, which I review in Chapter 3 (for instance studies on the supermarkets revolution in 
the south is based on earlier work on global commodity chains); (2) present critiques that can be 
transposed to add to the analytical framework here (for instance critiques of the commodity 
chains analysis in work on global production networks which urges a greater focus on domestic 
institutions); (3) or they provide a conceptual language to take forward the argument in the thesis 
(for instance, work on ‘the local turn’ in agrifood studies looks at ‘rationalisations’ that are 
inherent in the building and nurturing of localised/alternative food networks. I take forward the 
analysis by retaining some of the terminology from this wider framework, but focus on the 
literature on the ‘supermarket revolution’ and urban food studies in Africa.  
 
The claims of my research project are as follows:  
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1) We are best able to examine the economic growth pathways, and ongoing, interconnected 
processes of change (or trajectories) in Zambia's urban food system through an 
examination of the domestic political economy; 
2) Multiple sites of power in the food system, particularly those institutions that would be 
ignored in more normalising agrifood research approaches, constitute an integral part of 
the food system because they govern it; and 
3) Given that there are multiple sites of power, the various firms and institutions in Zambia’s 
food system clearly do not govern in isolation, but instead, intersecting forms of 
governance circumscribe and often profoundly influence agribusiness institutions.  
 
In sum, the thesis argues that urban food systems in Africa can be seen as situated or located in 
a domestic political economy, which is influenced by domestic and regional processes, and are 
the result of intersecting forms of governance by different firms and non-firm institutions. The 
next section outlines the conceptual basis of the study. 
 
The conceptual basis for the study  
I situate the three claims mentioned above in wider bodies of work, which either provide a 
general basis and language toolkit in the discipline, or open up possible points of departure and 
critique, which are then further grounded in the specific literature that frames the research 







Claim 1: We are best able to examine the economic growth pathways and ongoing, 
interconnected processes of change (or trajectories) in Zambia's urban food system 
through an examination of the domestic political economy. 
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Understanding food systems through a wider consideration of the political economy is not a 
particularly groundbreaking endeavour. But it is a focus of work in the 1980s that has 
comparatively petered out in recent work. A brief reflection on this work allows me to 
recapture the earlier rationale of this work and thus support Claim 1.  
 
Commodity Systems Analysis and Urban Food Economies in Africa  
The notion of ‘food systems’ has been a feature in the academic literature in the 1970s and 
1980s where scholars such as Friedland and Wallerstein deviated from what they termed 
traditional commodity studies. The approach, quite popular in the 1980s and 1990s, engaged 
with the central issue in the thesis that has to do with examining food ‘systems’ through looking 
at the political economy. According to one of its main proponents:  
When commodity systems analysis began to emerge during the 1970s in the social 
sciences, there was already a well-established literature on commodities by agricultural 
economists. Much of this literature is extremely narrow, often focusing on price and 
markets and rarely venturing into the politics of commodities, institutional elements, 
and other aspects of commodity life. … Sociologists, geographers, and other social 
scientists who became involved in commodity studies often approached their research 
with a specific problem generated within the discipline and literature; the focus was less 
on the commodity than what a commodity could illustrate about a research problem 
(Friedland, 2004:6.) 
 
Although this work was not specifically targeted at Africa, it is a useful background literature 
because it distinguished itself from other food ‘study’ approaches which were for instance 
concerned with pricing markets, or technological innovation in grain breeds but less concerned 
with the ‘system’ that shaped how production was happening, the politics of demand and 
supply or the intricacies of labour organisation or cultural nuance that influenced 
innovation/prices/supply chain structure. Commodity studies, they argued, had more to do with 
finding about aspects about a said commodity where the focus was on anything from value to 
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technical measurements and specifications. The distinction made from food ‘systems’ research, 
is that the latter looked at a number of peripheral elements to food production, demand, labour, 
market related factors that were most often outside the scope of commodity studies.  
 
Somewhat related, work on urban markets in Africa during the 1980s demonstrated a similar 
rationale. While food studies in Africa at the time tended to focus on famine and 
undernutrititon, on the one hand or rural households and urban supply chains on the other, 
certain scholars such as Watts, Guyer and Bryceson argued that looking at ‘urban food systems’ 
represented the convergence of urban demand, consumption, changing priorities at the state 
level and broader political economy changes (Guyer, 1987:6 see below).  
 
The study of urban food systems can provide the context for taking a broad 
systemic approach, in which the mutual implications of organisational form, 
power bases, entitlement rubric and material conditions can be traced over 
time. One can ask not only whether the system ‘works’ by some objective 
criteria, but such questions as …what makes a particular niche in the market 
chain the unambiguous scapegoat of an infuriated elite or a starving crowd 
(Guyer, 1987:6). 
 
Scholars also developed a methodology around both these approaches, the former drawing out 
five areas of focus that research could possibly base their system analysis on – ‘production 
practises or labour practises; grower organisation and organisations; labour/the labour 
market/how workers organise themselves; science production and organisation; and marketing 
and distribution (Friedland, 1984) - which was later modified by Dixon (2000) to include 
regulatory politics and state-producer relations; and product design. The latter, focused either 
on writing a social history of urban food supply systems, which looked at colonial records, 
urban planning during colonisation and early independence (see Guyer 1987; Watts, 1987; 
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Bryceson, 1987), or on urban grain marketing and the state-agriculture complex (see Jayne, 
1991; Good, 1988; Bates, 1989).  
 
It is clear that these scholars did not focus on the system in its entirety, but based their work 
instead on an awareness of a wider political economy system in which food supply/provisioning 
occurred. Also, they used a broader understanding of the political economy to illuminate the 
setting in which certain phenomenon occurred, and the relations of power that shaped the 
system. Drawing on this idea of systems, padded out by recent work on innovation systems in 
international development policy arena, the use of ‘systems’ in this thesis invokes an awareness 
of the political economy in which food supply/provisioning occurs. Indeed a major part of this 
thesis makes the domestic political economy system visible – Claim 1.  
 
As I mentioned earlier, research on commodity studies eventually petered out as the focus 
increasingly turned to globalisation and the influence of global capital, retailers and 
agribusiness firms. Another reason that the scholarship was later superseded is that the 
commodity studies work was critiqued because of its inherent dependency rationale that 
dynamics and processes occurring in the ‘developed’ core would ultimately influence 
developments in the ‘periphery’ which all functioned to keep the system intact (Raikes and 
Gibbon, 2000). What was retained is the focus on commodity chains, which were initially seen 
to tie the core and the periphery together in a food system.2
                                                 
2 The implicit idea of dependency later became the point of contention for other scholars who were to continue 
with commodity studies (Raikes and Gibbon, 2000). 
 The turn to commodity chains in 
some ways signalled a shift away from the commodity systems work toward how globalisation 
fundamentally transformed trade and economic interaction. This shift had a direct effect on 
perceived sites of power that influenced and governed food systems. Also, since the focus in 
Economic Geography scholarship seemed likewise to shift away from looking at the domestic 
political economy to the power of retail firms and international capital, domestic institutions 
also fell out of sight.  
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The next section looks at the literature that is seen to supersede commodity systems analysis. 
The purpose of considering the rather lengthy body of work is to highlight the gaps in this work 
so as to open up the debate in order to investigate Claim 2 – or more pointedly to account for 
‘multiple sites of power’ falling out of site in recent Economic Geography scholarship, and the 







Existing agrifood approaches in Economic Geography/Sociology also provide a basis for 
thinking about some of the issues central to the thesis. What are the ‘normalising agrifood 
research approaches? What are the roots of these debates? And why are other ‘sites of power’ 
or domestic institutions overlooked in these approaches?  
 
Economic Geography approaches 
In the late 1990s and from 2000 onwards, globalisation was seen to fundamentally alter the way 
the world worked, particularly because it was associated with increasing industrialisation of 
production, including profound effects on food systems and commodity chains. It also altered 
the focus in academic studies.  
Friedland (2004:**) puts it this way:  
Another element was added to the research agenda with the advent of globalization 
studies as researchers understood that a new level of analysis was required to deal with 
the expansion of trade and the restructuring of commodity chains. Where, before, 
commodity production, distribution, marketing and consumption had been focused 
Claim 2: Multiple sites of power in the food system, particularly those institutions 
that would be ignored in more normalising agrifood research approaches, constitute 
an integral part of the food system because they govern it. 
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around national and regional activity, increasingly economic action began to be 
organized globally. Agrifood social scientists moved into globalization analyses with 
rapidity and a globalization literature began to build. 
 
In academic scholarship, the restructuring of the economy resulted in what Goodman and Watts 
(1994) refer to as the ‘new agrarian political economy’, which in turn resulted in a myriad of 
research foci including the industrialising reorganising of agrarian labour and global 
commodity chains. For Goodman and Watts, research on the late twentieth century ‘agro-food 
system’ is based on a ‘desire to place agriculture, and the rural sphere more generally, squarely 
within mainstream theoretical debates on capitalist development is both admirable and 
necessary’ (Goodman and Watts, 1994:5). For Marsden and other economic geographers in the 
1990s, the ‘new political economy’ approach to agrifood restructuring focused on 
understanding food production and consumption in relation to industrial restructuring and 
regulation (see Marsden et al., 1996). For Friedman, it was placing an inquiry of agrifood 
restructuring and change in a broader understanding of food ‘regimes’ or historical 
periodisation which linked a particular food regime with an political economy analysis of a 
particular point in Western history (see Friedman, 1993). Raikes and Gibbon (2000) distinguish 
between this school of thought – the ‘International Food Regime (IFR) theory – and the concern 
of Wallerstein and others who were concerned with ‘world systems theory’ (WST), but at the 
same time draw out the benefit of bring these to foci together. They argue, in sum, that the 
political economy of agrifood restructuring is best seen through a study of commodity chains, 
supporting the work of sociologists such as Gereffi (see below), in which new forms of power 
result from the economic restructuring. 
 
Here, as Raikes and Gibbon argue,  
WST/GCC theory has the merit of focussing on the issue of power in relation to the 
restructuring of international economic relations, and at the same time embodies a 
fundamental recognition that both the precise location of power, how it is exercised, and 
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the restructuring process more generally, tend to be mediated differently on a 
commodity-by-commodity basis (Raikes and Gibbon, 2000:55). 
 
The focus on distinct commodity chains ultimately paved the way for commodity or value chains 
analyses that are concerned with commodity (and agrifood) restructuring, the functional division 
of labour, and private forms of regulation. ‘Globalising perspectives’ within the broader 
discipline of Economic Geography, which amongst other things examined changes in agrifood 
global trade through global value chains, gained currency in the 1990s, and was based on how 
food regimes had changed over the previous few decades in Europe and North America (see Arce 
and Marsden, 1993; Friedman, 1993; Whatmore, 1994; Watts, 1996; Goodman, 2003; Daviron, 
2008). This large body of work examines how food systems have changed as a result of 
globalisation and economic restructuring within a context of global trade regimes3
 
 and 
liberalising food systems. Although international trade had been happening for over two 
centuries, the emerging research focused on a new era of global interactions in which transport 
and communications technologies have made trade more prolific than ever before (see Booth, 
1985; Peet, 1993a; Peet, 1993b; Dicken, 2003). According to the literature that reviews the trends 
of globalisation over the past two decades on commodities (Dicken 2003; Goodman and Watts, 
1997; Gereffi et al., 2005), there are three broad consequential trends or implications of the 
globalised trade systems. These are:  
(1) ‘Oligopolistic rent seeking’ and buyer drivenness: Increasing financialisation of 
international trade results in a fewer, more powerful players in the global economy. These 
powerful firms drive global trade and control all interaction along their value chains down 
to production. They have such power because they increasingly control or govern supply 
chains (firms downstream that manufacture/produce/market commodities).  
                                                 
3 The international/global trade (or food) regime is defined by Daviron (2008:47) as the ‘set of … policy objectives 
and instruments that have been adopted by a large majority of governments in a specific period of 




(2) Governance and entry control: Powerful actors in the global economy progressively 
standardise trade regulations and control membership into ‘the market’ (their global value 
chains). These regulations directly influence global trade policy and become, as it were, 
the rules of the game. The ‘rules’ are enforced and upheld by particular institutions (such 
as the World Trade Organisation or independent quality regulators), or firms given the 
increasing power of buyers. The way governance has changed has implications for entry 
barriers and has often resulted in exclusionary measures for producers.  
 
(3) Supplier adjustment: There is ever more stringent private regulation over participating in 
globalised commodity chains. These controls have implications for developing countries 
and producers in those countries. Producers have to comply with these 
regulations/standards if they want to supply global markets. The (in)ability of countries 
and its producers to meet global standards has led to trade exclusion and continues to lead 
to increasing inequalities in global trade. 
 
Capitalist restructuring in this phase of globalisation means that for some theorists power resides 
in the hands of international private interests, essentially mirroring the structural adjustment 
strategies of the 1980s where control of resources and trade is taken out of the control of states. 
This resulted in structural changes; new private, buyer driven chains have restructured how 
production, processing and exporting happens. Larger, more established producers and exporters 
have the capacity to integrate into global markets and smaller producers, in a global regime of 
transaction, typically do not have the capital or volumes to enter in to such contracts. This had 
massive repercussions on global commodity prices – which are now set by the global market – 
and the ability for producers to cope with these changes ). The three trends noted above also 
meant that transnational corporations merge, consolidate and ultimately come to control or ‘re-
regulate’ trade (see Dicken, 2003; Farina, 2002). Those trends, then, represent the normative 
account of agrifood restructuring and indeed also economic development, since it not only has 
become ‘the norm’ but it represents the vision of supermarkets or high value agribusiness firms 
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as the vector or trajectory for developing a ‘modern urban food system’ as the thesis goes on to 
show.  
 
Larger buyers take over smaller buyers, and exporter and processor functions. The entire 
commodity chain, which once would have many possible linkages, is now compressed or 
consolidated. Consolidation has happened so rapidly and so efficiently that in ten years, for 
instance by the early 2000s, four major agrifood industries collectively owned around 70 percent 
of global trade; five trading companies control around 40 percent of all fruit traded globally; and 
three international trading companies own more than 70 percent of global cocoa trade (Gibbon 
and Ponte, 2005:100, 105). Buyer-drivenness, or the tendency for buyers to drive the supply 
chain as a trend, is perhaps the most pervasive change in the way production, marketing and trade 
happens, affecting producers far down the supply chain (Gereffi, 1996). In light of this, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that ‘other sites of power’ or other domestic institutions fall out of sight of 
the analysis. That is, agribusiness firms and supermarkets become the epitome of the food 
system, and transitions in how these institutions govern, regulate or control supply chains or 
production become the focus of attention. As a result domestic institutions and domestic political 
economies more broadly have fallen out of sight in this literature.  
 
In the literature, the focus on global ‘commodity’ chains later gave way to a focus of global 
‘value’ chains. Where the commodity chains analysis drew out the linkages between producers 
and retailers and highlighted the power of retail capital along the chain, and its profound effect 
on commodity producers, the value chains analysis focused on the ‘geographical and 
organizational reconfiguration of global production’ (Gibbon et al., 2008:318) and codified 
knowledge along value chains. The two approaches themselves differ in terms of the depth of 
analysis, particularly of (1) quality standardization of global chains; (2) the forms of power and 
governance in the chain; and (3) the possibility for producers and other suppliers to upgrade 
functions to add value (see review in Gibbon and Ponte, 2005) – all of which are subjects 
rigorously undertaken in the GVC analysis. (Bair (2008; 2009) provides an excellent review, 
comparison and critique of both these bodies of work, drawing out their subtleties).  
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Despite the field of global value chain analysis having becoming a more nuanced field in recent 
years4
 
, which does focus on domestic forms of regulation of quality, the literature on 
supermarkets and the domestic economy is based on earlier conceptions of global commodity 
chains – the spread of retail capital, its increasing power, and new forms of private regulation or 
buyer-drivenness– thereby translating this work to the domestic context. And it is this work that 
has come to inform analyses of food economies in Africa.  
The rationale of translating this work on global value chains to domestic (or regional) 
supermarket/retail expansion may be explained by Pritchard and Burch’s argument that  
Global agri-food restructuring needs to be understood as an intricate set of processes 
operating at many scales, and on many levels, rather than a unilateral shift toward a 
single global marketplace (Pritchard and Burch 2003: xi) 
Thus, while the GVC literature continues to be a vibrant field in global studies, the ‘domestic 
turn’, which looks at similar processes of economic restructuring and the consolidation of 
agribusiness firms and supermarket retail at the domestic level, evokes earlier theorizations of 
agrifood restructuring, as I detail in Chapter 3, and has failed to refocus on the domestic 
political economy or domestic forms of governance.  
 
In other words, although much of the work on agrifood economies seems to perpetuate a 
preoccupation with the global marketplace, another body of work has emerged over the past 
decade that is concerned with agrifood restructuring and what this means for domestic food 
economies. The focus has predominantly been on supermarkets and the spread of retail capital 
in the global south, which is also covered in Chapter 3. In sum, the agrifood literature suggests 
                                                 
4 The GVC approach lends a better understanding of the ‘interactions between public forms of governance 
(international and domestic regulation), private forms of governance (global business strategies, internal dynamics of 
coordination in value chains), and what falls in between (standard setting networks, label and certification initiatives, 
public-private partnerships) [because]… it is aimed at going beyond state-centric approaches to economic 
development (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005:xi).  
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that as economies progress, on indeed just during the period of economic restructuring, 
agribusiness firms – especially retailers – increasingly begin to regulate, control or govern 
economic trade through value chains which link up producers into contractual relationships 
with retail or agribusiness firms. These firms, in this view, are increasingly powerful because of 
complex control or governance structures that they enforce along the chain, and it is therefore 
conceivable that in the literature retailers or agribusiness firms are seen to transform domestic 
economies or become the markers or symbols of economic development in the south.  
 
The GVC literature also has been critiqued for a similar omission. The GVC analysis has been 
critiqued in work on global production networks (GPN), which is formulated specifically vis-à-
vis the GVC analysis to correct its shortcomings (Gibbon et al., 2008:316). Amongst other 
things, GPN theorists critique the GVC approach for the apparent disregard of domestic 
institutions and the overemphasis on the role of lead firms (its ‘top-heaviness’) (Palpacuer, 
2008; Bair, 2008). Although the GPN work concentrates mainly on electronics commodities in 
Asia, it argues that firms are compelled to ‘territorialise’ or adapt to local needs and inputs, and 
it suggests that the value chains approach assumes ‘an image of a faceless juggernaut of 
globalisation under the control of transnational corporations’ (Dicken et al., 2001:106). 
 
Instead, the GPN framework is frequently offered as ‘an antidote to the deficiencies 
of…prevailing… approaches’ where it considers: 
[t]he broad range of nonfirm organization – for example…government agencies, trade 
unions, employers’ associations, nongovernmental organizations … – that will (or may) 
shape the activities of firms in the particular locations absorbed into GPN (Coe and Lee, 
2007:64, 66).  
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The work of Yeung, Hess, Coe, Lee and Dicken from ‘the Manchester school’, as Bair5
 
 (2009) 
terms it, is concerned with how the spread of international capital relies on being embedded in 
local territories, and on the institutional dynamics in those territories.  
Unlike work that privileges lead firms or retailers, GPN scholars argue that markets are 
embedded in a social context, and other local projects of economic transition (Bair, 2008:339). 
Drawing their rationale of institutional governance from scholarship on new institutional 
economics in Economic Sociology (Coe and Hess, 2004; Bair, 2008; Bair, 2009), they argue 
that other, non-firm institutions profoundly influence the way lead firms/retailers embed in the 
domestic economy, and that lead firms/retailers in turn modify their economic operations in 
relation to factors or cues from the domestic setting. Global production networks do not merely 
locate in particular places; they may become embedded there in the sense that they interact with 
and, in some cases, become constrained by the economic activities and social dynamics that 
already exist in those places.  
 
They show through various case studies, mainly in Asia, how even though the same lead-firm 
rationalisations (about regulating quality) are present, there are also domestic rationalisations 
that regulate demand. For instance, they cite firms like Samsung-Tesco, in a multinational retail 
expansion project, have realigned their marketing and production strategies to the socio-cultural 
demand of buyers in Asia outside South Korea. This is more than just a case of advertising. 
Instead, the GPN approach argues that economic growth happens through relational network 
interaction, and that international firms are increasingly influenced by the domestic economic 
practises.6
                                                 
5 Bair’s (2008) and (2009) work reviews various economic globalisation discourses.  
 The GPN rationale that I draw on, in critiquing the assumption that agribusiness 
firms/capital investment or retailers fundamentally transform domestic food economies in Sub-
Saharan Africa, is as follows:  
6 Technological demands in Asia, for example, shape the marketing strategy and product specifications in a way 
that is unique to that context. In this sense the strategy may be similar to adaptive marketing strategies, with the 
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Ultimately…when undertaking research on production networks, it is necessary to steer a 
delicate path between overemphasizing the transformative effects of transnational 
corporations in economies where they invest and overstressing the extent that national 
conditions shape their operations in particular countries. Instead the aim should be to 
explore the…mutual transformation of both the firms and places in which they are 
embedded (Coe and Lee, 2007:66 citing Dicken, 2000).  
 
As Coe and Lee’s quote above cautions, while understanding that foreign investment and 
international retailing chains transform certain countries, it is necessary to balance this 
understanding with how other sites of power (or other institutions) and priorities from that 
domestic setting, in turn, influences agribusiness firms and retailers. This is particularly 
important given that firms do not govern a passive, formless economic space. Instead, there are 
non-firm institutions that have agency and capacity to effect change in domestic economies. 
The mutual transformation of both the firms and places in which they are embedded has 
implications, for instance, for how the spread of supermarkets and agribusiness are understood 
in Africa. 
 
Furthermore, as I detail in a subsequent chapter, the preoccupation with globalising transitions 
in economies has also resulted in urban food studies either subsumed in these debates or 
relegated to Development Studies (Abrahams, 2007). Academic scholarship on urban food 
studies in Africa dates back well before the 1960s. In recent years, one of the main rationales of 
this work, is to correct the preoccupations in the literature with those readings of the economy 
that was highlighted above. Porter et al (2007:116-118) argue that tracking the growth of urban 
food economies in Africa relies on a close reading of produce-market institutions, suggesting a 
different framework for thinking about African economies:  
The neglect of research into produce-market institutions is symptomatic of the emphasis 
                                                                                                                                                           
key difference being that GPN relies on a territorialized set of networks of processors and technical support (see 
Dicken et al., 2001). 
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on overly economistic views of development, such as prioritizing liberalization. Such 
approaches have been underpinned by assumptions that economic institutions will 
automatically appear and market economies will be structured along the lines of 
European or North American capitalism (Porter et al., 2007:116). 
 
Relegating work on urban food markets to development studies or to policy arena has not 
always been the case, and this another focus in the literature of the 1980s and 1990s that this 
thesis aims to contribute to. Urban supply systems in Africa from the early to mid-1980s were 
not only deemed to be instrumental in urban or African studies more broadly, but also came to 
stand for the confluence of a set of processes in African cities (Potts, 2006; Bryceson, 2006a). 
The focus in the 80s and 90s was on state marketing boards, the impact of neoliberal economic 
reforms, urban trading, but more recently, on intermediary traders. In the 1980s, urban food 
supply systems were therefore seen to emerge from ‘a confrontation of administrative, 
economic and cultural rubrics’ (Guyer, 1987:20) and embody the changing political and social 
priorities/concerns of the post-colonial state, which included supporting ‘peasant markets’, 
counteracting the negative effects of global market-determined oil and commodities prices, 
economic growth and overcoming urban poverty (Guyer 1987:22).7
                                                 
7 The convergence of issues in urban food systems – political, economic, and social – as seen in this body of work, 
which I review in Chapter 3 – is an important reflection in this thesis. 
 But while Bryceson’s work 
in the 1990s (1993) retained the important focus of economic interaction of intermediary traders 
in East Africa within a broader political economy framework, as does Harriss-White in the case 
of India, recent work on urban markets tends to focus on the minutiae of trader relationships 
and networks of ethnicity or on markets for development. As a result, much of this recent work 
is much less focus on the political economy of the urban food system, than on ethnographic 
accounts of traders and their social networks (see Porter et al., 2005; Molony, 2009), on 
urbanisation, markets and the challenges that traders face which could be alleviated through 
policy intervention (see Porter et al., 2004; Porter 2006), or on urban agriculture (see 
Abrahams, 2007). While these the concerns mentioned above are important contributions to the 
field of African Studies and to scholarship on urban markets, focusing on the ‘informality’ of 
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these markets, the lack of governance, the minutiae of trader relationships or ethnic networks 
and how these markets represent survivalist form of livelihood rather than a legitimate and 
integral part of the domestic political economy, ignores the possibility of reading changes in 
urban markets as fundamental to urban food economies in Africa.  
 
To recap: The work on economic restructuring and supermarkets offers an insightful account of 
how African economies have been restructured since other bodies of work have transplanted the 
broad principles of the approach onto a domestic reading of agrifood systems and the GVC 
approach is used to explain the transitions at a domestic level. Indeed this work shows that some 
of the processes of economic restructuring are still happening and the domestic realm represents a 
fascinating space where governance is being strongly regulated. However, if critiques of earlier 
value chains work is also taken note of, the second claim of the thesis – that there are multiple 
sites of power or institutions other that agribusiness firms and supermarkets that press for 
attention – presents an intriguing set of possibilities which the rest of the thesis takes forward.  
 
Thus, where the literature on agrifood systems for the most part dualistically focuses either on the 
supermarket or agribusiness ‘revolution’  or on the minutiae of intermediary traders’ 
relationships, the thesis points to more hybrid forms of economic interaction that are neither 
formal or informal, and often incorporate both agribusiness firms and intermediary traders. These 
are important transitions in the agrifood sector which, I argue, are best understood by considering 
how these transitions emerge from the political economy system and therefore fit into a wider 
narrative of domestic and regional political economy changes. Looking at these broader political 
economy shifts allows me to draw out various rationalisations that seem to coexist in the 
domestic food economy, and provides some clues about what makes up the domestic food 
system. 
 
In sum, taking this body of work into account, together with research on African food systems 
mentioned earlier, allows me to point to multiple sites of power (Hart, 2002:13) in Zambia's food 
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system, and to examine factors in the domestic context that influence international firms. In 
Chapter 5, I look at two institutions (the Zambian National Farmers’ Union and the Lusaka City 
Market) that are integral to Zambia's food system, which would be overlooked in both the 
conventional food economies and urban food studies research. 
 
The basis of third claim comes from the critiques of the previous two claims. In the thesis, once I 
have drawn attention both to how the domestic political economy has influenced the food system, 
and to the role of two key institutions in Zambia's food system, I consider this final claim by 
pointing to evidence of intersecting forms of governance and of how the power of supermarkets 






A final body of work that provides the rationale for this final claim is the ‘turn to the local’ 
literature which argues against the dominant perception that supermarkets or large economies of 
scale, and agribusiness through global economic restructuring, are really what transform local 
economies. The localist literature, often critiqued for its defence, fetishisation or romanticism of 
the local as a way to assert an underlying race or class politics on food provisioning systems, 
subscribes to the idea that local imperatives drive the form of local markets, and are thus outside 
the remit of big business. Granted, the use of this work is ironic given that scholarship on ‘local 
food networks’, which looks at the shift/return to local consumption in the UK and North 
America is strongly associated with an arguably elitist northern pursuit (see Abrahams, 2007b). 
In local food networks in the north, buying food from local producers through farmers’ markets 
or community cooperatives, thereby literally circumventing the control and supply of food by 
supermarkets and large enterprise, represents ‘democratic/reflexive/socially just’ food networks 
(DuPuis and Goodman, 2005).  
Claim 3: Given that there are multiple sites of power, the various firms and 
institutions in Zambia’s food system clearly do not govern in isolation, but 
instead, intersecting forms of governance circumscribe and often profoundly 
influence agribusiness institutions.  
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Clearly, the form of ‘advanced capitalism’ embodied in local food markets in the north is 
different to the underlying form of local food markets in the south.8
-Democratic, in making food accessible to the urban poor;  
 What is interesting, in 
thinking about African food systems, though, is that informal markets in African cities can be 
seen to fulfil similar priorities: 
- Reflexive, in ‘reflecting’ the imperatives in African countries to link farmers to markets and 
provide employment; and  
- Socially just, in providing food, benefiting livelihoods and becoming a palliative of sorts to 
remedy the inability of the state or firms to meet such needs.  
 
What is ‘alternative’ or seen as shift to the local can therefore be seen as those food provisioning 
systems that are outside the control of powerful firms, thus critiquing the idea that the spread of 
retail capital is ultimately what transforms or will transform food systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Abrahams, 2007). Instead, local provisioning networks that are ‘governed’ or influenced by 
domestic imperatives are fundamental to the food system. Incorporating the idea that firms do not 
only transform a place, but the place mutually transforms the firm and the importance of domestic 
forms of provisioning outside the remit of supermarkets, allows me to think about the domestic 
food system as productive, economically transformative, and based essentially on consumption.
                                                 
8 See also Wilson and Rigg’s (2003) debate about whether the ‘post-producitivist transition’ has happened in the 
south. 
Restating the Aims of the Thesis  
The first aim of this thesis is to more closely consider factors in the domestic political economy 
that have influenced and continue to influence urban food systems in Africa, which I do using 
Zambia as a case study. The scale of my analysis is the ‘domestic food system’, and does not 
focus on the international or global factors, but acknowledges that this is an important area of 
inquiry in recent study. I argue that we are best able to examine the economic pathways and 
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ongoing, interconnected processes of change in food systems through an examination of the 
domestic political economy. I consider in particular how factors and influences in the domestic 
political economy profoundly shape the urban food system in Zambia, thereby enabling certain 
economic growth pathways.  
 
The second aim of my thesis is to point to important non-firm institutions that are fundamental to 
Zambia’s food system. I draw on Economic Sociology and the work of Africanist scholars to 
argue that there are multiple sites of power in the food system that profoundly influence it.9
  
 
While the state is of course an important actor, I do not focus on new empirical material on the 
state since this is done in greater depth by other scholars (Jayne and Chisvo, 1991; Howard and 
Mungoma, 1996; Jayne and Jones, 1997; Jayne et al., 1999 Jayne, et al., 2006; Jayne, 2008; 
Dorosh et al., 2009). The focus therefore is on non-state and non-firm institutions. I draw 
particular attention to those institutions – namely the Zambian National Farmers’ Union, seen as 
an intermediary institution, and the Lusaka City Market, part of the informal economy – that are 
ignored in recent  agrifood research approaches.  
The third aim of the thesis is to take forward the concept of governance, and naturally, this 
requires some discussion about what governance is, and how it is articulated and operationalised 
in the thesis. Governance is seen as the most important consideration when thinking about food 
economies in Africa (Fold and Larsen, 2008:26-36). The next section details my use of the term 
governance in this thesis.  
 
                                                 
9 I do not grapple with theories of power or discourse in this thesis, as examined by Foucault (1978, 1991, 1994), 
Lemke (2001), Granovetter (1992) and Hart (2002), for instance, but these works have shaped my thinking of 
power in the food system. 
The governance of urban food systems as used in this thesis 
In this thesis ‘governance’, generally meaning the manner of governing, after Pierre (2000:5) and 
Williamson (1996:12), relates to how certain institutions (the mechanism of governance) mediate 
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or regulate social or economic interaction by virtue of their authority or ascribed authority, and 
steer an economic or political trajectory and brokering certain goals. Indeed there are other 
definitions or implicit notions about what governance means in the literature.  
 
In political science the term is most often associated with forms of governing outside the remit of 
the state (see Swyngedouw, 2005). In organizational studies, the term is most often associated 
with institutional power, from which the above definition derives in Economic Geography (see 
Amin, 2004). In development studies, governance is associated either with anti-corruption and 
accountable government – termed ‘good governance’ – or the activities whereby international aid 
or humanitarian organizations oversee the sourcing/distribution of water/food/vaccines or 
administration of donor funds (see Clapp and Cohen, 2009; World Bank, 2001). Stoker, in an 
article focused on public administration for UNESCO, neatly sums up the eclecticism often 
associated with the concept of governance:  
The academic literature on governance is eclectic and relatively disjointed (Jessop, 
1995). Its theoretical roots are various: institutional studies, development studies, 
political science, public administration … Its precursors would include work on 
corporatism, policy communities and a range of economic analysis (sic) concerned with 
the evolution of economic systems (Stoker, 1998:18).  
 
Despite the varied use of the term, Stoker continues to outline the benefit of the ‘governance 
perspective’ to a wide field of policy and academic research:  
The contribution of the governance perspective to theory is not at the level of causal 
analysis. Nor does it offer a new normative theory. Its value is as an organizing 
framework. The value of the governance perspective rests in its capacity to provide a 
framework for understanding different processes of governing (Stoker, 1998:18).  
It is precisely these ‘different processes of governing’ that I am interested in.  
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In agrifood studies, similarly, both the eclecticism and value of the ‘governance perspective’ is 
evident, which I briefly go on to sketch out.  
(1) The developmental focus on governance in food studies has centered on the role of the 
international development community in managing and regulating food and humanitarian 
assistance through donor funds (see Clapp and Cohen, 2009). Here the primary concern is the 
changing mechanisms of managing food assistance to alleviate or mitigate food insecurity. 
Governance in this sense is about the role of these institutions to disburse, monitor, and 
evaluate assistance so as to provide adequate assistance but also necessary accountability to 
donors, and the growing tendency for food security to be managed in this way as opposed to 
states (Bardhan, 2002; Kamat, 2004). 
 
(2) The most theoretically drawn out definition of governance in economic geography and 
agrifood studies is the ‘governance of value chains’. Here governance specifically means the 
division of labour along a value or commodity chain and the allocation of rewards and benefits 
associated with aligning functions to certain quality specifications (see Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005 (But governance was not always read this way in commodity 
studies as point 3 shows)). In GVC analysis as it has progressed further, the focus of 
governance has shifted from just the control or restructuring of commodity chains (or 
governance as buyer drivenness) by large multinational buyers/firms/retailers to ‘governance as 
coordination’ and later ‘governance as [discursive] normalisation’ (see Ponte, 2009). 
Governance in these terms is about the quality management and regulation of high value chains 
where different functions are regulated at different stages of productions/manufacture/retail 
(coordination) and where governance mechanisms are informed by discourses of quality and 
regulation (normalization).  
 
(3) Earlier related work by Gereffi and Sturgeon (Gereffi 1996; Gereffi et al., 2005), as alluded 
to earlier, conceptualized governance as the control that buyers or retailers have downward on 
suppliers and processors, or the power that these buyers exert along the chain down to 
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producers. The form of governance is termed ‘buyer-driveness’. Although this definition has 
been superseded by the view of governance in commodity studies, mentioned above, it is the 
basis of recent scholarship on supermarkets in the developing south. There is a considerable 
resurgence in the idea of buyer-drivenness in recent literature and particularly the literature that 
looks at the spread of retail capital in Sub-Saharan Africa. As earlier noted, since the spread of 
agribusinesses and supermarkets through high value chains is quick becoming a hallmark of 
emerging economies in the south, commodity systems are seen to be increasingly regulated by 
private firms, and transformed through retail capital and the restructuring of supply chains. 
Governance here is now only about how retailers and firms now govern supply chains and 
transform economic interaction, but it is also crucially is based on the removal of the state from 
food marketing systems and the rise in private regulation around agrifood production and retail. 
One of the most overt examples of this is a recent project entitled ‘Regoverning Markets’ which 
specifically focuses on the restructuring of agrifood chains based on the increased consolidation 
of agribusiness firms and the increased purchasing power of retailers – a feature of the early 
value chains literature in the early 2000s. Other examples from the academic literature of the 
new ‘governance’ of agrifood systems include the greater supply firm acquisitions of larger 
agribusinesses and a ‘new wave’ of economic interaction in Sub-Saharan Africa lead, driven 
and controlled essentially by agribusiness firms and supermarkets (see McCullough et al., 2008; 
Neven and Reardon, 2009; Louw and Emongor, 2004). Furthermore, supermarkets and 
agribusiness firms are seen to the represent the panacea for agricultural development because 
they offer the opportunity for small-scale farmers to tap into more lucrative end markets. 
Governance, in this sense, therefore not only implies the power of supermarkets and 
agribusiness firms to control or regulate economic interaction, but it also has a ‘normalising’ 
element which posits these firms as the custodian of agricultural and economic development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Despite these very varied conceptions of governance, in this thesis I use governance to mean 
the modes of regulating, controlling, overseeing and otherwise influencing economic 
interaction in Zambia's food system. My central rationale the fact that firms and supermarkets 
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are not the only players in African food economies. Instead they are a few of many other 
players or institutions, which each have an important role in the food system, and each have 
driving motivations or rationalizations that compel them to ‘act’ in certain ways, and specific 
‘behaviour’ has implications for other actors and institutions in the food system. For instance I 
show later how the perceived power of supermarkets and agribusiness firms are significantly 
circumscribed because of the continuing importance of urban food markets which are 
increasingly being governed.  
 
In addition, governance in this thesis is about effecting change so that it has a direct impact on 
the food system. As I show later, it is not only regulation or the lack of it that demonstrates 
governance, it is also about certain players/institutions lobbying other players to act in certain 
ways, or about certain players/institutions influencing other players, institutions or firms to 
conduct business and interaction in ways that meet the priorities/rationalisations of the former. 
For instance I draw attention to an agribusiness association that plays an important role in 
influencing agribusiness firms to train small-scale farmers to manage production etc., 
differently even though these farmers’ produce does not eventually end up as high value 
marketed commodities. 
Drawing on a more wide-ranging perspective of governance in the food system, as seen in the 
case of Zambia, the third aim of this thesis is therefore to take forward the concept of governance. 
With evidence from Zambia's food system, I argue that governance is best understood as 
‘mutually constituted’ because the agribusiness firms, the state, and other institutions do not 
govern in a vacuum, but in a context where there are multiples sites of power, several domestic 
priorities and intersecting governances. An understanding of ‘governance as mutually 
constituted’ and rooted in the domestic political economy, allows me to make sense of 
‘unexpected’ forms of institutional governance in the food system. For instance, a case study in 
Chapter 6 shows that agribusiness firms that are primarily concerned with profitability are also 
interested in the economic development of the country they invest in – an ‘unorthodox’ priority 
perhaps. But it is a contextually grounded strategy that benefits firms because a growing 
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economy increases local income and drives consumption. These unexpected forms of governance 
challenge more static conceptions of governance in the literature. 
  
Methodological Approach  
While the disciplinary focus of the thesis is Economic Geography, there is no single approach to 
the study of food systems in Africa. Neither of the approaches briefly outlined above lend 
themselves to the complexity inherent in contemporary African agrifood economies. The revised 
conceptual framework drawn out in the thesis and its methodological approach, which I introduce 
above and detail in the next chapter, allows me to ‘make sense’ of the eclectic food system in 
Zambia with its apparent juxtapositions. In brief, the methodological approach taken in this 
thesis: 
(1) Relies on an interdisciplinary conceptual framework; and 
(2) Demonstrates an awareness of the domestic political economy ‘system’ that influences and 
shapes the food system.  
 
The findings of the thesis are based on empirical fieldwork conducted in Lusaka, Zambia and 
Cape Town, South Africa between January and November 2007. The overall method of 
presenting data is a case study approach where the focus is the agrifood system as whole, with 
some focus on the poultry industry in Zambia. During 2007, I conducted a series of in-depth 
interviews with members of the agricultural community in Zambia which spanned informal 
market managers, marketeers, small-scale farmers, emerging and commercial farmers, heads of 
agribusiness firms and supermarkets, members of the Zambian National Farmers’ Union and the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade. The research design, list and justification of sources, and 
methodology are detailed in Chapter 2. The thesis only presents a fraction of the data collected, 
uses ‘Content Analysis’ to analyse the information, and draws heavily on the conceptual 
framework to provide a rationale for the approach. Content Analysis, as outlined by Krippendorf 
(2004) is sometimes used as computed assisted data analysis software to code massive amounts 
of qualitative data. Although it is not used in this thesis in this manner, the conceptual basis of 
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Content Analysis (CA) is extremely instructive in this thesis since it is ‘an empirically grounded 
method, exploratory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent’ (Krippendorf, 2004:xvii). 
Content analysts examine data, printed material, images and sounds naming these ‘texts’ in order 
to understand both what they mean in the world to people; and what the information conveyed by 
these texts does to what we know. The purpose of the methodological approach is to enable 
researchers to plan and to critically examine the logic, composition and protocols in research 
methods, and most importantly it is used to estimate the likelihood of practical research designs 
to contribute to knowledge by (1) defining the terms of the analysis; (2) justifying the analytical 
steps; (3) demonstrating procedural logic; and (4) justifying inferences by a close understanding 
of the background context (ibid).   
 
In other words, I base my research and evaluation on the implicit rationales of CA so that the 
choice of texts, the presentation of data, and the inferences that I draw from these texts/interviews 
all contribute to a robust and responsible representation of the field of study. In the Methods 
Chapter (Chapter 2), I expand on some of the points mentioned above. Here, I wish to reiterate 
that CA as a methodological rationale approach places a great deal of emphasis on remaining true 
to the context and basing inferences within a good understanding of the context, aware that texts 
also construct the object of study. In sum, given the complexity of urban food systems in Africa 
as exemplified in the Zambian case, the work presented in the thesis is an original contribution to 
food studies research, and therefore plays a part in rethinking responses to development of 
domestic food systems. 
Clarifying the terminology used in this thesis  
I am aware that certain terms that I use in this thesis may relate to different conceptual 
approaches, theories or disciplines, and indeed are more complex than I will describe here. Given 
these caveats, this section gives a brief clarification of a few of the key terms I use in the thesis, 




A systems approach, as alluded to earlier, is used to convey an awareness of certain 
determining factors that shape certain outcomes. In this thesis it is used to mean the larger 
domestic political economy and set of influencing factors that shape the food system. It is also 
used to show an awareness of the sum of the transactions, circulating knowledge(s) and 
interrelationships in the system that, with the range of actors, institutions, networks and 
relationships of power, subsequently shape that system (after Hall, 2002; Spielman, 2006).  
 
(Domestic) Political economy 
The term is not used as a theory here, but as a descriptor of the context which comprises of 
political and economic elements, for example I use the phrase ‘Zambia’s political economy’ in 
much the same way as scholars may use the term ‘Global political economy’  
 
Agrifood  
The amalgam term is taken to mean both agriculture (as in production) and food (as in the 
consumable product). In Economic Geography, the term agrifood suggests that these two aspects 
are indivisible, and are intricately rely on the other. When I use the terms ‘agrifood economies’ or 
‘economies’, it usually points to how the literature has termed the country or context. So for 
example, I have inserted agrifood ‘systems’ to distinguish the approach in this thesis from other 
work that uses the term ‘agrifood/African economies’. 
 
Institutions  
After North (1991:97), ‘institutions’ are defined as ‘humanly devised constraints that structure 
political economy and social interaction’. 
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Africanist scholars/scholarship  
I take this phrase to mean those scholars who focus specifically on African cases and the 
academic scholarship that result from the analyses of these cases.  
Thesis Outline 
The five core chapters that follow are briefly outlined here are followed by the conclusion. 
Between each of the chapters I have inserted a ‘Road Map’ interleaf to sum up what the previous 
chapter does and points to what the next chapter will focus on.  
 
Chapter 2 details the research design, methodological considerations and methodologies used in 
this thesis. I justify the use of the case study, and explain the rationale for the conceptual and 
methodological approaches taken in the thesis.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the conceptual framework in this thesis. In Chapter 3, I review the literature 
on agrifood studies as it relates to cases in Africa. In doing so, as I mentioned in this chapter, the 
conceptual basis for this study is a broader body of work that I reviewed in this Introduction. In 
Chapter 3 I go on to discuss specific bodies of work that focus on African food economies, or 
African food markets. The aim of the literature review is to draw on different bodies of work to 
formulate a working conceptual framework for this thesis. Although the focus is broad, it is 
weighted toward the Economic Geography (supermarkets) scholarship, since the findings of this 
thesis contribute to this body of work. 
  
Chapter 4 answers the first research question: What are the domestic political economy 
influences of the urban food systems in Lusaka Zambia?  In Chapter 4, I provide a detailed 
explanation of those factors in Zambia's food system that are influenced by broader political 
economy transitions at a domestic level. I argue that the complexity in food systems can only be 
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addressed through a nuanced understanding of how the domestic political economy influences the 
growth, resilience and role of the food system. Understanding key influencing factors allows 
make sense of the apparent juxtapositions the food system. I look at the early nationalizing period 
in post-independent Zambia, then move on to how Zambia was seen as a testing ground first for 
agricultural research innovation in the 1970s, for liberalization in the 1980s and for the expansion 
of South African business in the 1990s. I also show how the informal economy is a prominent 
feature of the economy. I conclude by pointing to rationalizations that appear to be shared by 
different actors, and that circulate in the food system.  
 
Chapter 5 answers the second research question: In addition to agribusiness firms, which other 
institutions are central to the urban food system, and what are their roles? In Chapter 5, I 
consider two ‘home-grown institutions’ that demonstrate that there indeed are other institutions 
that are central to Zambia's food system. The Zambian National Farmers’ Union is shown to be 
an important intermediary institution that takes on the crucial task of developing the capacity of 
small-scale farmers and integrating the food system. The informal market is an essential part of 
the urban food systems in many African countries. The second half of the chapter draws attention 
to the institutional changes in these markets and to their crucial role in linking farmers to markets. 
Chapter 6 answers the third research question: Does the domestic political economy and non-
firm institutions influence firms? And if so, how? In Chapter 6, I take four agribusiness firms 
as case studies to consider whether other key institutions/players in the urban food system 
influence firms, or whether the power of firms are influenced by the priorities of 
players/institutions in the domestic political economy. I argue that by virtue of their 
embeddedness in the Zambian context, firms are profoundly influenced both by institutions such 
as the Zambian National Farmers’ Union and the urban market, and by other motivations that are 
central to African political economies such as nurturing the economy, and facilitating 
development of the agricultural sector. I point to a localizing trend – focusing on strengthening 
and nurturing the local economy – which these firms also surprisingly support. I conclude by 
arguing that there are intersecting governances at work in the food system.  
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In sum, each of these chapters addresses the key arguments in this thesis. Where research on 
supermarkets has tended to dominate recent academic debates, I critique this work by looking at 
other bodies of work and evidence from the field that challenge the assumptions in this work. 
Where the literature is weak in pointing to factors in the domestic and regional political economy 
that influence food systems in Africa, I fill this gap by providing a detailed examination of the 
domestic political economy as it pertains to the food system. Where the literature overemphasizes 
the dominance of firms in African food economies, I point to two domestic institutions that are 
considerably more powerful in the local food economy. And finally, where the literature argues 
that firms transform African economies, I counter this argument by arguing that factors in the 
context constrain the power of firms. I conclude the thesis by reconsidering the question of 
governance in domestic food systems. The definition of governance that I take forward in the 
thesis is what has been termed ‘institutionalist’ where governance is the particular role that 
certain institutions play in influencing potential economic pathways, in shaping the outcome of 
certain economic interrelationships, or in employing particular rationalisations in order to further 
or advance particular priorities. Taken together, African food systems are seen to include hybrid 
sets of interactions and rely on domestic priorities and motivations. The urban food system 
therefore can be seen as meeting local needs, adapting to domestic priorities and comprised of 
multiples sites of power and intersecting governances. Finally, I consider the implications of 
these findings and take forward a conception of intersecting governance as ‘mutually 
constituted’. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: RESEARCH 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The initial plan of this thesis was to look at supermarkets and agribusiness firms in Zambia and 
show that because they are seen to be the market of economic progress, development and 
modernity, supermarkets and agribusiness firms in Africa do not only represent a shift for Africa, 
away from its ‘developing status’, but signal that African countries are in fact ‘emerging market 
economies’, as define by Agtmael (2008) which are no longer characterised by ad hoc, traditional 
modes of economic interactions, but instead are transformed by retail capital. The framework 
would have relied quite heavily on postcolonialist approaches and focused on meanings, 
signifiers and representations. Indeed, during the pilot phase of my research, I looked for ways 
that pointed to a modernising trajectory in Zambia.  
 
I soon abandoned the postcolonialist reading of the context because while it remains important to 
challenge the ways African countries are imagined and constructed (see Ferguson, 1996), I also 
wanted to make a clear contribution to the discipline of Economic Geography. I believed at the 
time that examining the food system in Zambia through a postcolonialist lens placed my research 
in a certain ‘dissident’ category that has a less obvious impact on existing work. I also saw my 
research and the PhD project as defining my work for the near future, at least. The choice to 
firmly ground my work in Economic Geography meant that I still kept open the option of making 
other contributions to Critical Geography and postcolonialist scholarship later, which I may not 
have had, had I done it the other way around. The next section restates the research questions, 
sets out the research design, details the methods used to answer those questions and points to 




Research Questions  
 
Research question 1: What are the domestic political economy influences of the urban food 
system in Lusaka, Zambia?  
Research question 2: In addition to agribusiness firms, which other institutions are central to the 
urban food system, and what are their roles? 
Research question 3: Does the domestic political economy, and non-firm institutions influence 
firms? And if so, how?
Research Design  
As mentioned in the Introduction, Content Analysis (CA) forms the ‘rationale-basis’ of my study. 
The focus of this methodological approach is to evaluate the ‘content’ of texts – images, sounds, 
interviews, printed material etc., – and present empirically grounded material in such a way that it 
is responsible to that context, and draws inferences that are validated either by other material or 
justified because of a robust understanding of the context. ‘Context’ here, although often a vague 
term, means place in the geographical sense which invokes an awareness of the societal, political 
economy, economic and/or developmental aspects that make up a place, amongst other factors.  
 
Content Analysis, according to Krippendorf (2004), furthermore  
(1)  Is not as open-ended and hermeneutical as ethnographies but guided or structured by 
research questions, as I have done;  
(2)  Samples only relevant texts, and is therefore presumptive in that it chooses specific 
texts/sources for a purpose, as will be shown later and throughout the thesis. It also 
provides guidance about interview data transcription so as to ‘transform unedited texts or 
original images … into analyzable representations’ (Krippendorf, 2003:84). 
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(3) Demonstrates procedural logic, or a clear outline about why certain texts/sources are 
pursued and why certain inferences are made.  
(4) Places emphasis of credible sources, ‘bridg[ing[ the gap between descriptive accounts of 
texts and what the mean/refer to’ (Krippendorf, 2004:85); 
(5) Makes the analysis work in relation to a close reading of the context so that it renders my 
assumptions and the appropriateness of my reasoning examinable; and 
(6) Acknowledges that sources proceed from contexts; that is that ‘the context directs the 
analysis of a text, and the results of the analysis contribute to a (re)conceptualisation of 
the context, redirecting the analysis, and so forth’ (Krippendorf, 204:86).  
 
The main objective in this thesis is to explain what makes up the food system. ‘Explaining’ or 
‘considering’ a subject, according to Blaikie (2000:14), involves ‘making intelligible the events 
or regularities that have been observed and which cannot be accounted for in existing theories’. 
We explain, follows Blaikie, ‘to establish the elements, factors or mechanisms that are 
responsible for producing the state of or regularities in a social phenomenon’ (Blaikie, 2010:69). 
In work on agrifood studies in Economic Geography, we have established that the current 
framework alone does not lend itself to explaining the complexity in food systems. There is no 
doubt that existing scholarship, particularly work on supermarkets, is drawn from a sophisticated 
methodological approach that looks at the hierarchical or network structure of interaction along 
value chains, and the circulation of codified knowledge between firm clusters or networks (see 
Gibbon and Ponte, 2005: Chapter 1-2). But because the conceptual framework overemphasises 
the transformation of African economies by supermarkets or agribusiness firms, the dome 
political economy falls out of sight and, as a result, so too do multiple sites of power and forms of 
governance outside the remit of supermarkets or agribusiness firms. The existing literature, 
therefore, cannot account for the ‘events or regularities’ that are observed in this context, nor can 
it draw out the ‘elements, factors or mechanisms responsible for producing and regulating’ these 
observable phenomenon in the food system. Answering the key research questions, then, relies 
very much on answering an underlying methodological question about how we are able to 
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capture, explain or consider the inherent complexity in the food system. Furthermore, to draw on 
CA again, research of this nature requires a responsibility to the place of study so that it results in 
a ‘quality of research findings that leads us to accept them on account of their contribution to 
public discussion of important social concerns’ (Krippendorf, 2004:314).  
 
Research Strategy  
The research strategy is qualitative, relying on meanings and interpretations of observed 
phenomena, and relating these findings back to the grounded theory (after Blaikie, 2000:114-
115). This best suits the purpose of this research, because, in contrast to fields of study that are 
positivist or where there are objective truths to be gained, the nature of the research inquiry in this 
thesis relies on interpretation. Clearly there are certain knowable realities about the field of study, 
such as who the actors are, what the networks of interaction look like and how the chain fits 
together. However, what these interactions mean, for instance, in the case of intermediary traders, 
requires interpretation about, say, the changing nature of high value chains from ‘formal’ to 
incorporating elements of informality. And interpretation, in turn, must be shown to be credible 
by relying on other bodies of work that support the evidence (see Krippendorf, 2004:xvii), which 
I do throughout the thesis. 
  
Second, the purpose of explaining what makes up the food system and considering why certain 
phenomena exist as they do, requires me to look at a coherent case study. Yin (1984) argues that 
case studies must be temporally and sector bound entities, suiting the Zambian agrifood industry 
as a case. Looking at the agrifood system in Zambia as a case study in this thesis enables me to 
point to reasons in interviews, observations and printed texts that convey why this is an important 
case, and how it is likely to contribute to knowledge, as set out below.  
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The case of Zambia’s agrifood system 
Zambia is a land-locked country in Southern Africa (see Figure 2, and my research case study is 
its capital city, Lusaka (circled in white).  
 
Figure 2: Map of Zambia (Source: Zambian National Tourism Trust, 2009 (© A. Curtis)) 
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Zambia’s main revenue comes from copper mining activity in the ‘Copperbelt’ region. 
Although the Copperbelt has a larger population city than Lusaka, the capital has the highest 
population density and urbanisation has continued steadily. In the Copperbelt region, urban 
population expansion or decline is very much influenced by the intermittent growth of the 
copper industry. Agriculture has contributed nearly 20 percent to the county’s GDP since the 
1990s, and agricultural exports, mainly of tobacco and baby vegetable have doubled in the 
same time (CSO Agricultural Analysis Report, 2003). Grain for the domestic market, in 
addition to other commodities, is grown by small-scale farmers, who make up more than 75 
percent of the agricultural population, and around 50 percent in Lusaka, even as urbanisation 
increases. In the country more broadly, the last census (CSO Agricultural Analysis Report, 
2003), showed that there were almost two million small-holders in the country, of whom, 99.2 
percent produced grain, and more than 26 percent reared poultry. The informal market absorbs 
the bulk of the grain grown in Lusaka both through the raw stock and as poultry inputs (CSO 
Agricultural Analysis Report, 2003). 
 
The object of study is the agrifood industry with some focus on the poultry industry. As a study 
of the food system, it is important to cover the main blocks of the food system in the country. 
While it is outside the scope of this thesis to look at any of these blocks in great detail, it bears 
mentioning to demonstrate a broad awareness of the over food system milieu in which this study 
or the urban food system in Lusaka takes place. While the bulk of my research was conducted at 
agribusiness firms, as I detail later, I also conducted research in informal markets in Lusaka, 
particularly the Soweto and City Markets (see Figure 4) 
 
(1) Maize  
Maize is the main staple crop in Zambia, particularly in the central and Southern region, which is 
known as the ‘maize belt’. It accounts for over a quarter of the total gross value of smallholder 
crop output in Zambia and almost half of Zambia’s calorie intake (Govereh et al., 2008: 1). 
Although structural adjustment has affected a number of countries since the 1980s, the 
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intermittent liberalization of Zambia’s maize industry is a recent focus of policy interventions. 
Unlike other countries which saw an incremental shift away from state control of grain markets 
and the disbandment of grain reserves, in Zambia, different governments pulled back control of 
maize markets. As Govereh et al explain:  
Fifteen years after the initiation of agricultural reform programs in Zambia, maize 
marketing and trade policies are again fundamentally similar to the controlled marketing 
systems of their earlier histories. The Chiluba government deregulated maize prices and 
private trade in the early 1990s but retained a limited government role in the market and 
frequently arranged maize imports to ensure adequate food supplies during drought 
years. However, the Mwanawasa government, starting in the early 2000s, has 
substantially increased the role of the Food Reserve Agency (Govereh et al, 2008:v) . 
 
Table 1 gives some indication of the production figures and Food Reserves Agency prices 
between 1991 and 2007. What is evident from this table is the changes in prices when the state 
bought grain from small-scale farmers or controlled imports, and when the Foods Reserve 
Agency was re-established absorbing over 80 percent of grain in some cases.  
 
As scholars note  
The well-documented decline in maize production has been driven largely by policy. 
During the 1992 to 2004 period, government support for maize production was reduced, 
but not withdrawn, as government treasury outlays for the purchase of maize were 
reduced, maize meal subsidies were eliminated, and massive fertilizer subsidy programs 
were scaled-back (Govereh et al., 2008: 7).  
 
As a result of this shift, in the Northern region of Zambia, there has been substantial 





Maize of course, is not just a domestically priced crop, and has been subject to pan-territorial 
pricing since the 1990s (Dorosh et al., 2009). Regional maize trade is a major determinant of 
maize prices in Zambia particularly in drought years where the state is forced to import maize 
from the region, most notably South Africa which given the latter’s economies of scale often 
causes further food prices stressors in Zambia. The main reason is because import permits are 
mainly given to large millers together with subsidies to import maize. As a result while the 
import costs are subsidized, subsidies do not reach consumers and the cost of food remains high 
since they are absorbed by millers, and private cross border traders often fill the gap of 
supplying cheaper grain to urban areas (Govereh 2007; Dorosh et al., 2009).   
 
 (2) Cassava  
Cassava is another key staple in Zambia, particularly in the ‘Cassava Belt’ the Northern and 
Eastern provinces. The production of maize is influenced by international and territorial price 
fluctuations, periods of drought/rainfall and the cost of fuel, and this is less so for cassava 
production. Cassava, unlike maize, being a more drought resistant and, importantly, non-
commercialised crop, has shown a steady increase in production figures over time. Figure 3 gives 
a sense of the steady increase of cassava in the case of Zambia.  
 
In particular, the growth of in cassava production since the 1970s is in part as a result of farmers 
wishing to diversify their production which coincided with intermittent removal of maize 
subsidies and pan territorial maize pricing. For the most part, cassava is grown by small-scale 
farmers and remains an ‘under-commercialised’ market. The Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
the state and farmer associations have recently touted cassava as the answer to Zambia’s food 
security woes because of the economic potential of cassava and maize flour blends and a vision 
of building cassava value chains. In addition, improved cassava varieties is, according to recent 




Figure 3: Growth in production – Maize and Cassava 
 
In the Cassava Belt, 90 percent of rural households and small-scale farmers produce cassava and 
in the Maize Belt, there is almost 15 percent production by smallholders. There has been a surge 
in production in recent years because of increased donor support, particularly the ‘Accelerated 
Cassava Utilisation’ task force that function with donor funds and expertise by USAID, the GTZ, 
SIDA, the FAO and the Agricultural Consultative Forum. The task force concludes that while the 
cassava production statistics are promising, the lack of commercial markets for cassava will 
eventually slow down. At present the challenge has been for the taskforce to encourage state and 
non-state domestic actors to ‘realise the economic potential’ of cassava which can be driven by 
agribusiness processors and farmers (ACU Task Force, 2008: Positioning the Cassava Value 
Chain). 
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(3) The Poultry Industry  
The consumption of poultry is seen to represent rising urban incomes and in some cases, 
changing consumption demand by the Black urban middle class in Southern Africa (see Poultry 
Bulletin, 2002). In addition, small-scale chicken production and demand for live ‘village’ chicken 
is seen to characterise African agriconomies (see Guèye, 2000; Louw et al., 2007). In terms of the 
development of agricultural enterprise or agricultural industry, investment in large broiler 
economies of scale is seen to represent a growing or industrialising economy (see Liebenberg and 
Reid, 1996; Poultry Bulletin, 2004). Related to this, finally, is the fact that poultry production in 
Southern Africa is directly connected to grain production, particularly the staple crop, maize. 
Global maize prices and regional demand for maize then is implicitly associated with the poultry 
industry in Southern Africa, and the maize price often reflects demand for chicken (Grobler, 
2001; Malibeng, 2005; Ngosa, 2005; Kaira et al., 2002). In Zambia, the poultry industry was seen 
to be Zambia’s ‘most outstanding success story’ because hybrid chicken breeds were also a result 
of increased agricultural technological innovation (Lombard and Tweedie, 1972:42). The poultry 
industry in Zambia therefore may convey more than just a set of value chain interactions, and we 
can interpret the changes in the poultry industry as relating to these broader sets of issues – rising 
urban consumption, growing economies and agribusiness investment – which is implicit in much 
of the analysis in the next few chapters.  
 
Credible Sources (on and off the field) 
The research design, as mentioned earlier, has to demonstrate ‘procedural logic’ that guides the 
kind of ‘texts’ we look for, whether it is the interview questions asked, or the archival material 
looked at. This lends credibility to the research process so that it is clear how ‘we have arrived at 
our judgements so that other researchers especially our critics can replicate it’ (Krippendorf, 
2004: xxii). I explain below how I have arrived at my judgements about the sources I look for and 
what approach to take. I drew on a number of academic sources for this thesis which mainly 
focused on the Economic Geography-Sociology ‘nexus’. Indeed many of the scholars write in 
interdisciplinary journals and the debates draw on various theoretical frameworks within this 
discipline.  
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The academic work on African food economies, urban food supply and African agricultural 
development predictably is quite varied, and indeed more voluminous. Part of this, as Power 
(2003:26) notes, is because of the industry of African development that has churned out huge 
amounts of literature in the often shared international policy and development studies fields. One 
of the biggest challenges was finding the balance between covering a large body of work, and 
losing focus. Where I present the various bodies of work along more developmentalist lines, I do 
so with a clear focus on the Economic Geography literature, as detailed in the Introduction. After 
the fieldwork phase, my interest in African economic growth grew and I read the work of 
Amartya Sen, CK Pralahad, Antoine Van Agtmael, Sir Arthur Lewis amongst others, most of 
which I do not reference here, but nonetheless contributed to the implicit aim of the thesis to 
place consumption in Africa at the centre of my thinking and research. 
 
In the field, the archival work that I carried out involved sifting through agricultural magazine 
journals and the grey literature on agriculture and economic development in Zambia. The latter 
were predominantly outputs by the World Bank, and held in the small archives of the Zambian 
National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) which I was allowed the privilege of using free of charge, and 
the agricultural archives in Johannesburg which had specialist magazine journals targeted to the 
Southern African poultry industry.10
 
 The ZNFU headquarters in Lusaka, is based in the 
Agricultural Showgrounds (see map – Figure 3), together with the various commodity sectors 
associated with the ZNFU such as the Poultry Association of Zambia (PAZ). I used the 
Showgrounds as a central base (it was between the city centre and Mtendere, the compound in 
which I lived), a meeting point with key respondents and my research assistant, and as an office 
base. Although I could not confirm it, the state-of-the-art archival facilities was funded by an EU 
capacity building grant, which also funded good governance auditing measures twice a year.  
                                                 
10 Here I am thankful for assistance with sources of Prof. C. Mather who was conducting research on the poultry 
industry in South Africa at the time.  
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The justification of my choice of empirical sources and respondents also bears relaying in some 
detail. (A full list is also provided in Table 1). Given that my initial approach aimed to consider 
the ways that the Zambian food industry was ‘modernising’ or evolving from a ‘developing 
country’ state to an ‘emerging market economy’ state, the sources that I looked for initially were 
mostly related to the ‘agribusiness’ side (which presented the challenge of making contacts, 
discussed later). Also, the methods related to the global value chains analysis, by definition, 
required me to look at the value chain, and because of the GVC conception of governance, to 
concentrate mainly on the firm and tracing the circulation of knowledge between ‘lead’ firms at 
different tiers. While the first phase of research focused on the limited number of value chains, a 
very small number that had second and third tier suppliers, it became clear that the conceptual 
framework of the thesis like the research design, needed to be much wider.  
 
I initially targeted two of the large agribusiness firms that had an internet presence, and made 
contact with them via email and telephone. Tiger Animal Feeds is a subsidiary of a South African 
company (Meadow Feeds), and were keen to offer information. Zambeef was the largest agrifood 
firm in Zambia, which specialises in beef, leather, milk, and chickens (ZamChick). The company 
had recently won a tender to run the butchery in the South African supermarket Shoprite in 
Zambia, and thus ran a completely vertically integrated chain. While the prospect of conducting 
research with these two firms would have been an excellent start to a focus on domestic value 
chains, I quickly realised that there was a much wider political economy system that allowed the 
‘classic’ commodity chains to function in quite unexpected ways outside Zambeef, for instance. 
And indeed that Zambeef was the exception. The central tenet of the value chains approach was 
that the global political economy gave way to the most logical form of transaction in this system 
– the global value chain – and attempting to look for the value chain would shape my thinking 
about the domestic, regional and global political economy that resulted in the urban food system 
as seen in the Zambian case. Instead of paying particular attention to those influencing factors, I 
would be zooming in on a slice of the food chain that may inadvertently sideline important 
insights about why the food system exists as it does. I realised, however, that the process of 
choosing the research pathway was very much tied to my understanding and reading of the 
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context in Zambia, and the research endeavour would be precisely about making the influence of 
the context explicit.   
 
As I mentioned in the Preface, the turning point in my research design was the ‘man and his 
bicycle’ incident. It allowed me to see these seemingly isolated incidents of informality as part of 
a bigger system, and as a result I went about ‘examining’ the food system with all its composite 
parts. Although my examination of governance was not really well thought out at the time, the 
second and third phases of research allowed me to also look for other information sources outside 
the agribusiness firms, and ask different questions of the firms when I did conduct research with 
them. Instead of asking questions about how firms were transforming food economies in Africa, I 
wanted to explore how the context influenced the behaviour and strategies of agribusiness firms 
since the agrifood system is a product of the domestic political economy. Although the thesis 
required a broad research scope, it was still unfeasible to look in any great depth at the entire food 
system. What I chose to do, instead, was to concentrate on the insights that thinking about a wider 
‘system’ would afford me. While I did not intend to cover the breath of Zambia’s food system, I 
did want to offer an assessment of the nature of the food system that would offer a concrete 
explanation of African agrifood economies in this era. Of course during the course of the writing 
up, the global financial crisis caused many policy makers (and states) to reconsider their position 
on the laizzes faire economy, and to think about how to guard economies against further 
economic meltdown. One of debates that surfaced again, directed at the global south was 
protectionism, and the woes of looking inward, but instead, continuing to reduce trade barriers, 
while at the same time northern governments bailed out their domestic industries. Placing the 
domestic context at the centre of the inquiry is an important rationale that underlies the thesis as a 
whole.  
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Chinika
Source: Re-drawn from Greater Lusaka,1:50,000 Surveyor General, Lusaka. 1986.
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How do we find out about the food system, with its many facets, and where does this thesis 
delineate its focus?  
 
The ‘Systems’ Approach  
As highlighted in the Introduction, one of the foundational elements of this research is that it 
places importance on recognising the food ‘system’ or the political economy context in which the 
food system emerges. Friedland and others have postulated a number of methodological angles 
that researchers might demonstrate a broad awareness of the food system. Figure 5 below 
diagrammatically presents the ‘angle’ of this research focus.  
 





In addition to this focus, there is further justification of the use of a ‘systems’ approach found in 
the international development literature. The reason for drawing on this body of work to inform 
my research is that it makes future policy linkages discernable. I allowed a systems approach to 
inform how I read and look for sources, and how I evaluated them. The systems approach in 
International Development Policy circles is both a retrospective heuristic device and a 
methodological tool drawn from the field of ‘Innovation Systems’ (most notably used in Science 
and Development Studies). ‘Innovation systems’ is a complex set of ideas about how knowledge 
is generated and circulated, the institutional domains in which knowledge is produced and the 
innovations that emerge from this ‘system’ (Hall, 2002). It has been used as a developmental tool 
to look at agricultural marketing of potatoes in the Andean region, for instance, and the 
interrelationships between the public and private sectors, farmers and intermediaries to bring 
about the ‘innovation’ that will benefit farmers and other actors in the system (Devaux et al., 
2009). In this approach, innovation is seen as any product, process, technology or institution that 
emerges as the result of different interactions and influences at the global, regional, national or 
community level, and benefits those in the system (Devaux et al., 2009:31; Smith, 2004; Ernst, 
2002). It has also been used to look at agricultural research and how the contributing influences 
and capacities in that system allow certain research innovations to emerge (Spielman et al., 
2008:1; also see Sumberg, 2005).  
 
The rationale for drawing on this work is that the role of diverse institutional actors and 
interactions and the context within which these processes occurred is emphasised (Hall, 2002:44). 
It thus sits well with institutional approaches and supports the larger aim of this thesis which is to 
explain the shape of Zambia’s urban food system by looking at the domestic political economy 
and different institutions prominent in the agrifood system. Also, the system ‘way of seeing’, so 
to speak, is useful at every level of the research process – research design, methodological 
approaches and analysis as I show in other sections.  
 
In sum, the ‘agrifood system’, as I have adapted it here can be seen outcome of a selected number 
of influences and interactions as seen through a series of explanatory factors – the domestic 
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political economy, domestic institutions and agribusiness firms. While there are of course other 
influencing factors or explanatory factors, such as globalising forces, the focus here is the 
domestic political economy and the sum of a selected number of interactions and 
interrelationships, and the institutions that govern these interactions. 
 
This research design section therefore establishes that:  
 
 1. The objective in the thesis is to explain what makes up the food system 
 2. The research strategy is qualitative and relies on interpretation; 
 3. A ‘systems’ approach allows us explain the interlinking aspects in the food systems.  
 
I now turn to the methodology used in the thesis to answer the research questions. 
 
Methodology  
As I pointed out earlier, the methods associated with Economic Geography approaches do not 
always lend themselves to the inherent complexity in Zambia's food system, indeed nor are they 
directly relevant for this study. But it is important to point out that looking at the value chain was 
an important part of my fieldwork mostly because this was the initial approach of the research. 
During the pilot phase of my fieldwork, which was conducted in March 2007, I was most keen on 
‘following the chain’.  
 
To make initial contacts I emailed and called a number of poultry agribusiness firms listed on the 
Zambian Business Directory, ZamNet. Of the three people I managed to speak to, they all 
expressed willingness to meet with me when I arrived in Zambia, but explained that their broiler 
plants were outside Lusaka. At the time I did not think this would present a problem. I intended to 
hire a car, and find my way there. When I arrived in Zambia, however, I struggled to secure 
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appointments with anyone. Through a personal contact at the Geography Department at the 
University of Zambia (UNZA), I was introduced to a livestock vet who was completing his 
Masters research in Agricultural Science at UNZA. During the pilot phase of my research in 
Zambia (March 2007), Dr Zulu introduced me to Mr Matthews Ngosa, the Head of the Poultry 
Association of Zambia, who was ultimately my main contact, and research assistant. Mr Ngosa 
brokered the research process in introducing me to the key players in Zambia’s poultry industry. 
Through his professional networks, I gained access to large processors, emerging farmers, stock-
feed enterprises and broiler owners, and I also gained a level of credibility with these firms and 
actors that I would not have had otherwise. Mr Ngosa accompanied me on most of my research 
trips, often driving to farms and processing plants on the outskirts of the city and outside Lusaka, 
introducing me and accompanying me on tours of facilities. Mr Ngosa used the chance to watch 
me conduct the research which would be a beneficial skill for him in his professional 
development. During the subsequent phase of my research, which was conducted between July 
and November 2007, I met and conducted interviews with a number of key respondents, some of 
whom I interviewed in two phases.11
                                                 
11 I also attended regional training sessions for small-scale farmers held by a large agribusiness firm, and was 
based at the agricultural show grounds in Zambia where I was given the opportunity to look at the agricultural 
archives at the ZNFU headquarters. I was able to conduct my research in informal markets through the assistance 
of one of the farmers would bring hundreds of chickens everyday to the market to sell. Mum Agnes, I called her, 
introduced to two of her trusted traders who showed me around the market, took me to wholesale areas and 
introduced me to traders and other intermediaries along the supply chain. 
 Table 2 lists the specific number of interviews, the actors or 
categories of actors, the location and the selection criteria used in the fieldwork. The reason for 
including this is to demonstrate the empirical research that informs the conclusions in this thesis 
since only a small selection of the interviews are referenced here or quoted from.  
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Actor/Category of Actor No. Location Criteria for Selection  Type of Interview 
Intermediary traders and/or 
transporters 
 






Urban markets in Lusaka  
 
 
On site at agribusiness firms/processing 
plants 
Referral or recommendation by 
farmers or traders and/or 
agribusiness managers 
Semi-structured and where 
possible, informal focus 
groups 
Traders/Vendors 20 Urban markets in Lusaka  
Residential Compounds 
Random selection Short, semi-structured 
interviews 
Urban Market Managers 2 
x2 
Lusaka City Market 
Soweto City Market 
On the basis of their position. Access 
through personal network with 
traders.  
Semi-structured and in 












On site at interviews with agribusiness 
managers  
On the basis of their position. Access 
through personal network. 








Lusaka, Manda Hill Shopping Mall;  
Cape Town South Africa, Shoprite HQ 
On the basis of their position. Access 
through personal network and 
availability. 
Semi-structured and in 
depth interviews 
Emerging farmers 2 On farms in Lusaka province On the basis of their position. Access 
through personal network and the 
ZNFU. 
Semi-structured and in 
depth interviews 
State officials 3 At government offices, Department of 
Domestic Trade and Commerce 
On the basis of their position, 
through personal network access and 
availability. 
Semi-structured and in 
depth interviews 
Table 2: Details of Interviews conducted  
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Interviews are a useful way of gaining information, but the weakness of the method is that the 
responses are often subjective. To balance out this subjectivity, I attempted to validate the 
responses by looking at the literature, which itself is a subjective exercise as Krippendorf 
(2004:41) argues, and conducted additional interviews with intermediary traders and farmers. I 
also looked at available work in the grey literature (which often was published by the World 
Bank perhaps pointing to a more institutionalised subjectivity), and other secondary literature to 
validate the findings. The archival work, consisted mainly of searching through material 
published by the ZNFU (the Zambian Farmer), other regional poultry industry publications 
(Poultry Bulletin).  
 
Relating the findings to the literature and other material was in part an attempt to ‘triangulate’, or 
to corroborate my findings (Blaikie, 2000:33).  The analysis relied on interpretation, processing 
the information and ‘look[ing] for meaning, and significance in the presentation of others’ 
(Krippendorf, 2004:85). Thus while there were many instances in the interviews where 
respondents represented a particular opinion, they also were relaying actual evidence of how the 
food system works, and with what rationalisation they govern it.  The nature of social research, 
though, and perhaps most especially research on food systems in Africa, has a strong ‘social 
justice’ leaning. In Krippendorf’s view, this adds to its validity: ‘Research examining such public 
issues is socially validated by proponents and antagonists who worry about these issues and are 
eager to translate research findings into action’ (Krippendorf, 2004:314). So in thinking about 
how I demonstrate that the results presented in this thesis are credible, Krippendorf (ibid) argues 
again that demonstrating sensitivity to the context offers three kinds of validating evidence: (1) it 
justifies the treatment of a text or data as meaningful; (2) it justifies my abductive inferences; and 
(3) it justifies the results.  Understanding the context is therefore fundamental to the research 
endeavour, to the credibility of sources and to the integrity of the analysis. In sum, the research 
methods presented here, although they each have weaknesses, together they provide me with a 




The research design, methodological considerations and methodology outlined in this chapter 
detail the rationale and justification used throughout the thesis and the research process. While 
some of the observations about the process itself are only seen retrospectively, the research 
experience that was very much a part of the telling of this larger narrative that underwent many 
changes. In the Conclusion, I reflect critically on the methodological approach in the thesis, and 
at the end of the chapter which follows (the literature review) I restate the methodological 




The next chapter reviews the literature. The first three sections respectively deal with (1) post -
independence food marketing and economic reforms and briefly looks at the literature on food 
marketing in Africa, and also points to how food marketing in Zambia has been written about; (2) 
the literatures on food crises and survivalist initiatives which examine the crises of food systems 
in Africa more generally; and (3) work on informal food markets in Africa. The review of 
literature on informal markets in African cities is separated between the next two chapters – this 
following literature review and the subsequent, more contextually grounded chapter. While this 
separation of the literature risks the perception of a weaker analysis in the review chapter, I 
believe the literature on informal markets that is reviewed in this chapter adds to a more robust 
conceptual framework – which is the ultimate aim of the chapter. The second half of the chapter 
focuses on the literature on supermarkets and how they are seen to transform economies in the 
South, critiquing this work by looking at additional material in the ‘new retail geography’ 
perspective and highlighting the role of South Africa in Africa accounting for the dominance of 
supermarkets and agribusiness firms in this context.  
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CHAPTER 3: AGRIFOOD STUDIES: APPROACHES AND 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
Questions of evaluation raise the critical importance of politics in, for example, 
attempting to shift notions of evaluation to take full account of the rapid but 
unpredictable changes in the environmental context within which economies operate 
and to consider the environmentally appropriate and socially just time frames and 
discount rates for adjusting the norms and metrologies of evaluation. 
Lee, 2008:1114  
Introduction 
 
In the literature, the focus on ‘food’ in African countries, has received considerable attention in 
the past few decades, whether it is about overcoming famine or food insecurity crises; the 
imperative for states and the international development community to strengthen export linkages; 
or the need for greater investment in agriculture,.12
                                                 
12 Take, for instance, the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) funded ‘Making Markets Work 
for the Poor’ project (see http://www.markets4poor.org); the World Bank’s ‘Agriculture for Development’ focus in 
the World Development Report (WDR, 2008); and the focus on ‘Agriculture’ in the 2006 report Promoting Pro-
Poor Growth (OECD, 2006) published by the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) and the Network 
on Poverty Reduction (POVNET). 
 Despite the sustained interest, the approaches 
taken to conceptualise food in Africa have shifted over time, often moving back and forth 
between more dominant schools of thought. For instance, as Guyer (1987) notes, the focus since 
the 1950s was on the innovative economic spaces in African agrifood trade mainly in 
Anglophone literature, but this quickly changed as the perspective of Francophone scholarship 
became more dominant in the Social Sciences, resulting ultimately in a ‘consensus’ in the field 
about the backwardness of African food systems in the years that followed. Potts (2008) similarly 
notes the shift over time in how informal agrifood supply chains (and the informal economy more 
broadly) were sometimes reviled and other times commended as a way to mitigate urban poverty 
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and food insecurity in African countries. Indeed history, it seems, is repeating itself as the 
international development community has a renewed interest in the promises of a Green 
Revolution: 
Using agriculture as the basis for economic growth in the agriculture-based countries 
requires a productivity revolution in smallholder farming. Given Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
unique agriculture and institutions, that revolution will have to be different from the 
Asian green revolution. How to implement it after many years of limited success 
remains a difficult challenge. But conditions have changed, and there are many local 
successes and new opportunities on which to build (World Bank ‘World Development 
Report’ WDR, 2008:1) 
 
Once again, revolutionising agricultural productivity is seen as a panacea to ‘Africa’s food crisis’ 
in providing technological solutions to increase the production of food in Africa, this time 
focused on African-led solutions and partnership.13 But the return to a Green Revolution, despite 
the failures of the project and the criticisms it elicited in the 1970s, and the resurgence of interest 
in the African food crisis between 2007-2008 can be seen in part as a result of the (re)current 
agenda of the development and knowledge industries (see Smith, 2005; Holt-Giménez, 200914; 
Bryceson, 200915
                                                 
13 See ‘What is AGRA’s distinctive vision of an African Green Revolution?’, AGRA, <
). What is clear from shifts over time is that while the concern about food in 
Africa is driven by particular agendas, it also reflects broader shifts in geopolitics, and it results in 
particular imaginaries or conceptions of food systems in Africa. For instance as Smith (2003:5) 
http://www.agra-
alliance.org/section/about/faq#02> 
14 Holt-Giménez argues that ‘[s]olutions to the food crisis advanced by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and mega-
philanthropy, propose accelerating the spread of biotechnology, reviving the Green Revolution, re-introducing the 
conditional lending of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and re-centering the now fragmented 
power of the World Trade Organization (WTO) by concluding the Doha “Development Round” of trade 
negotiations. These institutions have a mandate from capital to mitigate hunger, diffuse social unrest, and reduce 
the overall numbers of peasant producers worldwide — without introducing any substantive changes to the 
structure of the world’s food systems’ (Holt-Giménez, 2009:1) 
15 Bryceson (2009) points to more critical views: ‘[V]arious environmental and social activists suspect that 
[Alliance for the Green Revolution in Africa] AGRA investments are intended to create new markets for western 
chemical and agro-industries, encouraging African farmers’ dependence on non-sustainable agricultural inputs and 
favoring larger more entrepreneurial farmers at the expense of others.’ (Bryceson, 2009:1) 
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and (Mitchell, 2002:25) note, approaches to food in Africa have created a particular imaginary of 
Africa that is environmentally deterministic, necessitating, for instance, disease or malnutrition 
control, population regulation, or technological solutions such as modified grain species, and the 
subsequent ‘justified’ intervention by development agencies. Yet it is also clear, as seen in the 
World Bank quote earlier, that there is a recognition that ‘conditions have changed and [that] 
there are many local successes and new opportunities on which to build’.  
 
Seen within this context, one might appreciate the complexity of the task of reviewing the 
literature on food in Africa, seen especially in the light of Lee et al’s (2008:1114) comment 
quoted at the opening about how evaluating scholarship relies on seeing those 
projects/interventions in context, while recognising their power in reproducing a set of 
conclusions. As such, based on the key claims of the thesis as restated below, in this chapter I 
review only those bodies of work that provide an appropriate framework for this research, and 
concentrate predominantly on scholarship in Economic Geography (particularly the work on 
supermarkets). While the bodies of work are related, I have separated them in this review on the 
basis of how the debates are circulated in the literature. This Chapter concludes that by looking at 
different bodies of academic scholarship, food systems in Africa can be seen as situated or 
located in the broader domestic political economy, which is influenced by globalised and 
localised processes.  
 
Understanding trajectories of change in African countries: Post-
independence food marketing and economic reforms 
 
In many African countries, after their independence, agricultural markets and prices of food were 
controlled by the state. This was as much a political imperative as it was an economic one (Bates, 
1981). State actors had to ensure reliable food supplies to people and they had to grow the 
economy. State actors, therefore, controlled the marketing boards and sold to large private food 
processing facilities, who would buy exclusively from state reserves agencies. As Africanist 
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scholars note, controlling food marketing was also one mechanism, among many, to ensure 
political control of rural and urban constituencies (Boone, 1994; Bates, 1989) 
 
In Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania, state support guaranteed smallholder 
producers agricultural input subsidies, credit provision and assured producers that the state would 
purchase their produce (Jayne and Jones, 1997; Putterman, 1995). In particular, the state buying-
station targeted those areas that had been excluded from colonial marketing regimes (Jayne, 
1997). The state would also have direct control over food pricing and grain supplies, ensuring, for 
example, cheap food to urban areas through consumer price subsidies. Often the ultimate aim of 
such interventions was to ensure that the state would not need to import food. Such systems 
effectively made the state the main buyer and reseller of agricultural produce in most African 
countries, and the costs of marketing were transferred to the state treasury. In addition to this 
economic aim, state-supported agriculture also ensured more political aims: on the one hand, 
cultivating a support base – because well supplied urban constituency – and on the other, 
reducing overall dependence on settler (colonial) agricultural producers (Bates, 1976, 1981, 
1989).  
 
More generally, in Southern and East Africa, the aim of newly independent states to keep food 
prices low – which, as noted, was done in part to ensure political stability – made it increasingly 
difficult for African states to maintain the costs of collection, processing and distribution, and 
even more difficult for economic growth (Jayne, 1997). In Tanzania in the mid-1970s, for 
instance, Bryceson (1987:185) notes that there were serious bureaucratic and transport logistic 
inefficiencies in the grain marketing system that was controlled centrally by the National Milling 
Corporation. In other cases in Southern and East Africa, state control allowed opportunistic 
leaders to line their own pockets by monopolising transport or storage facilities, or by making 
sure that the produce from their farms received preferential access to national grain reserves 
(Bates, 1981:40). Duncan and Jones (1993:1496) suggest that the amalgam of debt, marketing 
inefficiencies, and bureaucratic incompetence made economic reforms unavoidable. Indeed it was 
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in the name of economic reform that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
justified African structural adjustment. 
 
Many African states could no longer afford to maintain subsidising inputs, supporting transport 
and processing, and subsidising selling prices (Bryceson, 1993). High levels of indebtedness (and 
treasury losses) were compounded by increasingly dilapidated processing facilities and inefficient 
operations (Bates, 1989). For instance, Jayne and Jones (1997) show how in Zambia and Kenya 
state debt was in part because of low repayments from smallholders. Most Southern and East 
African states could no longer afford to subsidise the price of food to urban consumers (Pinckney, 
1993). High levels of debt and high inflation often also had direct implications on the currency 
exchange and the capacity to import food (Pearce, 1991). In addition, Dorosh et al., (2009) and 
Diao et al., (2008) note that during this time many African countries became net importers 
because of the steep rise in food prices globally, and the high costs of food locally. Massive 
spikes in food prices sparked widespread riots in the late 1970s in many African countries 
because state marketing systems suppressed other marketing channels (Putterman, 1995). State 
control of agricultural production, marketing and sales meant that smallholders had no direct 
access to markets, marketing channels between the rural and urban areas were strained, and trade 
on the black market had even further escalated food prices (Guyer, 1987; Bryceson, 1993; Jayne, 
1997).  
 
As a condition for receiving loans from the World Bank and the IMF, many African states were 
coerced into removing agricultural subsidies, which rapidly increased food prices. As Jayne and 
Jones (1997:1512) notes:  
Fiscal crises and increased donor leverage over policy pushed the grain marketing systems 
of Eastern and Southern Africa toward liberalization in the mid-1980s. After first trying to 
strengthen the performance of state marketing boards in the 1960s and 1970s, donors and 
international lending agencies began promoting the reform of food marketing and pricing 
as a central component of structural adjustment programs in Africa. 
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Economic liberalisation entailed the removal of state subsidies, cutting back on social spending 
and deregulating state control on trade, and resulted, on the one hand, in slightly lower food 
prices because of the opening up of private food marketing channels through urban traders 
(Bates, 1989; Bryceson, 1993; Guyer, 1987). On the other, according to Jayne and Chisvo 
(1991:319) state controlled supply chains were subsumed by larger commercial processors which 
escalated food transport costs because grain from rural areas had to be transported to urban 
processing plants and back to rural areas to be sold. In short, Jayne and Jones (1997) note that 
economic reforms resulted in decreased resources and public funds for smallholders – which 
meant smaller yields – and an increase in private traders servicing producers. Guyer (1987), Bates 
(1987) and Bryceson’s (1993) point to the tendency for private traders to fill the gap of urban 
food supply where there were failures of public funds, in particular those that would serve urban 
informal markets. Despite the fruitful academic inquiry about traders and alternative markets, the 
literature continued to focus predominantly on the crisis of food in Africa and the interventions 
development agencies could make in response (Guyer, 1987: 5). The particulars of how reform 
happened in the Zambian case is discussed further in Chapter 4, but for now it is important to 
reiterate that we can understand food systems in Africa in a much more nuanced way if the post-
independence political economy is highlighted.  
 
Food crises and survivalist initiatives 
In the 1980s, African state agricultural systems were characteristically seen to be ‘a particularly 
detrimental combination of backward techniques and predatory state politics’ (Guyer, 1987:3).  
An emergent literature in the early 1980s, during the ‘great Sahel famine’, focused on the crisis of 
state-controlled food systems, agricultural stagnation and the need to modernise agricultural 
systems (Guyer, 1987; see Bates, 1981).16
                                                 
16 In part this literature focused on the Green Revolution and the way developing country producers could increase 
grain yield by adopting technologically modified varieties and inputs. Chapter 4 discusses this in greater detail.  
  State controlled food systems became indelibly 
associated with ‘intractable under-nutrition and malnutrition associated with drought, civil 
conflict, refugee camps and impoverished labour reserves’ (Guyer, 1987:3, 2). The narrative 
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justified intervention through food aid, and prescriptive policies for reduced state involvement in 
agriculture (Dorosh et al., 2009).  
  
The literature from the 1980s therefore placed great emphasis on famine, crisis-ridden 
production, under-nutrition or the imperative for African states to further liberalise agriculture to 
escape these ills (see Riddell, 1997; Sarmiento, 1998; Bill, 1991; Raikes, 1985). The livelihoods 
approach, which emerged in the 1990s, exposed the ‘human face’ of crisis-ridden African 
agriculture by personalising the research on famine, vulnerability related to environmental 
degradation, under-nutrition and poverty at the level of the household (see Bernstein et al., 1992; 
Chambers and Conway, 1991). Much of this literature reflected how political, social, 
environmental and economic factors influence livelihoods.  
 
Another body of work, which emerged from debates on the food crisis, focused on food 
marketing and on making food accessible to the urban poor. The body of work represents a more 
sustained focus even after the drought in the Sahel and the proliferation of developmental 
literature. Here one of the main thrusts of the research was on improving rural-urban linkages, 
and, more particularly, on the potential for urban agriculture to be an urgent and necessary 
coping/survivalist mechanism for the urban poor. In addition, urban production and marketing 
could have had the potential to curb inflation and stabilise food pricing, and, more importantly, 
increase people’s access to food through informal urban food livelihood markets or food vending 
(see Drakakis-Smith, 1991, 1997; Mougeot, 1999; De Haen, 2002; Porter, et al., 2004; Mougeot, 
2005). The rationale for this type of research is perhaps best captured in this quote by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) cited in Devereux and Maxwell (2001:5): 
‘a new kind of food system will be needed, no longer concentrating on meeting local 
subsistence needs, but instead supplying cheap, safe food to cities, in an integrated supply 
distribution chain’ (Devereux and Maxwell, 2001:5) 
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Urban food supply systems are thus often seen as strategic alternative income generating 
enterprises, and potential coping/survivalist mechanisms to urban residents in the developing 
world (Drakakis-Smith, 1991; Drakakis-Smith, 1997; Mougeot, 1999; De Haen, 2002; Rogerson, 
2003). Urban food systems are seen to reduce poverty because they make food more accessible to 
urban residents and markets more accessible to producers. Its relatively small importance in 
national strategies and priorities has meant very self-secured vitality in some cases (Reardon and 
Gulati, 2006) and marginalised producer-communities in others.  
 
Most often, urban food supply systems are closely associated with informal urban markets (see 
Rakodi, 2002; Rogerson, 1997). Although these supply systems, or alternative marketing 
channels mentioned earlier, have been a feature of African cities from pre-colonial days, through 
the colonial era and post-independence (see Guyer, 1987; Watts, 1987; Bryceson, 1987, 1993), 
they have become increasingly important in an era post World Bank and IMF reforms. According 
to Rogerson (1997:85), informal food markets have proliferated since the 1980s as a result of 
how communities and enterprise cope with an inability to meet the demands of the formal food 
economy.   
 
Not only are they seen to ‘fill the gap; of the formal economy, urban food supply systems are 
integral to the survival of cities in the south because of its ‘contribution to local economic and 
micro-enterprise development, poverty alleviation and inclusion of the poor’ (De Haen, 2002:3). 
For instance, in Ghana, 90 percent of the city’s fresh vegetable consumption is from production 
within the city; in Shanghai, almost 90 percent of meat produce is though urban and peri-urban 
agriculture; and in Central and South America, alternative modes of food provisioning, through 
UPA and direct selling, become a necessary channel for small-scale farmers to survive (De Haen, 
2002; Kwa, 2001). 
 
Although some see informal food markets in Africa as progressively dwindling and retreating as 
supermarkets tend to dominate urban economic space (Reardon and Weatherspoon, 2003), in 
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policy development arena it is argued that urban food supply systems will become the dominant 
channel in reaching the Millennium Development Goals in developing world cities (Mougeot, 
2005:3).17 As such, urban supply systems will play an increasingly a major part of state-driven 
food security initiatives (Mushamba, et al., 2003). Informal markets in Africa account for over 
two thirds of urban consumer expenditure (Jayne, 2008:109). In Mozambique over seventy 
percent of small-scale farmers retail their fresh produce through large wholesale wet markets 
because agro-processing chains are limited (Nair and Coote, 2007:1), and because Mozambique 
had a specific urban agriculture programme where food produced in the Green Zone around the 
main urban areas would supply the city (Ayisi, 1995; Ferraz and Munslow, 2000).  In Zambia the 
statistics are similar; more than eighty percent of fresh produce is sold in informal markets. 
Small-scale farmers grow most of this produce and while not many of them supply to markets 
directly, the produce makes its way to urban markets through intermediaries (Hichaambwa et al., 




Much of the discussion, with respect to informal markets in the ‘developmentalist’ literature, 
centres on issues of donor funding, de-criminalising urban agriculture, and aiding small-scale 
farmers (Mougeot; 2002; see also Devereux and Maxwell, 2001). Scholars suggest that one of the 
most pressing research concerns in food studies is how urban food systems work or indeed how 
they could work better, with the broader aim of linking farmers to markets and making food more 
accessible for the urban poor.19
                                                 
17 As I show in the next section, informal food markets are not only associated with development policy. 
 Implicitly, this work recognises the importance of informal food 
markets in urban Africa although the main focus is policy intervention. Indeed one of the main 
18 In Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and the Philippines informal wet markets have formally employed a 
number of market management staff to regulate markets, to sedentary them into centrally contained zones and then 
to adequately manage them, which has proven to be a successful strategy in supporting informal markets. In other 
parts of Asia, commercial regulations may have in fact purposefully discouraged the informal sector to benefit and 
facilitate growth in the formal sector (Reardon and Gulati, 2006). 
19 See Ngugi, 2006; Jayne (2008); Hichaambwa et al (2007) and McCullough et al (2008).This shift to linking 
farmers and markets is in part influenced by an understanding of how food systems are ‘re-governed’ by private 
enterprise. As I discuss elsewhere, changes in the global economy (and the way it is governed) has fundamentally 
transformed how we think about food systems. 
 80 
problems of the literature is the seamless coupling of the informal economy with urban 
agriculture. As I mentioned earlier, there is substantial work on informal urban food supply 
systems that are not primarily linked to developmental policy, some of which I detail in the next 
section, and the rest in Chapter 4. 
 
Urban food markets in Africa 
As suggested in the Introduction, the work of Africanist scholars points to the fact that urban food 
markets are a permanent feature of African cities, and have not recently emerged in response to 
economic crises. In particular, Bryceson (1987; 1993), Bates (1981); Guyer (1987), Watts (1987) 
Porter et al (2004; 2007) and Porter and Lyon (2005) present detailed reviews of the history of 
urban food marketing in African cities – some over one hundred years. The body of work shows 
that urban markets have a longer history in Sub-Saharan Africa and they will continue to be a 
feature of the urban food supply system because of political economy changes and urbanisation 
trends. In some cases, in Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries in the global south, these 
markets are becoming a more ‘permanent’ feature of cities because municipal governments 
provide financial, infrastructural support or introduce protective planning and management 
regulations.  This has meant the modernization of infrastructure or markets, and encouragement 
of retail innovation for small retail outlet stores through training programmes (see Tschirley et al., 
2004; Reardon and Gulati, 2006; Abrahams, 2010).  
Urban markets make food accessible to city residents, many of whom are poor. While 
supermarkets and other retail outlets make food available, many people living in urban Africa do 
not have (nor, in fact do they need) access to these outlets. Access to food is influenced by other 
factors including urban poverty and vulnerability, the accessibility of urban markets, and 
individual consumers’ access to transportation and refrigeration. For this reason, argue Tschirley 
et al (2004a:2), in Africa, informal markets are by far the most important retail outlet of urban 
residents. Furthermore, Abrahams (2007b) argues that informal retail outlets and traditional 
markets continue to be the choice of urban residents because they facilitate food networks for the 
urban poor and for culturally diverse communities in parts of urban Africa. A large percentage of 
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urban consumers in Africa continue to have low disposable incomes and ‘their shopping patterns 
are tied to low value-added goods, in small units, with minimal processing and packaging 
purchased from informal markets and smaller retail outlets within walking distance of their 
homes’ (Jayne, 2008:129). In a detailed presentation report by Tschirley (2009), he presents 
excellent graphical evidence providing evidence of sustained lower retail prices of urban markets 
in Zambia, and the small percentage of retailed food from supermarkets as compared to urban 
markets (Tschirley, 2009), concluding that despite almost fifteen years of supermarkets 
penetration in the country that ‘the “traditional” sector will dominate for many years, though 
supermarkets are likely to grow (Tschirley, 2009:12) because the food system is not becoming 
increasingly homogenous as promoters of the supermarket revolution initially assumed. Despite 
the importance of urban markets, Tschirley notes some of the major challenges to overcome if 
urban markets are to flourish and grow, viz., ‘woefully inadequate investment’, lack of physical 
facilities, cold chains, market information, grades & standards and frequently dysfunctional 
management (ibid.).  
 
Despite these challenges, which as I show in the case study are already being resolved, the 
point is that urban markets do not only represent more accessible food systems for consumers; 
while in the literature ‘informal’ markets are often associated with unsophisticated or risky 
forms of food supply that often involve exploitative transactions (Porter et al., 2004), because 
they are tied to lower costs of food, local sourcing of produce, a guaranteed consumer base and, 
sometimes, quicker transportation within the network or supply chain through intermediaries, 
they are also the preferred supply system for small-scale farmers.  
 
Informal food markets are only one part of a large commodity and service exchange sector that 
is integral to the functioning of cities (Bryceson and Potts, 2006; Robinson, 2006; Potts, 2006). 
The informal economy in Africa is not as it is often categorised – temporary, flailing and 
survivalist. On the contrary, it absorbs more than half the urban workforce in Africa and 
accounts for more than two thirds of its economic exchange (Simone, 2005). It is increasingly 
seen by African states as vital to the urban economy and is often protected by state legislation 
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and non-state lobbying. Tschirley et al (2004a-b) argue that investment into traditional format 
markets should be the more urgent policy priority in thinking about food security, access to 
food and food in emerging market economies. While large retail outlets may offer new retail 
opportunities for automobiles and electronic high value goods (Coe and Lee, 2007) food supply 
in traditional formats proves more resilient (Abrahams, 2008; Tschirley et al., 2004b).  
Indeed, the supermarket is not the only option for farmers to sell to; informal markets still cater to 
the majority of urban residents in African cities. In Nairobi, only 10 percent of the urban 
residents’ budget is spent at supermarkets, and supermarket expenditure as a whole is by the 
wealthiest 20 percent of the urban population (Tschirley et al., 2004). Haantuba and De Graaf 
(2008:212) note similar evidence in Zambia. They confer that ‘supermarkets still account for an 
insignificant proportion of produce sold’ in Zambia. Because of this, the literature (notably 
articles from a FAO-funded publication) notes that other retail formats that are still important in 
urban Africa must become the central focus of donor, state and agribusiness investment and/or 
partnership:  
Modern retail chains are growing fast, drawing in new sources of investment, and opening 
new reliable markets for higher value produce… For many smallholders throughout the 
world, and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the challenge of participating in modern, 
organized chains is eclipsed by the more fundamental challenge of participating in any 
market (McCullough et al., 2008:xix).  
A solution to this, according to the literature, is to invest in domestic market and transport 
infrastructure, build capacity of small farmers to ‘meet the demands of the market’, lowering 
transaction costs and increasing access to high value markets and inputs (ibid). This is similar to 
Tschirley’s (2009) argument where he highlights the potential of urban markets, with the caveat 
that these markets need management and facilities to be upgraded. Have there been recent 
developments in urban markets in Africa in terms of management or upgrading quality? The 
research that I present in the chapters that follow, confirms that indeed there are significant 
developments in urban markets, and these have important implications for understanding urban 
food systems.  
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In sum, while there may still be forms of economic exchange that are considered illicit and 
indeed are illegal, the informal economy is considered to ‘fill the gap’ of ineffective national 
provision. And unregulated spaces of economic interaction often means that markets are not 
included in literature on urban African economies, or if they are they are dualistically removed to 
the periphery of these debates as economic networks outside mainstream. This has two 
implications: first, a normative vision is created which places the supermarket as the end point of 
a vector for economic development where, for example, ‘informal’ or ‘traditional’ markets are 
seen to give way to ‘modern/formal’ modes of food provisioning and economic interaction. The 
traditional-modern or formal-informal dualism is thus entrenched, as is the normative ideal of 
how economies progress. Both this dualism, and the idea that as economies evolve from informal 
to formal the dominance of supermarkets is inevitable, are never more evident as they are in the 
supermarkets literature which argues that the spread of retail capital signals the transition of an 
economy and the demise of traditional forms of retailing. The second implication of research on 
urban markets being relegated to peripheral debates, or development studies, is that research on 
the spread of supermarkets as the dominant trend in urban Africa has taken centre-stage or come 
to define work on urban African economies, without any challenge. One of the intentions of this 
thesis is to challenge the work on the supermarket revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Supermarkets, it is argued in this literature, represents a shift from traditional to modern modes of 
food provisioning as the chain from farm to retail moves from being unregulated to regulated by 
firms, and the literature often cites the ‘demise of the informal sector’ as an defining outcome of 
the spread of supermarkets and agribusiness firms in urban Africa. The importance of urban 
markets in African economies, given their centrality in urban economies noted above, and as I 
argue elsewhere (Abrahams, 2010), specifically contests the assumption that supermarkets 
transform the face of food provisioning in urban Africa. The next section looks more closely at 
the supermarkets literature. 
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The Supermarket Revolution  
 
It is commonplace to view food economies as evolving and transforming along a teleological 
trajectory from traditional to modern food supply systems (see McCullough et al., 2008). The 
transformation directly impacts on procurement, processing, and retail, and the various actors 
along the value chain. In the developing South, the beginning of this trajectory is small-scale 
farming, lower-quality processing, and informal/traditional modes of retail such as wet markets. 
The zenith of the transformation is the modern supermarket, and the high-value, high-quality 
modes of sourcing and procurement that supermarkets demand.  
 
And indeed there is much evidence of the spread of supermarkets in terms of volume and 
investment: Reardon and Berdegué (2002:373) argue that “shares of various types of food 
retailers in the national retail sectors of 12 Latin American countries...constitut[e] 90% of the 
region’s economy”. This is by far the dominant share of retail capital in an emerging market 
economy where economic markets may not be perceived to be advanced. In South Africa, 
supermarkets represent less than “2% of all retail outlets, [but] a rough estimate of the share of 
supermarkets in total food retail in South Africa is around 50-60%” (Weatherspoon and 
Reardon, 2003:4). The success of formal retailing in Kenya is based on its sheer volume: “34 
chain-supermarkets; 10 hypermarkets (100 super-market equivalent [and] 117 small 
independent supermarkets in Nairobi... with a metro-population with about 2, 5 million’’ 
(Kenyaweb, 2002 as cited in Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003:7). According to this literature, 
Kenya is by comparison a late starter as compared with South Africa (Weatherspoon and 
Reardon, 2003). Irrespective, Kenya’s supermarket growth is comparable to South Africa’s, 
which boasts on average “39,5 supermarkets per million people (similar to the rate in Argentina 
and Chile)” (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003:3). In Brazil, Farina and dos Santos Viegas 
(2002) argue the phenomenon of investment by retailers is in part driven by economic 
stabilization and liberalisation, and the increase in spending in consumer markets. In six years 
the number of the largest food companies in Brazil had doubled (ibid.).  In the past decade, 
South African market share of the top thee supermarkets – Pick and Pay, Shoprite and Checkers 
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have increased exponentially. In addition, other grey economist research notes that in Africa, 
the spread of supermarkets and capital investment in retailing is evidence of the increasing 
wealth of developing countries, and the tendency for these economies to evolve into emerging 
markets (Van Agtmael, 2008:10; Reuters, 2007; EIU Zambia, 2006; EIU Zambia, 2008). While 
the GVC literature is concerned with export and inter-continental chains, between consuming 
countries and producing countries, the ‘supermarkets and agrifood restructuring’ literature (and 
evidence in popular literature) shows that retail investment in Africa is happening by African 
countries expanding their reach on the continent. 
 
However, while investment and volume of supermarkets in emerging market economies is a 
significant determinant and ‘fast-tracker’ of transformation, Humphrey (2007:434) questions 
whether it is enough to warrant a generalisable ‘reach impact’. The theoretical trend is often 
given greater import than the actual cases show, and should be countered with considered 
research in variable environments (ibid.) that includes the myriad of food economies in the said 
location (Abrahams, 2007a; Tschirley, 2004b). As mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been 
growing caution on the part of scholars in the past few years in estimating the spread of 
supermarkets in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In the literature that has promoted the metaphor of an overwhelming tide of supermarket 
takeover as in a ‘revolution’ (sic) that overcomes existing food economies completely 
transforming the face or food provisioning, most of sub-Saharan Africa is seen to be amongst 
the ‘last wave’ of countries catching the supermarket tide. Other developing countries, 
particularly those in Latin America and Asia, are understood to be the second and third waves 
respectively (Humphrey, 2007). Implicitly asserting that the succession of waves is related to 
‘the natural course of things’, the ‘first wave’ of the supermarket revolution in Europe and 
North America was seen to initiate the process (Neven and Reardon, 2008). Also, the vision of 
‘the natural course of things’ where the supermarket would be the zenith of economic 
development, is linked to how the global economy has been restructured – which was detailed 
in Chapter 1. Value chains – that link large-scale commercial farming, value-added processing, 
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and high-value marketing, often on the global market – have become increasingly specialized, 
capital-intensive, and consolidated. Where in the past different actors or firms would occupy 
different functions along the chain, retailers increasingly control all aspects along the chain, 
increasing quality, decreasing throughput time, and maximizing profits. This global 
reorganization relies on consumer demand for quality or processed food. Retailers ‘meet’ this 
demand by passing it on to suppliers who in turn consolidate, modernize, and upgrade their 
operations in a complex, technology intensive system. Most significantly, these structured 
systems bypass ‘traditional’ markets because the latter remain inefficient in meeting the quality 
and safety specifications, and the logic is that systems of exchange gravitate towards greater 
efficiency. As mentioned in the Introduction, the rationale behind this work is global economic 
restructuring and the rise of buyer-driven or retail-led chains that link up producers to retailers 
in formal, contractual relationships based on adding value to commodities. In short, though, the 
innovative focus is on how structured systems bypass ‘traditional’ markets because the latter 
are seen to be inefficient in meeting the quality and safety specifications. Supermarkets are not 
only seen as the marker for economic transition, but they also come to represent economic 
evolution. High value chains and supermarkets are seen to be the harbinger of progress for food 
systems in emerging economies from traditional markets to modern retail, and there is little 
recognition in this literature of its modernist assumptions. The dominance of supermarkets in 
the developing South, particularly Africa, is seen as the end point of a normative trajectory 
along which food systems transform, and has become a popular research focus despite evidence 
that urban markets continue to dominate, as already mentioned, and that the success of 
supermarkets depends very much on a political economy environment that facilitates their 
dominance, as we will see later.  
 
Supermarkets and the demise(?) of ‘informal/traditional’ modes of food retail  
Indeed there are cases of a recognisable shift from informal, fragmented retail structures toward 
sophisticated and concentrated formal retail structures like supermarkets and large format 
hypermarkets, in the literature (Wrigley and Lowe, 2002; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; 
Louw et al., 2007; (Haantuba, 2007; Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Farina and dos Santos 
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Viegas 2002). In many areas, there has been a progressive demise of small shops and informal 
food market outlets. The increasing dominance of supermarkets and large discount stores is 
evident even in remote rural areas of the developing world (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). 
The arguments are related: On the one hand, where people may have done their food shopping 
n the past at a number smaller stores and informal markets scattered across town, and this 
costing more, consumers are now able to purchase all their food in a supermarket which offers 
cheaper, safer food. On the other, the literature also attests to the fact that the greater purchasing 
power of large retailers, has indeed led to the shift from many, decentralised ‘traditional’ stores 
to larger, centralised supermarkets (Faiguenbaum, et al., 2002; Farina, 2002, Ghezan, et al., 
2002). In other words, economic markets are seen to have shifted from fragmented local 
markets to more centralised formally retailed wholesale markets and that this has had 
detrimental effects on traditional informal stores, as well as consumption choice (Weatherspoon 
and Reardon, 2003:8). The literature cites cases from Latin America to support these 
arguments. Formal retailing has resulted in the demise of state storage facilities and public 
distribution centres in Brazil (Farina, 2002:449), locally- based ‘feria libre’ in Latin America 
(Reardon and Berdegué, 2002), and ‘mom and pop stores’ in Argentina and Chile (ibid.). 
Because the domestic market changes with development in general (Weatherspoon, 2003:8), 
larger supermarkets are seen to replace the traditional stores that are aimed at the poor 
consumer segment in the local neighbourhood (Farina, 2002:445). The conclusion in this 
scholarship is that traditional retail formats in emerging market economies (informal wet fresh 
produce markets) will ‘progressively’ demise (Neven and Reardon, 2008). Yet as much as this 
evidence points to an apparent trend, one has to ask why, given this dominant assumption about 
the retreat of urban markets, do these markets continue to play such an important role in the 
urban food system in Africa? Notwithstanding the idea that urban markets will progressively 
demise, what are the factors that promote the longevity and resilience, or demise and retreat of 
these markets? Does it merely happen as ‘the natural course of things’? Or does the domestic 
political economy play a role in determining the eventual outcome of the urban food system? 
 
Champions of the supermarket ‘revolution’ base their conception on a teleological model of 
food economies seen predominantly in North American and European contexts. It is thus 
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unsurprising that the demise of other, less-consolidated, capital-intensive, informal and/or 
traditional forms of retail is seen as a ‘necessary progression’ towards the inevitability of better, 
more modern retail chains (read supermarkets). In South Africa, while supermarkets are seen as 
the obstacle to the growth of small enterprises, the former do not necessarily demolish the latter 
(Mather, 2005). Contrary to the implicit assumption in the supermarkets literature, the 
dominance of supermarkets in a particular economy does not just happen because supermarkets 
have ‘awoken ‘sleepy’ domestic food systems’ or swept through cities of the developing South 
because the political economy is open for foreign investment and private local investment in 
retail as Weatherspoon and Reardon argue (2003:402), while those processes may indeed have 
been the case. Nor is it based solely on the fact that supermarkets have greater purchasing 
power and supply chain penetration.  
 
Larger supermarkets replace traditional retail outlets as a result of deliberate economic changes. 
Both the success of supermarkets and the dwindling of informal economic spaces result from 
the removal of funding from state storage facilities and public distribution centres, and attempts 
to quash the informal economy (Abrahams, 2010; McCullough et al., 2008). And for this reason 
one of the overarching policy concerns in the literature is how to increase investment, improve 
management systems and encourage development of urban markets.  
 
It is necessary therefore to highlight factors in the domestic political economy, as seen in the 
literature, that drive or resist the process, and not merely essentialize the apparent pressure on 
informal economies or traditional modes of retail as the natural evolution of food economies. If 
we have to look for evidence in the literature of institutional policy shifts that profoundly affect 
(a) the spread of supermarkets or (b) the demise of the ‘informal’ sector, we have to reflect on 
the changes in the institutional system that supports informal modes of food retail leads to a 
more accurate assessment of transitions in local food economies. Institutional support (or, 
conversely, protracted repression) of informal markets has direct implications for resilience or 
decline of informal markets in the supermarket ‘tidal wave’. 
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(a) Economic policy regulation that encourages supermarket dominance: Take the ‘first wave’ 
countries, for instance, since the 1930s, North American and British supermarkets have grown 
through economic policy that fostered rapid expansion, consolidation, and the investment 
strength that would inevitably drive out competition. The demise of the ‘traditional’ food 
economy in these contexts is related to purposeful economic policy mechanisms that encourage 
the growth of capitalist firms (Wrigley and Lowe, 2002). In Wrigley and Lowe’s book based on 
‘New Retail Geography’ in Europe and North America, with a focus on the United Kingdom, 
they argue that the spread of retail capital was the result of ‘regulatory practice at the local and 
national scales…local modes of regulation, and central-local state relations’ (Wrigley and 
Lowe, 2002:115) amongst other things which I will briefly touch on.  First, the spread of retail 
capital was not seen as the ‘natural course of things’ or some predetermined trajectory, nor was 
the process static and inevitable. Instead, the growth of supermarkets happened as a reaction to 
regulatory rules governing capital accumulation, and thus did not result in ‘mass-produced’ 
models of urban retail, but showed ‘how contrasting national regulatory environments can 
produce very different corporate and spatial structures (Ibid, 2002:119). Second, for 50 years, 
from the 1930s, the rapid increasing in concentration of agribusiness firms and supermarkets in 
the UK meant that power shifted to retailers, a situation unlike that of North America. For the 
same 50 years, in North America the growth spurt and eventual dominance of supermarkets was 
restrained as a result of ‘price discrimination legislation…aimed at protecting the smaller 
trader, via criminal indictment of the leading US food retailers at the time’ (Wrigley and Lowe, 
2002:120). The ‘first wave’ was not as cogent. Third, in the UK, the concentration of retail 
capital was bolstered if not driven by the post-war regulatory environment, removal of anti-trust 
legislation and a period where  
Regulatory conditions which many academics have regarded as being supportive of the 
emergence of that period of rapidly escalating profitability, increasing concentration, 
and frantic new store development in the food retail industry which characterized the 
late 1980w and early 1990s in the UK (Wrigley and Lowe, 2002:120).  
 
Fourth, it is not so much as the increased purchasing power of agribusiness firms and retailers 
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automatically meant that retailers controlled or governed production and consumption. Instead, 
this also was a result of the broader domestic political economy that facilitated the dominance 
in private forms of regulation governed by supermarkets and other large agribusiness 
conglomerates. 
Private interests have been generally empowered in the formulation and implementation 
of…regulation. … rather, they are increasingly delegated by the state mane of the key 
regulatory responsibilities which previous accrued to [state] agencies (Wrigley and 
Lowe, 2002:121).  
 
Indeed as they go on to show (p123), hybrid forms of ‘private-interest’ state governing 
mechanisms was a cause and consequence of the growth of retail power, and therefore changed 
the way the state and firms governed the food economy. In sum, what is seen as a teleological 
certainty in the literature viz., that supermarkets transform food economies in the south misses 
the important point that there is an existing regulatory political economy environment that 
influences the spread and success of retail power – whether that is to promote or to 
circumscribe it. I show in the subsequent chapters, and in the following section, that this is 
indeed also the case in African food systems, as seen in the case of Zambia. While I do not 
allude so much to the state regulatory environment, the point is that there is a broader political 
economy that profoundly shapes the growth and behaviour of supermarkets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as seen in South Africa’s role in the Southern African region since the South African 
supermarket, Shoprite, is the dominant player.  
 
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, there is similar evidence that the spread of supermarkets is 
not the ‘natural course of things’. The removal of trade sanctions against South African 
companies happened to coincide with liberalization drives in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus from 
the mid-1990s – the inappropriately named ‘second wave’ – there was massive investment in 
African countries north of the Limpopo in Southern Africa. Indeed, as I mention later in the 
thesis, Zambia was seen as the main testing-ground for South African operations outside the 
country and has often been termed ‘South Africa’s doll-house’ (see Saunders, 2008). Between 
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1994 and 2004, South Africa had become one of the tope investors in Africa, often replacing 
formally European companies that had been tied to the colonial state (Games, 2004:12). In 
2001 alone, South Africa was listed as the second biggest investor in the Southern African 
Development Community region with investment of R14.8 billion, (the next highest country 
investor was the UK at R3.98 billion), with multi-state deals leading at R27 billion (Games, 
2004:19). While the level of investment did not always stay that high, South Africa remains 
among the biggest trading partners of many African countries, but the trade balance remains 
skewed in South Africa’s favour in almost all instances (Games, 2004:20).  
   
Power is seen to have shifted to the South African retailer and other businesses in many African 
countries not just because these firms grew too large for the already saturated South African 
market as is often assumed (see Mather, 2008). Miller (2004, 2005, 2008), Simon, (1998:6) and 
Saunders (2008) suggest that the spread of capital across South Africa’s borders on the continent 
was an extension of the apartheid project where white-owned agribusiness firms and retailers 
looked for cheap labour and ‘easy’ land access in other African countries. Bond (2004), in 
another vein, argues that the dominance of South Africa in the region has ‘subimperialist’ 
overtones and had to do with neoliberal discourses of accumulation in the ‘new South Africa’s 
government’. Third, the spread of South African retail was bolstered and driven by tax holidays 
in investment hungry countries, and by concessions for loan repayments back home so that South 
Africa could pursue a path of economic development through its Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) policy. In other words, many countries not just in Southern Africa, had 
actively invited retail investment by offering tax holidays and subsidies on leased land for a 
limited time in the mid-late 1990s (see Wilkinson, 2008), and states are often still keen to do so 
because supermarkets represent modernisation (Kenny and Mather, 2008:1).  Finally, the power 
of South African agribusiness firms and retailers is not an automatic outcome of their 
geographical spread or their buyer-drivenness over producers and other economic functions along 
a value chain. Instead, it is because of extended apartheid policies that impacted on labour 
sourcing in countries where the supermarket expanded into as well as preferential financial 
arrangements from the South African Reserve Bank for companies sourcing labour and supply 
chain commodities from South Africa. Atkins and Terry (1998:140) explain:  
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Similar developments have taken pace in Tanzania, where Tanzanian Breweries has 
been taken over by South African Breweries (SAB). As part of the agreement with the 
South African Reserve Bank to release funds for the takeover, the new company has had 
to use as many South African raw materials as possible [and thus one] main benefactor 
of this policy is the South African sugar industry which supplies refined sugar.   
 
In sum, in these two cases, the UK and South Africa, we can see that capital expansion of retail 
does not happen naturally or independently. In the first case, the eventual dominance of 
supermarkets in the UK and North America is the result of deliberate economic policy shifts 
and a supportive regulatory environment. In the second, the dominance of the South African 
supermarket chain in Sub-Saharan Africa is not because Africa is the last frontier to be 
overcome by the ‘supermarket revolution’. Instead, it is because of regional political economy 
changes that drove and fostered the expansion of agribusiness and retail power. Indeed this is 
not to say that global restructuring of trade had nothing to do with the consolidation of firms 
and spread of capital. Quite clearly these global processes played out in the domestic and 
regional political economy as other authors have noted (see Bates, 2008; Daviron, 2008; 
Mather, 2008; Gibbon, 2008; Ndulu, 2008). However, at another level, as in the cases 
highlighted above, one must see regional and domestic political economy influences as central 
to transitions in domestic food systems in Africa, and these influences must allow one to 
challenge the assumptions of the supermarket revolution. Similar reasoning challenges the 
assumption that supermarkets are increasingly dominant in Sub-Saharan Africa because the 
replace and progressively cause the demise of ‘traditional’ segments of the urban food system 
in Africa.  
 
(b) It is not just regulatory support for supermarkets that have spurred their growth, it is also the 
regulatory policy environment that inhibits, or encourages the ‘informal’ economy. While much 
of the evidence for this assertion relates to the empirical material presented later, the first part 
of the story, as seen in the literature, demonstrates that in Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Lusaka, Zambia, there is evidence of institutional support for the protection of so-called 
informal or traditional food markets.  
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Tranberg-Hansen (1997, 2000, 2004) notes that the building of Lusaka’s three largest ‘public’ 
markets was funded internationally just after independence in 1964. The so-called ‘ultra-modern 
market’ was funded in the 1990s by the Israeli government and became the site of the Soweto 
Market, replacing a central open area known by traders as Soweto. What made the market 
‘modern’, and increasingly formalized, was primarily the built-up infrastructure that would house 
hundreds of market stalls: an indoor space, built-up and lockable trading ‘booths’, access to water 
in the market (albeit limited), and market roads and road enclosures where market sales could be 
conducted efficiently. In the late 1990s, Lusaka markets received funding from the European 
Development Fund to upgrade their infrastructure and market facilities. Part of the municipal 
response to this was the demarcation of a bus station near the trading area, which was designed to 
‘bring in the market’. This represents concrete recognition of the importance of the central 
markets for urban residents (and town planning), and this early effort at investing demonstrates 
the escalating significance of local food economies to authorities. As my empirical research 
shows later, in 2007, a formally regulated Markets and Bus Station Act was instituted, which 
specifically addresses issues of management and representation in informal markets and transport 
networks, and places the control of markets and bus stations under management boards. This Act 
is the basis for the discussion of the changes in Lusaka’s food system as it relates to the urban 
markets. Also, as is evident in this section, and as will be made increasingly clear in subsequent 
chapters, the term informal is increasingly becoming obsolete because of how these urban 
markets are either being regulated or how urban traders are being incorporated into more 
formalised economic linkages with agribusiness firms and small-scale farmers. For this reason, in 
the rest of this thesis what has been termed ‘informal’ markets are now termed ‘urban markets’ 
except where I cite a specific perception of markets as informal in the literature.  
 
To conclude this supermarkets section, it is not only that African economies or economies in 
the global south provide a ‘fit’ for the advancement of supermarkets because of their liberal 
economic policies or the aspirations of the urban middle-class consumer, that Africa is the last 
frontier to which retail investment is attracted, or even that as African economies progress, 
‘informal/traditional’ modes of food provisioning eventually give way to ‘formal/sophisticated’ 
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modes of retail. Instead, where all these processes are evident, they happen on the basis of (a) 
institutional economic policy reforms and (b) regional political economy changes in developing 
countries. The perceived the tendency for supermarkets and agribusiness firms to dominate 
African economies is similarly dominant in the academic literature. This literature increasingly 
guides/supports policy decisions and recommendations, particularly in donor-led initiatives to 
link farmers to high value supermarket chains in African countries. However, as this section 
argues, the assumptions of the supermarket revolution as positioned in the literature must be 
challenged.  
 
Localising food networks 
While the last three sections focused on literature that explored the trends of globalised 
agribusiness, I turn briefly to a body of work that deliberately adopts an alternative view to 
scholarship on globalised economic processes. The literature on local or alternative food 
networks20
 
 attempts to look beyond processes of globalisation, ‘redeem’ some of the features of 
‘pre-globalised’ food networks and practically reclaim food systems so that they are, for instance, 
local, purist, organic, rain-fed, community-based, or in short alternative to ‘conventional’ mass-
produced, technologically intensive and geographically global food networks. While this activist 
or policy driven shift has recently become a formal (or institutionalised) feature in the UK and 
North America, there are important caveats that are important for the focus on urban food 
systems in Africa in this thesis.  
The interest in alternative food networks has emerged ‘in part a consequence of consumer 
reactions to a range of environmental, ethical and health concerns which are associated with 
‘conventional’ food supply systems’ (Maye and Ilbery, 2007:149). According to food 
geographers, industrialised agrifood system fail to secure environmental sustainability, 
transparency in terms of production, food safety or socially responsible sourcing methods 
                                                 
20 see Hinrichs, 2003; Winter, 2002; McCarthy, 2006; Maye et al, 2007; Trauger, 2007; Holloway et al, 2007; 
Maye and Ilbery, 2007; Goodman and Goodman, 2007; Torjusen, 2008 
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(Ghezán, et al., 2002; Du Toit, 2001; Campbell and Coombes, 1999; Doel, 1996). As a result, the 
turn to the ‘local’ in the literature, which is also mirrored in European and North American 
agricultural policy, aims to promote lagging rural regions in the north, and move toward a more 
‘reflexive politics’ of food that is ‘socially just’. DuPuis and Goodman (2005:359) note that in 
‘Europe, localization has become integral to a new E.U. system of devolved rural governance to 
enhance rural livelihoods and preserve European heritage’. But some authors suggest that it is not 
just an implied shift, but instead that food system localization is a fundamentally ‘political’ 
strategy of alternative agrifood movements in Europe and the United States whereby a class of 
consumers ultimately drive food reform and ‘save the food system’ (Allen and Hinrichs, 
2007:255).  
 
The research, with social activism undertones, has often been associated with elitist class politics 
and is fundamentally exclusionary, and scholars in the sub-field of Critical Geography (see 
Campling and Bernstein, 2006; Berg, 2004) take task with the romanticism of this work and call 
for an understanding of local food systems that ‘put localist actions on a better political footing, 
one that can contribute to a more democratic local food politics’ by placing ‘the local food system 
debate into the larger debate over devolutionist forms of governance (DuPuis and Goodman, 
2005: 360, 356).21
does not address the political driving forces behind the reconfiguration of space and scale 
or the new forms of commodification of territoriality. The local as an arena of political-
economic struggle and socially constructed scale of accumulation remains an opaque 
category, conceptually and empirically, a veritable black box (DuPuis and Goodman, 
2005:364).  
 As Dupuis and Goodman go on to argue, the (re)turn to the local  
Although DuPuis and Goodman’s work relates to northern contexts, the ‘arena of the local’ bears 
on our thinking of urban food systems in Africa. While food systems in urban areas in African 
countries are intricately linked to processes of globalised economic change, these spaces are also 
arena of ‘political-economic struggle’, and this ‘struggle’ or contestation provides insight into 
                                                 
21 Also see Bernstein and Campling (2006a), Abrahams (2007a) and Binns et al, (2007). 
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localised sets of practises (Abrahams, 2007).  While the precise insights from the localisation 
literature are different to what food system might mean in urban Africa, the idea of local or 
contextual embeddedness in this literature helps us understand how the political and social 
imperatives of the ‘local’ profoundly influence food systems.  
 
This is important for the purposes of this thesis because it is possible to see how institutionally 
and locally supported production and consumption systems have led to a sustained food economy 
that exists in a global context with local values (Allen and Hinrichs, 2007:255).  I draw on this 
work because it provides a useful vocabulary to examine ‘localised’ food systems in Zambia. 
Although the rest of the thesis does not use the concept of embeddedness, localised food systems 
are used to represent the political and social imperative that arise from actors, institutions and 
historical factors in the context, which shape the food system.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter began by reviewing the literature on how food in Africa (or urban agricultural 
systems) has been understood over time, and then discussed the shift from state-controlled food 
systems to liberalised economies after structural adjustment programmes. It traced the literature 
on food and agricultural systems in African countries post-independence where scholars focused 
on newly national marketing boards, the political and social imperatives of African states, and the 
impacts on the food systems because of increasing debt and inefficient bureaucratic structures. 
Social historians who reviewed food systems during the 1980s argued that understanding the 
multifaceted nature of African urban food systems relied on an interdisciplinary and contextual 
approach. It then went on to concentrate on the literature on the spread of supermarkets in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the perceived drivers of this process. This section formed the bulk of this 
review since it is the most dominant conception, in the literature, which seeks to account for the 
changes in African economies, and to project a growth path for African economies along the lines 
of supermarket dominance.  Finally, I briefly highlighted a body of work that is concerned with 
re-localising food systems. Although the focus on localisation reflected a particular moment in 
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European and British (rural) agricultural policy and greater interest in issues of consumption, 
there are important themes that emerge from this literature that point to how the trend toward 
localisation that appears to be growing. 
 
This chapter also demonstrates that there is no single approach to the study of food systems in 
Africa, which relates in part to the fact that the food system is so multifaceted, and in part to the 
perspectives in different disciplines. Work on informal markets for instance, has either tended to 
concentrate on (1) more anthropological elements of African urban food systems particularly in 
the work on social networks of interaction, or (2) urban informal food systems in Africa as 
survivalist or emerging as a coping mechanism in the face of other economic pressures. As such, 
the body of work on informal markets tends to exceptionalise African economies or, as Leys 
(1994) suggests, romanticise the economic interactions produced by poverty and food insecurity. 
Through the case of Zambia's food system, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate how examining the 
urban (informal) economy and processes of informalisation meaningfully contributes to our 
understanding of agrifood systems in Africa.  
 
Work on how agribusiness firms have profoundly transformed food systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in the past five years has become less disciplinary bound. Instead, because the approach 
emerges from a broader conception of how economies transition, particularly in this ‘phase of 
globalisation’, the changes in food economies in the south have become an important 
consideration. This chapter points to the inherent normativeness of the approach as seen in the 
way it asserts the dominance of supermarkets, and agribusiness firms and inadvertently overlooks 
the agency of non-firm institutions that may influence economic interaction in that context ( to 
recall the GPN approach mentioned in Chapter 1). The factors that influence the power of 
supermarkets presented here tempers the idea that high value chains linked to supermarkets are 
themselves the panacea for economic development in African countries. Instead, they place the 
importance of supermarkets and high value chains linked to agribusiness in perspective, detailing 
the importance of the domestic political economy and, within that context, the role of 
supermarkets in the urban food system. Where the literature is weak when it comes to presenting 
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the domestic political economy environment that shapes urban food systems since there is an 
overemphasis on the power of supermarkets, this section urges the necessary emphasis on 
historical political economy factors, other institutions, or the governing role of those institution in 
shaping African food systems. Where the literature fails to show how the power of supermarkets 
is contingent upon domestic and regional economic policy regulations, and institutional change of 
urban markets, the subsequent chapters of the thesis take on this challenge.  
 
Finally, the work on localisation adds to our conceptual toolbox by highlighting ways in which 
there may be other imperatives in the food system that are not entirely tied to globalised 
economic interaction. This work provides us with a framework of drawing out those elements of 
the food system that may relate to other political or social agenda that influence food system such 
as nurturing the domestic economy, or developing productive linkages between small-scale 
farmers and markets. These imperatives also point to other sites of power in the food system, and 
challenge the idea of a single trajectory of growth in food economies.  
 
More ‘material’ conclusions from this literature review point to the ‘makeup’ of food systems in 
Africa. From the discussion in the chapter we can conclude that food systems in Africa: 
- Are rooted in the domestic political economy context;  
- Incorporate elements of informality and formality;  
- Are the result of economic restructuring;  
-Are also the result of domestic political economy transitions and regional economic processes;  
- Embody a number of priorities – developmental, political and economic; and 
- Comprise multiple sites of power – urban markets and non-firm institutions.  
 
I am aware that drawing out these characteristics, in an attempt to get beyond the apparent 
dualism in the literature(s), risks generalising or essentialising economic interaction in different 
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countries on the continent to this framework. As Africanist scholars, note, drawing on 
postcolonialist perspectives, it is important to include literature that is not conventionally 
associated with certain places, and not to privilege a reading of African political or economic 
spaces, for instance, that is linked to discourses of either development or neoliberalism and the 
pathways inherent in these discourses (see Abrahamsen, 2003:191; Power, 2003:126).  
 
If we are to construct a conceptual framework on food systems in Africa, therefore, we need to 
make use of multiple conceptual lenses that will allow an empirical study that is relatively 
unhindered by these discursive categories, or at the very least, aware of them. The various bodies 
of work reviewed in this chapter, and the essential features of food systems in Africa alluded to 
above, contribute to a conceptual framework for the rest of the thesis. It also allows us to see food 
systems in Africa as situated or located in domestic political economies and profoundly 
influenced by processes of change at localised and regional scales. In sum, the cumulative 
conceptual foundation drawn out in this chapter frames the empirical examination in the rest of 
the thesis and gives us a wide-ranging and interdisciplinary ‘toolbox’ that informs the analysis of 
the empirical insights.  
 
The crucial next step, as outlined in this literature review chapter is therefore to look at (1) 
agrarian transformation and agricultural marketing post-independence in African countries; (2) 
the process and effect of neoliberal reforms and the liberalisation of the economy – which 
includes the spread of (South African) agribusiness firms and supermarkets; and (3) the informal 
economy. This is the focus of the next chapter. It is also appropriate here to recall some of the 
methodological considerations that have framed the empirical examination as set out in the next 
three chapters. 
 
 Restating the methodological considerations 
Drawing on the conclusion in this literature review chapter – that food systems in Africa can be 
seen as situated or located in a domestic political economy context and influenced by various 
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domestic and regional processes – this final section links the conclusion to the three research 
claims stated earlier in the thesis, and briefly recalls the methods I have used to acquire the kind 
of information that would be necessary in supporting these claims.  
 
Now that we have a basis in the literature/grounded theory to think about African food systems as 
situated in a domestic political economy context and influenced by various domestic processes, 
and we see the benefit of employing a systems approach, we are able to examine:  
1)  The pathways/trajectories of growth in Zambia's food system and the ongoing and 
interconnected process of change in the system that subsequently reworks it; 
2) Multiple sites of power in the food system, particularly those that would be ignored in 
more normalising agrifood research approaches; and 
3) Intersecting governances in the agrifood system and those factors in the domestic political 
economy that influence the power of agribusiness institutions and supermarkets.  
 
On the first point, in Chapter 4, I go about contextualising these broader concepts to Zambia. To 
do so, I examine the different pathways of growth, or trajectories, in Zambia’s political economy 
as it relates to the agrifood system, and the interconnected aspects that have influenced and 
continue to influence Zambia's food system. I look more closely at the historical context using a 
combination of methods such as archival work, secondary reading, and interviews as appropriate. 
As highlighted in the Introduction, since I draw on inductive and qualitative epistemological 
traditions, the analysis in this chapter both draws on and contributes to a construction of the 
context (as set out by content analysis methodology). In addition to the literature reviewed in this 
chapter, the rationale for this empirical chapter is drawn from the work of Jane Guyer, Deborah 
Bryceson and Gillian Hart in their understanding of (1) ongoing and interconnected processes of 
change that occur in African economies; (2) the underlined importance of seeing economic 
interaction and processes of change as rooted in the domestic political economy; and (3) 
multiples sites of power, or the balance of power, that influence(s) economic interaction.  
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On the second point, Chapter 5 argues that there multiple sites of power in the food system, and 
as such, the chapter examines two important institutions in Zambia's food system, the Zambian 
National Farmers’ Union and the Lusaka City Market, which would typically fall out of site in a 
more conventional value chains approach. As I point out in this chapter,  the rationale of this 
chapter is to directly address the assumption that supermarkets and agribusiness firms 
fundamentally transform (or even revolutionise) food economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 
the aim is not to quantitatively measure the ‘impact’ of these institutions in the food system, the 
methodological approach infers the importance of these institutions based on their function in the 
food system (as an intermediary institution in the case of the ZNFU and as an accessible market 
for small-scale farmers and urban consumers in the case of the informal market).  The empirical 
evidence presented here is based on narrative interviews and secondary material, where possible.  
 
On the final point, Chapter 6 is concerned with how the control or governance of supermarkets 
and agribusiness firms is significantly tempered or circumscribed by the governing behaviour of 





The previous chapter discussed the various ways agricultural and food systems have been written 
about, roughly, over the past forty years, and how food systems in Africa, particularly, have been 
understood. The next chapter starts out by briefly outlining why it is important to focus on the 
historical context, using important texts on African food supply systems as a rationale. It then 
emphasises various aspects of Zambia’s recent history that influence the agrifood system by 
drawing on various bodies of academic scholarship, and, where appropriate, it links these 
historical influences to recent changes in present day food system. The purpose of this chapter is 





CHAPTER 4: ZAMBIA’S AGRIFOOD  




In physics, when an object is moving, and several forces act on that object, the combined effect of 
those forces results in a shift of that object’s direction or pathway. The resultant direction is 
invariably altered, because it is the cumulative outcome of different influencing forces. But this is 
not physics, the forces are not always external, and the Zambian food system includes various 
actors and institutions that have a significant part to play in shaping it and influencing its 
direction. In this Chapter, I examine the different factors that have influenced, and continue to 
influence, Zambia’s food system and have also resulted in a particular trajectory. In other words, 
in addressing the complexity of Zambia’s food system, with its many juxtapositions, this chapter 
aims to highlight key influences in Zambia’s recent past and in some instances, reflect on how 
these influences intersect to result in the food system we see today. The rationale for this chapter 
is drawn from Gillian Hart’s (2002:13) use of the phrase ‘multiple trajectories’, in political 
geography22
                                                 
22 Hart examines how globalisation is destabilised because there are multiple sites of power at work locally that 
push development trajectories into multiple, and unexpected directions.  
, to articulate multiple sites of power that shape and influence a given ‘object of 
study’. Hart’s conception sits comfortably alongside the ‘systems approach’ because it 
incorporates notions of interconnectedness and continuity, which is precisely the motivation of 
this chapter. Hart’s definition of trajectories ‘convey[s] the ongoing processes through which sets 
of power-laden practices in the multiple, interconnected arena of everyday life at difference 
spatial scales constantly rework places and identities’ (Hart, 2002:13). Although this chapter does 
not look at ‘places’ or ‘identities’, the (often implicit) idea of trajectory or is taken to mean the 
ongoing, interconnected, political practises and processes that constantly rework Zambia’s food 
system and the broader political economy  that shapes the food system.  
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I am aware that taking this approach risks suggesting that there is a scientific way of ‘measuring’ 
these influences or a resultant ‘direction’. Ferguson (1999:x) accurately captures the sense of 
unease present when researchers attempt to map a neat story line of a set of occurrences from a 
range of different approaches. 
More theoretically, we might well be suspicious of criticisms of inevitable linear 
teleologies and progressive successions of epochs that proceed by constructing their 
own inevitable linear teleologies and successions of epochs…But it remains true that 
something has happened in recent years…the “rolling back” of the state, the 
abandonment of the goal of industrialization, the commitment to what are 
euphemistically called “market forces” and “private enterprises,” and the shattering of 
expectations for economic convergence with the West, all come together to create a 
very real end…of at least the grander versions of the development project in Africa 
(Ferguson, 1999: 247). 
 
This is especially poignant for this thesis given the varied conceptual approaches used over time 
by researchers discussed in Chapter 3. Yet, as Ferguson continues, there are particular aspects in 
Africa’s recent history that tell a story of how change has happened in many countries on the 
continent. While Ferguson later introduces the ‘development project’ in Zambia, his conclusion 
resonates in work on Zambia’s food system.23
 
  There are particular changes in Zambia's food 
system that can be traced to definite aspects, or as Ferguson puts it ‘start point[s] of a particular 
trajectory’ in its recent past (p247). 
In the Introduction, I drew attention to research by Africanist scholars working in the 1980s and 
90s on urban food systems. It bears reiterating relevant points here to frame the approach in this 
chapter. Feeding African Cities by Jane Guyer (1983) and Liberalizing Tanzania’s Food Trade 
by Deborah Fahy Bryceson (1993) outline important considerations for framing research on 
                                                 
23 Ferguson also makes the important point that the story of economic growth in Africa cannot be told without 
understanding the larger project of development that influenced countries in the south. 
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urban food supply systems in Africa. I base the discussion of Zambia’s historical context, as it 
relates to food systems, by drawing on two distilled reflections from these texts. Bryceson’s work 
places value on the political economy and the balance of power that together influence economic 
interaction in urban food systems (Bryceson, 1993). Guyer advocates an interdisciplinary 
approach which will ‘provide a coherent set of lenses that can reconstruct a knowledge base 
around urban food systems’ (Guyer, 1987:5).  
 
Given the above caveats, and the reiterated approach, how do we ‘make sense’ of Zambia’s food 
system, with its many facets and juxtapositions? And how do we explain in which ways the food 
system is influenced by the political economy context? Earlier descriptions of Zambia’s food 
system conveyed the stratified food systems made up of a large proportion of smallholders, a 
small, but growing number of medium-scale (emerging) farmers, and commercial farmers who 
are linked to larger economies of scale and integrated agribusiness firms. Besides just ‘making 
sense’ of the food system, there are also useful insights to be gained from understanding the food 
system and the influences at different scales. For instance, one of the biggest challenges that face 
the agricultural sector in Zambia is supporting and growing the food system at all levels. Tackling 
this challenge requires us to understand the sum of factors that impact Zambia's food system, and, 
in turn, the historical, regional and political economy context. It also requires us to recognize that 
these influencing factors do not operate in isolation, or within a vacuum.  
 
The rest of this chapter discusses a few of these influencing factors, paying particular attention to 
how they interplay. The purpose is not to capture every aspect of influence or site of power, but 
rather to highlight important considerations relevant to the study. What this chapter does is argue 
that Zambia's food system looks, acts and grows as it does today because particular contextual 
factors influence it. More than just Ferguson’s idea of ‘events’ or ‘historical moments’, this 
chapter links the reviewed historical and contextual factors to ‘rationalisations’ that are at work in 
the food system. 
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The first section discusses the ideological projects of colonialism and the Zambian variant of the 
post-colony – Zambianisation – which included the nationalisation of agriculture and marketing 
boards, and state control on all aspects of food supply through providing input and retail subsidies 
post-independence. The second section then examines the effects of globalisation and economic 
reforms. Neoliberal reforms are seen to significantly influence food systems in Zambia, and even 
more given that the government continues to intermittently control the food system. Another 
important aspect of Zambia's food system is the effect of the international agricultural research 
agenda or the ‘globalisation of knowledge’, particularly in maize production, discussed in the 
third section. The final section captures the pivotal role of a South African enterprise in Zambia’s 
food economy. Consequently, Zambia’s openness to foreign investment has resulted in the 
dominance of South Africa in the Zambian economy, but also interesting growth pathways in 
Zambia’s economy. The fourth section has to do with the changes in urban informal as they 
pertain to Zambia’s food (supply) system.  
 
The chapter concludes that the system seems to hold together through certain tacit 
rationalizations that are still at work today. In sum, the chapter aims to present some of the 
complexity in Zambia’s agrifood system so that the political economy context is seen to 
substantively contribute to the present day food system in Africa. The chapter relies on secondary 
and tertiary data from interdisciplinary sources, and independent archival research and 
interviews.  
 
The Zambian agricultural narrative  
Zambia, formally Northern Rhodesia, gained independence in 1964 from colonial rule and 
marked this liberty by changing its name. Even though the name had changed, the legacies of the 
colonial state were still keenly felt in Zambia, most notably in the agricultural community. 
Colonial rule created a very distinctive feature in Northern Rhodesian agriculture, as it did in 
many other countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. It divided agriculture into a wealthy 
white settler system on the one hand, and a class of African peasant farmers on the other (see 
 107 
Bernstein et al., 1992).24
forced rural producers to earn cash for tax payment, generating the foundations for the 
continent’s agricultural export economy based on the beverage crops of coffee, cocoa, and 
tea and several food and fibre crops including peanuts, cashew nuts, tobacco, sugar, and 
cotton (Bryceson, 2009:1).  
 Bryceson (2009) notes that peasant agriculture was annexed because of 
forced residential and poll taxation. This, she argues  
 
During the colonial period, African smallholders were also a pivotal part of the domestic food 
market. Despite trying to restrict Black African participation in the maize trade, smallholders 
contributed significantly to domestic food markets even though they were not paid equally for 
their grain. The maize trade was not only tied to export, but was used to supply the growing urban 
settlements along the line of rail in Northern Rhodesia (McCann, 2005; Guyer, 1987). Colonial 
authorities also used a wealthy, indigenous but opportunistic land-owning class to benefit settler 
agriculture (Bates, 1976, 1981).  
 
In Zambia, after independence, this system of agriculture continued to dominate mainly because 
of the now settler-run ‘Commercial Farmers’ Bureau’ (CFB), an association to protect and 
advance the interests of white commercial agriculture, which administered exports. Good (1988) 
shows that members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, who were motivated by ‘nationalistic 
politics and economics’ and involved in large-scale farming, urged the newly independent 
government to intervene in the settler-dominated agricultural market (Good, 1988:201). In 
response to this pressure, in 1971 the newly independent Zambian state declared that the CFB 
would also include commercial African farmers, and would now be called the ‘Multiracial 
Commercial Farmers’ Bureau’. This change did not lead to white commercial farm dispossession 
as it did in other African countries. The Zambian government initiated this non-threatening move 
in part because it still stood to benefit from white commercial agriculture, and wanted to send a 
                                                 
24 Bernstein’s introduction in this edited collection also makes reference to literature on the indigenous elite class 
who bridged this divide.  
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clear signal that white commercial farmers would not be dispossessed of their land.25
 
 Many 
export farmers did leave, but the maize farmers and grain millers who stayed continue to play a 
pivotal role in Zambia’s commercial agriculture sector, which now incorporated a large 
percentage of smallholders. 
Another body called the Zambian Farmers’ Union was initiated entirely by highly politicised 
groups of ‘peasant’ smallholders who could produce large enough quantities of grain for 
domestic trade. Over two thirds of the agricultural population at that stage were small-scale 
farmers. While the Multiracial CFB was spun as a way to peacefully integrate black and white 
commercial agriculture in the national economy, the highly politicized Zambian Farmers’ Union 
was promoted as a nationalizing mechanism. Bryceson explains that  
peasant cash crop producers provided the political force behind the national independence 
movements that swept the African continent in the 1950s and formed the foundation for the 
economies of the newly independent countries that came into being in the 1960s (Bryceson, 
2009:1).  
 
Thus, in the Zambian case, both the political elite African farmers and the large percentage of 
peasant agricultural groups were seen to have motivated initial changes in Zambian agricultural. 
These changes were influenced ultimately by then President Kenneth Kaunda’s ideal for 
‘Zambianisation’, as I go on to discuss further. 
                                                 
25 In the literature this form of socialism is called Fabianism. It is argued to be the ideology responsible for post-
independence revolution through peaceful means while gradually becoming market-driven. Fabianism captured 
many of the returning Zambian politic elite who had complete higher education in Europe at the time when 
Fabianism was the leading influence (See Ndulu et al, 2008 for a detailed discussion on this argument). 
Nationalism and its influence on agriculture  
Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s first president, stirred his people with the political ideals of taking 
back what was lost and redeeming the glory of the nation through the ideal of ‘Zambianisation’, 
which was the more emotive term used to encapsulate nationalization through ‘taking back’ 
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agriculture, and other commercial enterprise such as mining. He encouraged the mostly rural 
population to return to the land, which was also politically strategic for Kaunda because it 
guaranteed a strong rural support base among the large proportion of small-scale farmers, and it 
also rationalized the control of public enterprises, not unlike other newly independent African 
states.  
 
Zambianisation meant that the government controlled agricultural marketing boards, effectively 
monopolizing industry through price controls and subsidies for commercial agricultural trade. 
Increased agricultural output of staples, during Kaunda’s first term in office, were collected 
through cooperatives and sold through the National Agricultural Marketing Board (Namboard). 
National policies favoured small-scale farmers though pan-territorial pricing, the cooperative 
buying scheme through Namboard even in remote areas, and input subsidies (Dorosh et al. 2009). 
Also, where colonial marketing boards (also using maize from African smallholders) aimed to 
supply maize grain to local and regional markets to feed the growing mining towns, 
Zambianising the line of rail in urban food supply became increasingly important (Bryceson, 
1983; Bates 1991). In other words it was not only important for government to control production 
and trade, but also food provisioning.  
 
By the mid 1980s the largest grain millers were also nationalized to ensure control on food prices; 
national policies also subsidized the price of maize to urban consumers. The Zambian 
government thus controlled both domestic exchange of food, imports and exports through 
Namboard (Dorosh et al., 2009; MSU paper; Haantuba and de Graf, 2008; Jayne, 2008; Wood, 
1985). The gains of this period were short-lived, however. The next major occurrence that 
influenced the trajectory of agrarian change in Africa was the Sahelian famine in the 1970s. Wide 
scale drought, led ultimately to the death of hundreds of thousands of people in the Sahel belt of 
countries. This crisis reshaped aid interventions in rural development already existing in African 
countries to a focus on agricultural innovation and the modernization of African agriculture to 
meet environmental challenges.   
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The globalization of knowledge and its influence on agriculture  
As a result of broader environmental challenges in the region, the reshaping of donor 
development intervention, and changes in the global financial architecture, Zambia’s agricultural 
narrative includes technological innovation in agriculture. Zambia’s Green Revolution, and the 
related Integrated Rural Development Program, on the surface resulted in higher yields and 
increased livelihoods security for the rural population, but it also caused social inequality and 
environmental damage. Smith (2005:649) argues that this was not simply the case of increasing 
yield or better livelihoods or uneven social consequences and environmental risks for small-scale 
farmers. Instead, agricultural systems in Africa, he argues, are part of a much larger 
developmental project where international agencies and research centres (as part of competitive 
national innovation systems) aimed to exert continued control through the transfer of existing 
technological innovation and development (Smith, 2005:647). This ‘globalization of knowledge’ 
(Smith, 2005:649) signalled an era of ‘modernization’ and ‘progress’ in Zambia and other 
countries in Africa and Asia.  For almost the first fifteen years of independence, many of these 
countries were used as testing grounds for new maize varieties by development agencies and 
international agricultural institutes, and Zambia was seen as the golden example.  
 
McCann (2005) notes that in the late 1970s various international donors aided the Zambian 
government, through the Mazabuka Maize Research Institute, in developing a variety of maize 
that was high yielding, and was adapted to local conditions. Howard and Mungoma (1996:1) state 
that ‘for the past 20 years, Zambia has provided a unique laboratory for examining the impact of 
institutions and organizations on the development and dissemination of maize technology’. The 
Green Revolution promised higher yielding seed that would support and modernize the country’s 
efforts to ‘re-agrarianize’ rural society (Fenichel and Smith, 1992). Little and Watts (1994:9) 
recount how, in the 1980s, farming contracts elsewhere in Africa were justified by knowledge 
services (and funding) provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
which was the main instrument for rural development in Africa. The combination of international 
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donor funding, globalised knowledge through Centres of Excellence, the rural development 
project in Africa, and re-agrarianisation created a situation where modernization, progress and 
agrarian transformation through technological means were indelibly linked. And these 
intersections did not only benefit researchers or agribusiness firms.  
 
Politically in Zambia, rural development through technologies was strategic because it meant that 
smallholders could benefit from their own ‘modern’ farming strategies, and earn a place in local 
or international markets, and their success translated to support for Kaunda’s government. Staple 
grain was most successful, followed by the poultry sector. British scientists together with their 
South African counterparts in the poultry industry, developed a breed of chicken adapted to the 
Southern African climate (Ross Breeders, personal communication, 2007).26
 
 Thus, outside of the 
domestic grain trade, poultry became the single largest agricultural enterprise, with an all 
important export supply chain to Zaire (the DRC). The Zambian government’s Rural Poultry 
Development Scheme (which ended a few years later) provided extension services for the poultry 
industry, and Israeli technical aid personnel farming supported cooperatives in the Copperbelt 
region (Lombard and Tweedie, 1972).  
Another reason why the yields of agricultural innovation were promising and politically strategic 
is because it was tied so closely to Zambianisation. Over the next fifteen years, up to 1990, maize 
production increased by 137 percent and small-scale farmers were producing 80 percent of 
Zambia’s output (McCann, 2005:160). But that success was not sustainable, and even if it were, it 
was doomed to failure. According to McCann,  
Zambia’s progressive policy of subsidizing small farmers in areas remote from towns and 
transportation quickly became the prime target of new liberalizing ideologies sweeping 
through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The organizations that had 
generously pushed loans on to Zambia in the 1970s now sought economic reform and made 
Zambia’s maize system a target (McCann, 2005:164-5).  
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As the next sections go on to show, the Zambian government and its policies were caught 
between Zambianisation ideals, pleasing the same international donor community that demanded 
reforms, and aspiring toward modernization or industrializing agriculture (Ferguson, 1999:8).27
 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
26 The literature on this particular point is limited.  
27 At present, agricultural research and innovation is carried out by a special unit in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, the Agricultural Consultative Forum, and a donor-supported partnership between stakeholders in the 
local and international community on agriculture. 
Neoliberalism and its influence on agriculture  
In the late 1970s and early 80s, Zambia had become the darling child of the international media 
and a symbol of ‘emerging Africa’. Because of the country’s success in mining, and the modern 
agricultural system it had developed, it was seen to be a ‘middle-income country’ with  
prospects for “full” industrialization and even ultimate admission to the ranks of the 
“developed world” (Ferguson, 1999:4-6).  
 
But declining copper prices and a slumping global economy resulted in a sharp downturn in 
Zambian exports that rippled through the economy. The IMF and the World Bank put this down 
to mismanagement, and the incapacity of the state – a recitation that provided justification for 
economic reforms in Zambia and elsewhere. The justification was often veiled in statements such 
as this: ‘Unless economic transformation [is] embraced, the established and debilitating linkage 
between weak state and backward peasant agriculture would almost certainly continue unabated’ 
(Good, 1988:203).  
 
Zambia’s economic decline was a sad reversal of the once promising modern Zambian image, 
argues Ferguson (1999:4). The economic decline nonetheless continued, and coupled with 
increasing debt during the mid-1980s, Zambia became a prime target for economic reforms. The 
IMF and the World Bank continued to coerce Zambia to remove state subsidies on agriculture, 
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decrease social spending and lessen support for public goods such as marketing boards and state 
storage facilities (Jayne, 2008; Dorosh et al., 2009; Jayne et al., 1999; Howard and Mungoma, 
1996).  
 
Kaunda’s government, because of its Zambianising ideals and the successes it had already shown 
in the agricultural sector, on the one hand, and increasing external debt and pressure by the donor 
community on the other,  
had little choice but to yield to the demands made by lenders for measures of “structural 
adjustment” of the economy [but this was] implemented on an on-again, off-again basis 
throughout the 1980s by a government that alternated between capitulation and defiance 
and carried through more consistently since the election of the Chiluba government in 1991 
(Ferguson, 1999:9).  
 
Kaunda’s government had an understandably unsettled stance on liberalization during the 
‘Second Republic’ (Kean and Wood, 1992). Zambia’s Fourth National Development Plan (1989-
1993), which crossed over the Kaunda and Chiluba regimes, was more favourable to foreign 
investment in agriculture than the three previously had been because there was support among 
government officials who stood to benefit from their agricultural enterprises and landholdings 
(Good, 1988). 
 
There were a few notable examples of the increased openness to neoliberal reforms. South 
African agribusinesses courted the Zambian agricultural community in the hope that they could 
expand into the newly liberalizing market, and, according to anecdotal evidence, the Zambian 
state retail company approached the South African supermarket chain, Shoprite, to ‘help 
liberalise state owned supermarkets’ (Personal Communication, Head of Shoprite Africa 
Operations, Cape Town, January 2007). In the last few years of his rule (1986-1990), Kaunda 
flitted between liberalizing and protecting local agriculture. This was also related to his last 
efforts at holding on to power before the election in 1991. To appease and gain support from the 
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agricultural community who were keen to compete in an open market, and to gain favour from 
the international development community, he removed state subsidies (from millers) and 
agricultural inputs. This had an effect on both the agricultural community because input costs 
could not be met, and urban residents because the cost of food was no longer subsidized, resulting 
in urban unrest. Another escalating contributor to food protests was evidence that the National 
Agricultural Maize Board officials pocketed much of the profits from its agricultural marketing 
enterprise. Food protests quickly escalated into violent riots where eleven people died. Kaunda 
promptly retracted his early decision to liberalize the food economy, and instead asserted the 
importance of state control of agriculture (New York Times, 1986). He reinstated subsidies, and 
made up for the state’s financial losses by using funds from public sector development from 
donors (Chicago Times, 1986). The maize price dropped irredeemably, in 1990, when Kaunda 
announced another round of agricultural subsidy cuts, this time because of the mismanagement of 
other funds. The Zambian state was faced with the challenge of increasing food prices, risking 
further riots or continuing to subsidise farmers and agrifood costs, but lose donor funding. 
 
As a response to Kaunda’s inconsistent policy that ultimately increased poverty and hunger, the 
nation made their voice heard by voting for his political rival in the 1991 elections. From the 
beginning of Frederick Chiluba’s regime in 1991, his government was open to economic 
liberalization and was praised by the World Bank and IMF for ‘embracing’ change and finally 
removing its trade barriers (Brambilla and Porto, 2006:1). In the words of the researchers from 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, Chiluba’s regime ‘gave way to an aggressive neoliberal 
economic strategy that embraced wide-ranging structural adjustment programmes and 
privatization’ (EIU, 2006:5). Zambia reduced its own investment on public goods like state 
marketing facilities, storage companies and agricultural boards. Namboard disbanded, but the 
government retained a Food Reserves Agency from Namboard’s stock. The Israeli government 
and later the European Union invested in previously state-owned wet markets, urging markets to 




Over the next five years, the state sold off its assets and within a year most of the state-owned 
enterprises were liberalized. Investment poured into mining, and international interests bought 
textile and agricultural industries and many of the key processing companies (Brambilla and 
Porto, 2006; Deininger and Olinto, 2000). The National Import and Export Corporation, which 
was the state’s main retail outlet, was bought in 1995 by the South African supermarket chain 
Shoprite, and two large, South African-owned private grain milling companies entered the scene. 
One bought out the National Milling Corporation, and the other was an expansion of South 
Africa’s milling company, Tiger Brands.  
 
Liberalization did not happen after a fixed moment, instead can de described more as a trajectory 
that set Zambia, as it did other countries, on a particular course. First, in Zambia, the 
liberalisation project was never ‘completed’. It is still on-going even though Kaunda’s era, with 
its stop-and-go revolution (as Howard and Mungoma (1996) term it) is long since passed. And 
even though maize was one of the last industries to be liberalized in Zambia (McCann, 2005), it 
still remains a highly political crop. The Zambian government continues to intermittently control 
the maize industry. For instance, during high yield harvests, it enforces tighter control on imports 
and exports, and in lean seasons, it releases control to the private sector to ‘lobby’ for importing 
agricultural inputs (Dorosh et al., 2009; Jayne et al., 1999). Most recently (2008) its tussle with 
the Zambian National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) about the Food Reserves’ Agency is telling.  
 
The government recently announced that in order to stimulate the private sector and encourage 
small-scale farmers to sell to high value chains, it would dramatically reduce the amount it would 
buy for the Foods’ Reserve. This drastic change was vehemently opposed by the National 
Farmers’ Union. According to the union, a reduction in state purchasing would lead to 
exploitative selling arrangements with unscrupulous traders and a massive grain glut. Instead, the 
ZNFU lobby urged the state to reduce its support for agriculture in tandem with the gradual 
growth of the agribusiness sector. Despite this, the agricultural ministry went ahead with its 
decision based on alleged ‘cooked minutes’ of state-private sector consultative meeting (ZNFU 
Press Release, December 2008). The state also faces continual critique by the ZNFU for its 
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prolonged monopoly on the fertilizer industry and its unsustainable commitment to subsidise 
fertilizer inputs. 
 
Interestingly, one would expect the ZNFU, which is a private business association, to back the 
state’s neoliberal agenda; instead, it recognizes the developmental imperative of the state to 
nurture the economy and not liberalise it too quickly or drop barriers too far.  Although I discuss 
this further in Chapter 6, it is important to demonstrate persistent elements of Zambia's food 
system here. This quote from my research in 2007 reflects the agribusiness community’s ongoing 
frustration with the Zambian state’s ‘on-again, off-again’ liberalization strategy, yet at the same 
time it reveals the compulsion to nurture the emerging Zambian agricultural economy. I use the 
excerpt to round this section off and to capture the characteristic sense of ‘restlessness’ in 
Zambia’s food system that is suspended between liberalizing and protecting local agribusiness, 
much like Kaunda’s ‘stop-and-go’ agricultural revolution.  
 
Now we're running into a slight problem; the millers here are often tempted to do bran 
exports, they do export maize bran and wheat bran to the neighbouring countries …and end 
up creating a huge shortage in the country, which is what we're going through right now. 
We cannot find maize bran for love or money. …In a free market system, if those guys can 
sell their products for a better price outside the borders, then we as local users should be 
paying that price… Although I'd like the bran export to stop, it's a two-edged sword, 
because I also want there to be a free market system. (Interview, Head of Tiger Animal 
Feeds Zambia, August 2007).  
 
The characteristic sense of restlessness of the agrifood industry in Zambia seems to emerge from 
conflicting national and neoliberal ‘rationalisations’, both of which constitute the context and 
motivate certain viewpoints and activities. Even though these two processes are distinct, in the 
agrifood system, one can understand the difficulty of separating them out. In Zambia, the ‘stop-
and-go revolution’, intermittent price controls and the characteristic challenges that are faced by 
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newly liberalising economies suggest that we need a revised approach. For the most part, 
accounts of agrarian change in Africa assume a divide between the nationalising and liberalising 
processes, and as such failures in economic development are attributed to continued state 
‘interference’ (see Bates, 2008:175). As a result, certain theorists do suggest that the kind of 
restlessness depicted in this chapter represents the ‘growing pains’ of an economy in transition 
from state to free market governance (see Collier and O’Connell, 2008:76). That economic 
growth is still embedded in a state-governed political context, is according to some, precisely at 
the heart of conflict in urban Africa (see Collier, 2008:1).  
 
The case of Zambia’s food system shows that ‘embeddedness’ is by no means a simple or neat 
idea. Indeed some researchers critique the idea of embeddedness, arguing that if ‘the economic’ is 
embedded in ‘the local’ (political or social) that these are two distinctive wholes (Swyngedouw, 
2004:25; Gibson-Graham, 2002:29). Instead, the constant struggle, or tug-of-war if you like, 
between nationalising and neoliberalising priorities must allow us to think of the context as a 
flexible space that is constantly negotiated and shifting, and not as a fixed entity upon which 
external economies are embedded. For the purposes of this chapter, it is useful to draw out the 
way these distinct priorities together constitute and shape the Zambian context wherein the 
agrifood system exists. The next section builds on the discussion of the neoliberal shift in 
Zambia, and relates it to a third more geographical aspect that influences Zambia's food system.
 
South Africa’s role in the Southern African region and agribusiness 
investment  
As noted in the previous chapter, the expansion of South African agribusiness is one of the most 
visible effects of market liberalization on food economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Zambia is 
the biggest recipient of South African foreign investment in agribusiness. Fortuitously for South 
Africa, Zambia’s ‘full’ liberalization during Chiluba’s reign, which roughly coincided with the 
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end of Apartheid in 1994, resulted in ‘new respectability on the region’s policies and projects, 
catapulting South Africa from pariah to regional liberator’ (Miller, 2008:1). Based on South 
Africa’s dominance in the region, mentioned earlier in the thesis, this section reiterates the role of 
South Africa in Zambia's food system, and closes with recent evidence that Zambia is 
increasingly guarded against this dominance.  
 
South Africa is the largest foreign investor in the rest of Southern Africa because of its strong 
economic position in the region (South African State of the Nation Report, 2006). The Zambian 
capital, Lusaka, is ‘seen by many South African businesses as a typical regional city [and] a 
regional testing ground of sorts…[sometimes termed] South Africa’s doll-house’ (Saunders, 
2008:1) – a quote I alluded to earlier. South African business expansion usually begins with 
Zambia; companies test-ran their capital expansion on Zambia, and then expanded elsewhere. 
This was most evident in the food retailing industry (ibid).  But there continue to be mixed 
feelings about South Africa’s role in the region, which also relate to Zambia’s priority to 
nationalise and further develop itself into a neoliberal economy.  
 
On the one hand, South Africa is seen as a key part of the strategy for strengthening regional 
integration in globalised agricultural trade. This is important to build an economically strong and 
competitive regional community. Former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, encouraged 
countries in the region to deepen, and often fast-track, their neoliberal policies to attract foreign 
investment (Saunders, 2008). He couched this blatantly pro-market view in the ideology of the 
African Renaissance, and this sat well with other newly liberalising African countries. It 
produced a sense of regional camaraderie: ‘South Africa is a friend, a strategic partner and a 
stable country for business (Kenyan High Commissioner cited in BDFM, 2008). On the other 
hand, South African agribusinesses are seen as bullies who are not afraid to exploit economic 
relations with its neighbours (see Miller, 2008). For instance, much like other countries, the South 
African (national) Reserve Bank supports South African investment initiatives so long as it 
contributes to benefiting South African labour. At the same time, South African companies come 
under vitriolic attack because of its labour policies in the Southern African region (see Miller, 
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2005a; 2005b; 2008). 
 
In Zambia, the hostility towards South African firms, particularly supermarkets and 
agribusiness firms has its roots in issues of both foreign ownership and labour. This has taken 
the form of protests outside stores and scathing press campaigns. The South African 
supermarket, Shoprite, has come up against intensely negative publicity in the past five years 
because of policies that favour South African employees in management positions in its 
Zambian outlets (Miller, 2004, 2005). Antagonism towards the conglomerate has also been 
directed at sourcing and procurement practices that are partial to South African – not Zambian – 
suppliers, even when produce is available in the country. Agricultural unions in Lusaka have 
accused Shoprite of actively excluding local farmers from supply chains (personal 
communication with CEO of the ZNFU, November, 2007). In response to the criticism levelled 
against its reluctance to source locally, the supermarket has been at pains to demonstrate 
examples of its local investment: it has pointed to upgrading assistance provided to the 
Zambian milk and chicken processing industries, and asserted its commitment to local sourcing 
by arranging large publicity events through Freshmark, Shoprite’s fresh produce procurement 
wing (personal communication with Shoprite’s Director of African Operations, January, 2007). 
The hostility towards supermarkets, more generally, and escalating incidents of civic and legal 
contestation of supermarket practices in Africa are surprising given the favourable treatment of 
supermarkets, and the transformation they generate, in much of the academic literature. 
 
South African agribusiness and retail expansion is successful in Zambia because (1) in the 
1990s, Zambia offered preferential tax holidays for investment; and (2) South African 
businesses had well-established themselves domestically in South Africa. The ability of these 
companies to take over existing food enterprise was strengthened by an open economy in 
Zambia. Also, South African agribusinesses were more powerful competitors in the region, and 
Zambia was considered a safe investment, far enough away from South Africa’s borders. The 
role of South Africa in Africa has received quite scathing criticism from authors who argue that 
the tendency for South Africa to over dominate (food) trade in the Southern Africa region can 
best be described as sub-imperialism (Miller, 2008; Kenny and Mather, 2008; Saunders, 2008). 
 120 
Apart from the South African supermarket Shoprite (see Chapter 6), other agribusiness 
involvement in Zambia is also fraught with ambiguity, as in the case of Tiger Animal Feeds, 
discussed below. In Tiger’s case, we can see the tension between protecting South African 
industry and, to use Coe and Hess’s (2006) phrase, ‘strategically territorialising’ in Zambia.  
 
Subsidiary of the South African firm: Tiger Animal Feeds 
Tiger Animal Feeds has been operating in Zambia since 1996 (for eleven years at the time of the 
fieldwork). It is exclusively an animal stock feed manufacturer, and a subsidiary of a South 
African company. Tiger is part of the Meadow Feeds branch of the South African owned Astral 
Group of agribusiness companies that split with Tiger Brands South Africa.28 Astral (SA) is a 




The company has come under criticism in the past for preferentially sourcing South African 
maize for their feeds, and now ensures that where possible, all its sourcing is local (Personal 
Communication, Tiger Animal Feeds, Lusaka, August 2007). One of the directors of Tiger, who 
later verified his statement by showing me company reports, asserted that where possible,  
 
In terms of procurement and sales… we procure all our raw materials locally. The only 
thing we, and I believe all other stock feed millers bring in is our soya and premixes (the 
vitamin and mineral packs we use in the feed) because they’re not manufactured here in 
Zambia and are essential. Anything that is produced here that can be used we use here. So 
                                                 
28 The company could not register under the Meadow Feeds brand as it did in our Southern African countries, thus 
retained the name Tiger. Tiger Brands, the South African company, is fairly influential in the downstream (retail) 
enterprises of agricultural production particularly bread, and other highly processed foodstuff. The company has of 
late attempted to rescue itself from a number of price fixing scandals and anti-competitive incidents. Tiger (Z), 
thus, is at pains to remove itself from Tiger Brands (SA).  
29 The company provides stock feed that is already mixed with micronutrients and antibiotics in 25 or 50kg sacks, 
or in bulk with a minimum weight of 20 tons. They also offer sales and animal nutritional support as well as soil 
testing and expert assistance. 
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we do support the local agro industry quite strongly…but if the situation dictates, then we 
have to adapt, I mean if there’s no product, we need to bring it in. Otherwise we buy locally 
wherever we can, whenever we can, that is definitely our preferred supply network.30
 
 
Tiger’s sourcing practises are related to remaining locally competitive and escaping negative 
publicity for sourcing from South Africa. Despite this, there are ongoing allegations that feed 
inputs (such as bran), available much more cheaply in South Africa, are being smuggled in 
(personal communication, respondent from the Zambian National Farmers’ Union, November 
2007, Lusaka). Unlike other companies that seem to ‘localise’ (see Chapter 6), Tiger Animal 
Feeds appear to vacillate between its territorial ‘commitments’ in Zambia, and its duty to the 
South African company. This is particularly important because maize prices in the Southern 
Africa region are often subject to fluctuations influenced by costs in South Africa. And more 
expensive (or protected) local prices in Zambia (through bans on imports) means that the 
company could sell feed to Zambian farmers brought in from South Africa at a fraction of the 
cost, but they remain constrained by trade barriers. The opposite is also true, Zambian feed 
exports, such as soya, could be exported competitively, but intermittent national export controls 
makes the market extremely volatile. This excerpt, from a lengthy interview, gives a sense of the 
ambiguity that a South African agribusiness manager feels in Zambia, where there are seemingly 
conflicting priorities in the Zambian context that influence business: protecting the domestic 
market, liberalising, becoming competitive and developing economically. I include this quote 
because it captures different rationalisations that are at work in Zambia's food system and thereby 
points to its complexity. 
  
You've got two choices, you can either lobby government and ask them to close the 
borders and to stop bran exports, and we [the local poultry industry] do that through the 
ZNFU [Zambian National Farmers’ Union]. ZNFU is still assessing the situation. Will the 
poultry industry suffer? That's on the one hand, in the poultry industry, it will make things 
                                                 
30 Interview, Tiger Animal Feeds Zambia, Lusaka, July 2007.  
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more challenging, but you know one has to decide and this is what government has to 
decide is whether they're going to support a free market system or not. Either one or the 
other. This half-half, sometimes exports are banned, sometimes there's an import duty, 
sometimes there isn't, you know it's a mess. … 
 
We've had exactly the same problem with the soya right now. Soya, the guys [Zambian 
soya producers] could export their soya, let's say for argument sake, for $360 a ton, and 
then government brought in a ban on soya exports, the price went from 360 to 260 
because there was too much soya, but you've also got to look at your cost of production. It 
costs 320 a ton to produce soya, so you also can't muck around with the guys taking 
advantage of the free market system by exporting their product, because how are the 
farmers supposed to make a profit, how are they supposed to stay alive, how're they 
supposed to make money?31
 
 
What this suggests is that both the South African supermarket and the agribusiness do not 
‘descend’ on a blank slate as suggested in the ‘supermarket revolution’. Even though they 
influence Zambia's food system, there are also on-going processes of change, constantly adapting 
policies and important priorities in the Zambian context that influence the way business happens. 
It is therefore important to recognise that the factors that influence the food system in Zambia are 
also in turn influenced by other forces. In Chapter 6 we look more closely at how different 
influencing or governing factors play off against each other. That said, it is still important to 
understand that in Zambia, South African business investment significantly influences the food 
system.  
 
Thus far, the chapter has focused on three aspects that influence Zambia's food system. These 
aspects do not ‘affect’ the Zambian context as if they are external forces and the context is a 
                                                 
31 Interview, Tiger Animal Feeds Zambia, Lusaka, July 2007.  
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blank slate. Instead, the ‘context’ is constituted by interaction between different institutions, and 
different rationalisations – protecting the domestic economy, liberalising, and economic growth. 
Development concerns, and political and economic priorities are inserted at every level, and as 
such, are not ‘embedded’. Although there may be many other influencing factors, this chapter 
will focus, finally, on the informal dimension of the agrifood system. Jane Guyer notes that 
informal urban markets can ‘also be legitimately claimed to represent important sites for focusing 
on larger social processes which link local, regional, national and international arena because the 
organizations which achieve these articulations are generally urban based’ (Guyer, 1987:6).  
 
Urban market economies 
As a short introduction to this section, it is appropriate to describe urban food markets in Lusaka 
at present. What we see, though, is only the outcome of a much larger process of informalisation 
that is integral to Zambia’s political economy. Urban markets are made up of two types: (1) 
larger wholesale markets (wet markets), which are on average two square kilometres in size, 
where large amounts of fresh produce are sold; and (2) smaller retail markets that range from 
small tuntemba (trading stalls, literally table of economy) clusters in residential areas to 500 
square metre demarcated spaces in the city, where one is either able to buy a number of things – 
food, electronics, CDs – or have tailoring, photocopying, or hairdressing done. The municipality 
regulates both these market types, even though a few are still under the ‘control’ of trader 
associations. There are also various types of traders: intermediaries or agents (as they call 
themselves, who bring produce to wet markets on behalf of farmers; transporters; marketeers 
(who are basically vendors); and resellers, who buy from wet markets to resell in urban retail 
markets or tuntemba in-and-around the city and in residential areas.32
                                                 
32 Bryceson (1993); Tranberg Hansen (2002); Coen-Flynn (2005) Porter et al (2004; 2006) provide further detail 
on urban traders.  
 Typical examples of 
wholesale markets would be the BH market for fresh produce and Mims market for live chickens. 
Outside the BH gates, sugarcane and coal traders line the road, and inside there is a colourful 




, large aluminium baths filled with rice, dried beans, small dried 
Kapenta (5mm-long fish), and neatly set out sacks of onions and boxes of tomatoes. BH was first 
the main trading area of commercial farmers during the colonial period. It is now an open field 
where scores of intermediary traders sell produce from farms outside the Lusaka province. BH is 
attached to the large Soweto retail market that extends on both sides of the railway tracks in 
central Lusaka. During the colonial period, informal retail markets such as Soweto developed 
along the line of rail to ‘feed the city’. The wet market remains crucial to the urban food supply 
system because foodstuff makes its way in and around the city through traders, and it aids 
accessibility to food to Lusaka’s population.  
‘Mims Gate’ is the poultry wholesale area between the Soweto and City retail markets in central 
Lusaka (see Figure 3). Every day of the week except Sunday dozens of intermediaries or farmers 
drive in their vans and trucks filled with hundreds of live chicken into Mims. One farmer 
explains:  
I bring mainly around 200-250 a day. Selling all depends how the market is, today is very 
slow. Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays are good. People buy one day, they skip a day. 
Mainly they are traders; very few buy for their houses. Some even buy a hundred. Some 
even 150. Some come here, they hire vehicles, some come with their buckets and dishes, 
some they just use their trailers. We have different prices. Some are selling for 15, 14. I 
started this morning with 14, now I’m selling at 14 500. Our farm is called Leopard. It’s 
2km away. I bring my chickens here, but people from Soweto market come all the way to 
the farm, or the traders from here. Every two weeks we have about 2 500 [chickens]. 
(Interview with Mims Gate Farmer, Mum Agnes, July 2007). 
 
As noted in the above excerpt, Mims area closes at eight am to prohibit large numbers of 
consumers from buying at wholesaler prices. Instead traders buy at Mims and resell in residential 
                                                 
33 Masau is a small gooseberry-type fruit sold loose, but measured in tins. They come from Chilundu, the area that 
borders Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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compounds or just outside the Mims Gate. This is a highly competitive retail area that is fuelled 
by a rise urban consumer demand for chicken. 
 
From the research conducted in urban markets in Lusaka, the importance of these retail spaces is 
clear. Wholesale markets frequently supply smaller retail markets in and around the city, and in 
residential compounds. Urban retail markets dot the urban landscape in the Zambian capital, 
Lusaka, and, because they are more proximate to urban residents, these markets create a more 
effective and accessible food supply system. For instance, in Mtendere, one of the compounds in 
Lusaka, there are a number of informal retail markets that sell foodstuff, live chickens and other 
commodities. The market stalls are built of corrugated iron, wooden beams, chicken wire, plastic, 
mobile pergolas, or a combination of any of these. Food traders do not expect to make huge 
profits, and often younger members of the family are left at stalls while older family members 
either have barber, construction, braiding stalls nearby, or work elsewhere in the city. These stalls 
are, then, an additional source of income for urban households. In cases where these market stalls 
are the primary form of income, neighbourhood residents support them. Most neighbourhood 
consumers purchase small quantities of foodstuff daily, and often on a meal-to-meal basis. This is 
because a large percentage of people do not have access to refrigeration. Urban retail markets 
enable the urban poor to buy fresh foodstuff, and as noted in the previous chapter, is central to the 
urban food provisioning complex in many Sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
Urban wet markets and tuntemba in Lusaka are physically accessible to consumers and traders 
because of the adjacent public transport system, and the high percentage of these outlets in 
residential compounds.  These markets are central to making urban food markets accessible for 
small-scale farmers and urban consumers, and increasing gainful employment in the informal 
sector. Given this, informal urban food markets are a crucial element of the Zambia's food 
system. They are neither ad hoc or survivalist and they have not recently arisen as a contingency 
plan to address poverty or food security concerns, even though they often do. Urban markets are 
established features of the city, rooted in historical political economy changes, in particular the 
failures of formal agricultural networks and the mainstream neoliberal economy. While such 
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markets are a common feature in urban Africa and there are many accounts of them in the 
literature, what makes this one worth attention are the recent development in the management of 
the market. 
 
Informal food marketing in Zambia pre- and post- colonization  
‘Informal’ modes of food exchange have long been a feature of the African city as briefly 
introduced in the previous chapter. Newly independent African states only inherited ‘controlled 
maize marketing systems’ from the colonial government (Jayne, 2008). This was true also in 
Zambia’s government. The urban economic base in colonial Northern Rhodesia (pre-independent 
Zambia) was copper mining. ‘Urban’ labour reserves sprung up along the line of rail, and urban 
populations needed food markets. Colonial authorities bought maize from small-scale farmers 
and urban traders controlled its sale in residential urban markets (Guyer, 1987). In addition to 
urban markets, a petty trade class soon emerged from black urban residential enclaves. Informal 
economic activity included food stalls, various artisanal and textile repair crafts and hairdressing. 
Colonial authorities were opposed to such unregulated capital accumulation, and instituted 
hawkers’ licence fees that were at times up to ten times more than the Native Tax. Of course this 
was a political decision to cripple economic activity that colonial authorities could not control. A 
vendors’ boycott in Lusaka, in 1956 eight years before independence, was one of the most 
notable forms of resistance to colonial authorities. It came to define the strength of the local 
market, a market that formed around a colonial food marketing system (Turok, 1989:33).  
Traders in urban residential markets were also relatively successful because before Zambia’s 
independence, African traders were prohibited from trading in major urban spaces (Rogerson, 
1991). Nonetheless, the petty economy, as it is termed by Rogerson (1991) sprung up around 
mining towns (similar to the way they had around South Africa labour reserves). Markets in 
industrial colonial towns, of course, were unlike other urban markets in Africa. In Nigeria 
markets were formed because of rent-seeking African elites, and religious trading networks 
(Porter et al., 2004; Watts, 1987). The urban food economy in the Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam, was 
based on the confluence of administrative, economic and cultural controls of priorities (Guyer, 
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1987:20). And had it not been for mobile (migratory) urban populations, ‘upwardly mobile 
African informal trade not limited to only a small political and economic space in which an 
institutionalised wholesale market with petty traders might have developed’ (Guyer, 1987:22). 
This was similar to the Zambian case where colonial systems controlled the movement of urban 
consumer through travel restrictions; and both the larger wholesale grain trade in cities through 
its own marketing system, and the smaller petty economy through taxes.  
 
In the aftermath of colonisation, notes Bryceson (2006b:4), newly independent African states 
faced the overwhelming challenge of providing food for the large urban population or face civil 
upheaval. On the one hand, this need was met by ‘insecure’ economic exchange where the entire 
spectrum was visible: ad hoc, often illicit and illegal spaces of exchange, to non-formal 
alternative economies. In Zambia, government rarely inspected informal markets in residential 
areas on the urban outskirts (if ever). However urban wholesale grain (and other produce) 
markets were pivotal to the political process.   
 
Maize, as noted before, is the strategic political crop in many African countries because it is both 
the most dominant crop for consumption, and economic exchange is more frequently measured 
through its trade. Thus, it  
became the cornerstone of an implicit and sometimes explicit ‘social contract’ that the post-
independence governments made with the African majority to redress the neglect of 
smallholder agriculture during the former colonial period…The social contract also 
incorporated the belief that governments were responsible for ensuring cheap food for the 
urban population (Jayne, 2008:110-111).  
 
Massive amounts of state spending were directed at this social contract through subsidies, input 
assistance and controlled marketing boards, as discussed in the Zambian case earlier, of course 
related to the need for government to secure a support base. While government controlled the 
marketing channels, private traders were crucial in the market in filling the gap of inefficient 
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cooperative structures through Namboard  (Zambia’s national grain marketing board). So while 
small-scale farmers sold grain through cooperatives to Namboard. Private traders, who had cross-
border economic networks frequently ‘competed’ with Namboard by offering farmers a higher 
price (Dorosh et al., 2009).  
 
The marketing of grain and the collection of rain reserves post-independence effectively 
functioned through urban markets. Because of ‘lagged’ public policy during the intermittent 
economic reforms in Zambia between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s (which partially and 
inconsistently liberalised then re-nationalised agricultural production and marketing), food 
markets remained an integral feature of the urban food supply system. Over time, public 
investment and policy choices also sporadically raised and reduced the importance of urban 
markets in state-led agricultural marketing efforts (Jayne, 2008). This did not change the fact that 
both urban consumers and a large percentage of small-scale farmers still relied on urban food 
markets – both the wholesale wet markets and the retail markets. And together with increasingly 
tenuous formal employment opportunities, and other economic reforms, such as the removal of 
the state in social provision and the removal of agricultural subsidies, urban markets in Zambia 
were to become an integral part of the food system. 
 
Zambia’s on-again off again state control of grain markets – given the input subsidies, its pan-
territory pricing system, and milling subsidies – led to a financial crisis. As Jayne reiterates, this 
gave international lenders increased ‘leverage over domestic agricultural policy starting in the 
1980s, which [eventually] culminated in structural adjustment programmes’ (Jayne, 2008:111). In 
the case of Zambia, this made both the (often unscrupulous) trader, and informal urban markets 
central to food exchange. Economic reforms are seen to be the most compelling reasons driving 
the informal economy as a consequence of increasing urban poverty and food inflation, the 
reduction of state provision of services and levels of employment, (Rogerson, 1997)34
                                                 
34 Rogerson (1997) reviews the rise of the informal sector, and highlights the underlying reasons that drive the 




In Zambia long-term traders and retrenched workers, who together made up the informal 
economy, rioted in 1990 (Kaunda’s rule) in response to numerous government attempts to 
regulate the informal sector or prohibit trade through licenses, levies, taxes and/or relocation 
(Tranberg Hansen, 2000:244). Government often enforced these prohibitions through violent 
eviction of traders from public spaces where they violated trading by-laws. Crucially, the market 
riots in 1990 were also linked to removal of the (milling and input) maize subsidy that would 
increase the cost of food and affect selling prices of grain. Because urban prices were no longer 
subsidised, traders may have been able to ‘fill the gap’ in urban food provisioning (albeit often 
exploitatively), and they would also have been pivotal in filling the gap of the collapsed 
marketing board. Informal sector prohibitions thus fuelled intense anger from market traders who 
were twice marginalized (Tranberg Hansen, 2000).  
 
This was also a pivotal moment in Kaunda’s ‘falling out of favour’. Again, in 1993 (Chiluba’s 
first two years in office), the Lusaka City Council organized a street clean-up campaign that 
included policemen and the military. There were violent riots, between traders and armed 
policemen, which led President Chiluba to make a public statement denouncing the violence.  
The vast majority of traders interpreted this as green light for street trading and market traders. 
Street vending stalls/tuntembas from then on time were nicknamed ‘the office of the president’ 
(Hansen, 2000:245).  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
urban populations. Increasing urban poverty and food inflation, the reduction of state provision of services and 
levels of employment are seen to be the most compelling reasons driving the informal economy. Ineffective formal 
markets and inadequate economic strategies to address the needs of the urban poor necessitated unregulated 
enterprise to fill these gaps (Rogerson, 1997). A state that is focused on its market integration and absent municipal 
structures clearly could not adequately deal with a growing urban population. The rapid increase in small, informal 
enterprises and economic activities throughout Africa, in the 1980s and 1990s, is a reaction to economic 
restructuring in favour of the formal economy. This system is a coping mechanism that counteracts the economic 
strain of loss of employment or the inability to find work in the formal sector, and mitigates against food 
insecurity. That being the case, a large proportion of the urban poor has ‘resorted to’ undertaking activities in the 
informal sector (Meikle, 1999 as cited in Rakodi, 2002:38/9).  
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Regulating ‘informal’ trade 
In West and East Africa, unlike in Southern Africa, private agricultural trading was severely 
undermined by colonial authorities because traders tended to be politicised through associations. 
The marginalisation of private traders in Southern Africa, as Porter et al35
African marketing in southern African countries such as Zambia was actively and 
institutionally undermined in order to protect large-scale European farmers from 
competition. West African countries such as Nigeria and Ghana, by contrast, retained 
vigorous traditional systems of periodic marketing that interlinked vast regions: these are 
well documented and remain crucial to current patterns of urban food supply (Porter et al., 
2007:117). 
 (2007:118) note, meant 
that market trading networks have not become as established as they are in West Africa in the 
few decades that followed:  
 
That informal food marketing channels through traders are less established in Southern Africa 
than in West Africa, does not take away from the fact that they are an important part of 
Zambia’s economy, and this is progressively recognised in policy circles (Porter et al., 
2007:120).36
                                                 
35 The work is part of an ongoing research endeavour funded by DfID, and amongst other aims, looks to further 
research on traders in West and Southern Africa including Zambia. 
  The Zambian state is increasingly wary of opportunistic trade associations that 
adopt a political guise while enriching the association’s overseers. But this also highlights the 
state’s determination to control politically strategic informal markets. And this also has an 
historical basis.  Close monitoring and quails-regulation of urban markets is related to an 
unremitting tension between formal and informal retail enterprise in Zambia. Tranberg-Hansen 
notes that in the mid-1990s informal market associations were ‘increasingly hostile, negative, 
[and] pitted against economic policies of the state’. This situation was compounded by strong 
reactions to foreign retail investment ‘accentuated regulations that contain and control 
opportunities for informal activities on the home front’ (Tranberg-Hansen, 2004:77).  
36 See also Dorosh, 2009; Hampwaye et al. (2007); Porter et al. (2007, 2004); Porter and Lyon, (2005); Tranberg 
Hansen (2002); Jayne et al. (1999); and Seshamani (1998).  
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One such example of this antagonism is a disagreement between the Zambian National 
Association of Marketeers (Zanama) and municipal state authorities (personal communication, 
Soweto Market Manager, March, 2007). In 2007, Zanama urged traders to hold back levies, and it 
illegally issued trade space, and allegedly had used the crisis to line their own pockets by taking 
two fees, one for market facilities and services (that it had no way of controlling) and one for 
‘political representation’. The Municipality retorted with preferential treatment of non-aligned 
traders, and actually raising market and facilities’ fees. Since then, the local municipality began, 
in earnest, to develop a ‘management model that would be self-sustaining, self-managing and 
self-regulating’ (Rogel et al., 2007:8) with the help of international donor funds. The 
management of urban markets represents an important development in an already dynamic 
segment of the Zambian food system. An important indication of this change is the case that I 
introduce here, but follow up on in Chapter 6.37
 
  
In 2007, at the time of my fieldwork, a Markets and Bus Station Act was instituted to regulate 
Zambian informal trade markets and traders’ marketing actively.38 The act specifically 
addresses issues of management and representation in markets and transport networks, and 
places the control of markets and bus stations under management boards consisting of 
representatives of local authorities, marketeers, bus operators, consumers, and other relevant 
stakeholders. It is intended to ‘enable consumers, vendors and other stakeholders to participate 
actively in making decisions that have a bearing on their welfare’.39
                                                 
37 See also Abrahams (2010). 
 In addition, it also prohibits 
private trader associations within markets, and has resulted in strong opposition by self-
interested market association leaders. Supposedly, it is motivated by a more broad transition in 
Zambia toward accountable and transparent governance. Mr Kachingwe, who is the market 
manager of the Lusaka City Market (LCM) argued that the act: ‘said to marketeers, this is yours 
38 The Markets and Bus Station Act, 2007: Number 7 (157-180). Lusaka Municipal Government, Government 
Printers, Church Road, Lusaka. 12 April 2007 
39 Henry Kyambalesa, 2007: 9-10. Party Presidential Address, Henry Kyambalesa, President, AfC Party 
<http://www.agenda123.com/html/Message.pdf > 
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- the board and the reinvestment for improvements of markets’ (Interview, Municipal Manager 
of the LCM, 2007). The adoption of the act thus represents an interesting change in the 
relationship between the informal economy and government. It also highlights an unexpected 
change: the neoliberal process of commercialising informal markets is seen to benefit the 
informal economy and traders, while at the same time ensuring state control of informal 
markets to a certain extent. This is indeed an important development that warrants further 
inquiry, since, in Zambia, as I go on to show elsewhere, the proactive response to support the 
local, ‘informal’ food economy emerges from this context. There are clear changes in the 
domestic food economy to do with the increased formalization of traditional markets, and 
institutional transformations at this level assert the resilience and importance of these markets. 
The institutional transitions transform local food economies because they facilitate efficient, 
transparent, and increasingly quality-based food networks. In essence, while urban retail 
markets still have the look of traditional, wet markets, they are becoming increasingly 
formalized at other levels of the supply and management chain, and this is the locus of their 
resilience – a reason for terming these ‘urban’ and not ‘informal’ markets.  
 
To sum up this section, unlike the other three aspects which influenced the food systems 
mentioned earlier, informal modes of transaction are very much a part of the food system. The 
urban market fills the gap for foodstuff unavailable or inaccessible through more formal channels, 
and it becomes the so-called ‘office of the president’, because it creates employment for the 
majority of urban residents, and its importance, politically and economically, is recognised by 
state structures. Similar to the three other aspects of Zambia’s political economy, informal modes 
of transaction do not happen in isolation, but are outcomes of other political and economic 
processes in the food system. As such, as I describe in the next section, , ‘informalisation’ is a 
growing trend in Zambia’s food system particularly as it is appropriated by large agribusinesses. 
Since the ‘informalisation’ of usually ‘formal’ commodity chains also poses the problem of 
terminology, ‘hybrid’ forms of economic interaction will be used with the caveat of explaining 
how the modes of interaction are changing. 
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The four aspects highlighted in this chapter are not only important because they allow an 
investigation of the agrifood ‘system’ (in Friedland’s terms) in Zambia, but also because they 
allow us to understand the ‘resultant direction’ of Zambia's food system. As discussed in the 
introduction, each of these aspects constitute Zambia's food system as we know it today, provide 
an explanation for the some of the current changes we see in the food system, and gives us an 
indication of those changes that we may see in coming years. With the background as laid out in 
this chapter, how do we make sense of the food system, with its juxtaposed set of interactions?   
 
Making sense of Zambia’s food system 
Given a more robust conceptual framework that pays special attention to the domestic political 
economy and having looked at those factors which have influenced and continue to influence 
food systems, the visible elements of the food system are defensible.  Most importantly, this 
approach helps explain some of the perplexing contradictions in the food system, because we 
have a wider awareness of the factors that have influenced it. Although the analysis of Zambia's 
food system in this thesis is not yet complete, its bears testing this chapter’s findings against the 
following description of Zambia's food system.  
 
Zambia's agrifood system is an eclectic mix of formal, high value industry based on the 
oversight of the Zambian National Farmers’ Union (an agribusiness association), large capital 
investments, urban markets with its array of traders and vendors, and enterprise along this 
spectrum. As mentioned in the Preface, depending on which part of the spectrum is the object 
of inquiry, one could be faced with very different worlds. On the one hand, there are, what are 
considered to be, highly formalised contractual arrangements and large economies of scale in 
the agrifood system. International agribusinesses invest in the Zambian economy, recognising 
the buying potential of its growing urban middle class, and the country’s openness to foreign 
investment. A few of these companies have expanded from its South African base; one such 
South African firm is Shoprite, the supermarket, whose investment on the continent rakes in 
more money than its South African domestic stores. Shoprite caters to the high-end consumer 
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bracket and constantly faces reprove from the Zambian government because its sourcing 
practises often disadvantage local Zambian producers.  
 
On the other hand, there is an interesting mix of so-called ‘formalised’ enterprise and ‘informal’ 
supply chains which incorporates intermediary traders, or ‘agents’ who work without 
commission selling the company’s product, or sourcing material for production. One such 
example of this hybrid form of interaction, recalled in a later chapter, is a large milling 
company that was formally a Zambian national asset. The ‘National Milling Company’, which 
retains the name, sources most of its grain from small-scale farmers in Zambia and sells stock 
feed to large and emerging meat producers both through ‘agents’ or intermediaries scattered all 
over the country. While the work rate of agents is recorded, there are no legally binding 
contracts, but instead there are reciprocal trust arrangements.  
 
Urban food markets in Lusaka are hives of activity where farmers find a daily supply chain for 
their produce and consumers find accessible retail outlets. Traders are also integral players in 
linking farmers to markets and distributing food through a web of networks in and around the 
city. Small, medium and emerging commercial farmers use the urban market as their preferred 
supply chains. Although returns may not be as lucrative as formal contractual work, which 
itself is hard to come by, the urban market is a regular and more secure source of income. And 
this encourages the growing proportion of enterprising small farmers in Lusaka.  
 
We can ‘make sense’ of Zambia's food system if we see the present-day, eclectic and juxtaposed 
food system as a product of different influences. These influences, in turn, emerge from the 
confrontation between seemingly polarised sets of economic enterprise. Three examples illustrate 
this point 
 
First, in the case of Ross Breeders or the National Milling Corporation, which I explore in greater 
detail later, large and vertically integrated agribusiness firms exist alongside more ‘hybrid’ 
enterprises, which incorporate ‘informal’ (or contractual) supply chains and business 
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arrangements based on trust. This is as a result of neoliberal reforms and large capital investments 
in the agribusiness sector, but also a very uneven spread of wealth across the vast population, 
which is the case in many African countries. Indeed the large proportion of informal employment 
is also a result of neoliberal reforms and the response of the state to the pressure to liberalise. But 
the state’s commitment to informal traders, and the increasing recognition of the importance of 
traders, is both a political and stopgap strategy – to maintain votes, and to support the informal 
economy’s employment capacity. Here, we see how the failure of protective national strategies 
creates the opportunity for a closer, and unexpected, connection between ‘formal’ agribusiness 
and ‘informal’ elements of the economy – resulting in hybrid forms of economic interaction.  
 
Second, in the case of the urban market, in Zambia in the 1990s, the threat of supermarkets to the 
informal economy in Zambia was evident in the initial tension generated by market traders 
through riots about forced removals, trading licences, and increased food costs (Tranberg-
Hansen, 2007). The pressure on the informal retail sector represented by the failure of states to 
invest in public goods like wet markets and wholesale distribution areas is irrefutable (Jayne, 
2008). In post-independence Zambia, pressure on existing production systems, failed state-led 
agricultural enterprises, and empty retail outlets fraught with mismanagement alongside moves to 
rapidly liberalize the economy, created the ideal climate for foreign investment in retail. In the 
early 1990s, food riots sent ripples through the economy. The privatization of the public sector, 
massive economic restructuring, grain gluts, and a defunct agricultural grain reserves board 
compounded these riots. Local markets and traders, and others, protested against supermarkets – 
the visible face of economic liberalization. It is significant that supermarkets became the 
embodiment of antagonism towards the interrelated economic reforms and state failures in 
protecting food markets. James Ferguson notes that, in Zambia, food prices increased by 650 
percent in the post-liberalization decade, making the economic shift a raw reality for urban 
residents (Ferguson, 1999:4). The ‘supermarket transition’ as a proxy for the broader shift in the 
food economy is thus not a naturally evolving process. Nor does it represent the demise of the 
‘informal’ economy. The growth and dominance of supermarkets presents only one element of a 
larger, more resilient narrative. That these two very different forms of economic retail and food 
provisioning exist alongside each other, attests to the wider political economy system that allows 
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each to thrive and growth, but not at the expense of the other. As argued before, this is because 
both the success of supermarkets and the dwindling of informal economic spaces result from the 
removal of funding from state storage facilities and public distribution centres, and attempts to 
quash the informal economy.  
 
Third, assumptions about ‘informality’ and ‘formality’ or informal vs. formal economic 
interaction do not hold in the case of Zambia. Indeed these problematise the dualism. Urban 
markets are increasingly being regulated by the state because ‘efficiency’ and ‘strategic 
management’ is no longer the exclusive domain of formal commercial enterprise nor is 
‘ungovernance’ linked to urban markets. Also, because the state increasingly recognises the 
importance of the urban market in providing employment, markets for small-scale farmers, and 
accessible food retail outlets for urban residents – things that the state is frequently called on to 
do. Likewise, large agribusiness benefits from informal contracts with small-scale farmers 
because they are able to acquire the necessary volumes cheaply and regularly, while at the same 
time contributing to the livelihoods of those small-scale farmers. As I discuss in the Chapter 6, 
although this is clearly profitable for the company, it does not necessarily benefit the company.  
 
In understanding how the food system fits together and why it ‘looks’ as it does with its 
characteristic juxtapositions, we are also able to consider how it may look in years to come. 
Some theorists may assume that this eclectic scenario represents ‘an economy in transition’ (see 
Louw et al., 2007; Onumah et al., 2007; Procter, 2007), as more traditional modes of retail are 
(painfully) giving way to agribusiness and high-value supermarket trade. However, considering 
this as a hybrid food system, in which there are multiple demonstrations of progress and 
development, is perhaps a better construct that does not necessarily point to a traditional food 
system evolving into a modern food system, but instead creating a ‘mélange’ of possibility40 
where the hybridity and eccentricity of Zambia's food system makes sense if we distinguish a 




Instead of focusing on how changes in the global political economy affect African agrifood 
economies, this chapter explains the ways in which Zambia's food system is influenced by 
different factors in the domestic political economy context. And although the literature on the 
spread of supermarkets and agribusiness firms dominates scholarship on African food systems, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, that process represents only one of a number of factors that 
influence African agrifood economies as seen in the case of Zambia. It is therefore important to 
draw out these influences in particular to counter  a major critique of the dominant and normative 
approach to food in Africa in Economic Geography, viz., that the normative approach does not 
acknowledge the domestic political economy context or the changes in agrifood economies that 
are influenced by aspects in the domestic political economy.  
 
These influencing aspects also demonstrate, in Bryceson’s terms, the balance of forces that are at 
play in the present day food system, and thereby come to characterize it. It is therefore important 
to draw out these influences because they help us to support the aims of the research project 
which are to (1) recognise multiple sites of power in the local context; (2) understand ongoing 
processes of change in that context; and (3) point to different forms of governance in the food 
system. In this chapter three aspects are seen to influence the food system: nationalisation, 
(neo)liberalisation, which includes South Africa’s role in the region, and informalisation. 
Thinking of the interlinking (inter-temporal) aspects as rationalisations, best captures both the 
material and ideological factors that shape/influence the food system, and allows me, in 
subsequent chapters, to more concisely articulate the motivations of different institutions and the 
intersecting governances in the food system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
40 The notion of hybridity has its roots in critiques of cultural globalisation (see Nederveen Pieterse, 2002) and in 
postcolonialist theory (see Kelsall and Ellis, 2006; Raghuram and Madge, 2006). Nederveen Pieterse (2003:274) 
uses the term ‘mélange’ to capture the mix of cultures or identities in a globalised context.  
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In addition, highlighting the aspects that influence Zambia's food system is important because 
these aspects are not unique to Zambia, perhaps with the exception of South Africa’s involvement 
in the economy, and thus lend to a more general framework of thinking both about food systems 
in Africa. In thinking about food systems, then, examining the domestic political economy 
accounts for the continuing imperative for the state to control agricultural systems in Africa. But 
at the same it also points to the fact that there are also competing priorities to liberalise the 
economy and to ensure that domestic food needs are taken care of. Existing food systems, such as 
urban markets, then, either embody these shifting priorities, or fulfil the role of urban food 
provisioning. For instance, this chapter shows how, despite the ‘neoliberal turn’ the government 
also continues to intermittently subsidize the cost of milling in the aim of contributing to cheaper 
prices for food.  
 
Finally, the domestic political economy environment includes different rationalisations and is the 
product of different influences. This is not to suggest that the domestic political economy is fixed 
or static, indeed quite the opposite. The various aspects that are shown to have shaped Zambia's 
food system, presented in this chapter, are themselves the result of a shifting and transitioning 
political economy  context. The domestic political economy context, then, comprises the 
influences, sites of power and rationalisations within it. As Hart (2002:13), and other scholars41
                                                 
41 See Gibson-Graham, 2002 and Swyngedouw, 2005 
 
note, outlining how certain explanatory factors  have come to influence a given outcome – in this 
case the Zambian agrifood system – lends to a sense of interconnectedness and continuity in that 
given area. In Hart’s terms, we can see the Zambian food system as comprising ongoing 
processes through which sets of power-laden practices in the multiple, interconnected arena of 
everyday life at difference spatial scales, such as the influences or explanatory factors mentioned 




The previous chapter closed off with showing how understanding the broader domestic political 
economy context of Zambia's food system helps us understand interactions within it. The 
chapter that follows is concerned with uncovering two key ‘sites of power’ in Zambia's food 
system and draws on the institutional turn in the literature. I use two key institutions as a case 
study to illustrate the importance of recognising multiple sites of power in the food system – the 
Zambian National Farmers’ Union, and the Lusaka City Market. I look specifically at a new 
Markets’ Act. The weight of the discussion in this chapter, then, is on the farmers’ union 
because by now, given the discussion in previous chapters, the role and importance of urban 
markets are well known.
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CHAPTER 5: HOME GROWN INSTITUTIONS: ZNFU AND 
LUSAKA CITY MARKET 
 





There is a growing consensus that as economic growth happens in Sub-Saharan Africa it is as a 
result of institutional governance. As the above quote suggests, institutional governance and the 
role of institutions in economic growth in African countries are also important concerns in the 
international development community. These concerns span a range of sectors from agriculture, 
to healthcare and education,43 and relate to capacity building of state institutions; strengthening 
governance systems; and supporting the work of non-state institutions through donor funding, 
technical expertise and knowledge transfer, amongst other ‘good governance’ concerns.44
 
 This 
emerging discussion about institutional governance parallels a shift in Economic Geography 
scholarship, generally termed as the ‘institutional turn’ (see Amin, 2004:51).  
                                                 
42 Thandika Mkandawire, Director of the UN Research Institute for Social Development in UN, 1998 
43 See for instance: Capacity building grant for health care institutions in Africa by the Wellcome Trust Medical 
News Today, 2009 < http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/156170.php>; Institutional development in Africa 
Research consortium (of ODI staff) funded by DfID and the Advisory Board of Irish Aid < www.institutions-
africa.org>; and a recent (2003) United Nations University and World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU/WIDER) publication (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2003) entitled Reforming Africa’s Institutions: 
Ownership, Incentives, and Capabilities, in particular Part III that focuses on developing institutional capacities in 
the public, private and informal sectors (see Tripp, 2003; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2003b).  
44 Although this is not the focus of this thesis, there is increasing concern in international development circles on 
‘good governance’ or the imperative for public institutions to manage funds properly, reduce corruption and 
increase transparency, while at the same time instituting World Bank and IMF related neoliberal policies and 
undertaking economic reforms (see Ng and Yeats, 1999). 
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Institutionalist perspectives recognise the collective, political and social foundations of economic 
behaviour (Amin, 2004), and have their roots in Granovetter’s (1982) conception of weak and 
strong ties. Amin notes that as geographers have rediscovered the work of Michael Polanyi and 
Granovetter, there is a greater recognition that economic markets are integrally linked to ‘the 
social and political’, and that this interaction is the basis for economic development. The 
rediscovery ‘is [thus] also based on the insights of institutional economic theory, particularly its 
explanation of why territorial proximity matters for economic organization’ (Amin, 2004:51). 
Thrift and Olds (2004:62) put it this way:  
this realization of the social nature of markets has changed the idea of the market as a 
neutral arena in which pure exchange takes place to an arena in which there are complex 
moral and institutional orders regulating not only the conduct of exchange but also what is 
defined as exchange in the first place. 
 
Two important tenets of (new) institutional economics, and innovations systems scholarship are 
that institutions (1) ‘operationalise particular political and developmental priorities’ (North, 
1991:97); (2) structure political economy interaction, and (3) influence and regulate the 
circulation of knowledge in systems (Hall, 2002:148). Although structuring, operationalising or 
influencing political economy priorities or interaction, this does not always happen on the basis 
of formalised regulation or control. Instead, it happens on the basis of tacit social knowledge(s) in 
shared economic-social space, which can be termed ‘rationalisations’. The idea of rationalisations 
incorporates shared knowledges and other non-tangible, but durable, factors that influence 
development, generally labelled ‘informal institutions’ or ‘weak ties’ such as mutuality, social 
priorities, trust, and shared identities (Granovetter, 1982).45
 
   
                                                 
45 Elsewhere in the economic development literature, ‘local needs’, ‘growth priorities’ (Sartorius and Kirsten, 
2007), ‘culture’ (Thrift and Olds, 2004), ‘societal norms’ (Du Plessis, 2006), the ‘local setting’ (Jütting, 2003), and 
‘multiple agendas’ (Mercer et al, 2003) are concepts often used to capture the non-tangible factors that influence 
economic development. 
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A similar definition is used in Economic Geography scholarship where institutions exist to drive 
or influence certain kinds of interaction or to drive/influence certain political economy priorities. 
While the literature includes quality agencies, certification bodies, trade regulatory institutions 
and other civil society organisations. Yet in agrifood scholarship, given a shift in conception to 
the increasingly dominant role of agribusiness firms and supermarkets as ‘the new masters of the 
food system’ (Wrigley and Lowe, 2002:124 citing Flynn and Marsden, 1992), in the way they are 
seen to drive the food system, influence political economy interaction and transform economic 
space, these are increasingly seen as the institutions that govern trade. In addition, as Wrigley and 
Lowe (2002:122) note, the increasing dominance of private-interest regulation and the shift away 
from public-interest regulation, means that private interest firms will likewise tend to dominate 
the view of institutions and institutional governance in the literature. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to answer the second research question ‘In addition to agribusiness firms, which 
other institutions are central to the food system, and what are their roles?’,  and in so doing to 
point to multiple sites of power in the food system.  
 
The first institution that I discuss – the Lusaka City Market (LCM) – is an informal urban market. 
The Lusaka City Market is becoming increasingly formalised because the municipal state 
structures have changed the way it governs the market. Data for this chapter are drawn both from 
empirical sources gathered during fieldwork, and other, relevant sources such as the Markets and 
Bus Station Act (2007) and news articles. Where appropriate, I use additional literature to support 
the analysis, and draw attention to the shared rationalisations embedded in the institutions. 
 
The second institution I look at – the Zambian National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) – is essentially a 
business association that represents farmers and agribusiness in lobbing the state, but also is 
remarkably influential in developing the agricultural sector in Zambia. The Zambian National 
Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) is an interesting case to look at because although it is an agribusiness 
association, which ultimately protects the interests of the commercial agricultural sector in 
Zambia, its emergence in Zambia, post-independence, means that it adopts a developmental role 
in supporting small-scale farmers (see Chapter 4), and is proactive in building a sense of cohesion 
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in the food sector (see Zambian Farmer, 1999). The ZNFU in some ways also appropriates a 
political rationalisation, as evidenced by its role as an ombudsman of sorts that calls the state to 
account for neoliberal decisions that debilitate local production.  
 
Urban Market Institutions: The case of the Lusaka City Market  
In keeping with the purpose of this chapter, which is to point to non-firm institutions that are 
overlooked in normalised accounts of agrifood economies, this section deals with the urban 
market as a one key institution in Zambia's food system. The informal market is typically not 
seen as an institution because the trade within this market is associated with the lack of both 
regulation and governance, i.e., its informality. Indeed Meagher (2007:499) argues that economic 
restructuring policies have reinforced patterns of ‘ungovernance’, which may be seen in informal 
markets. Conversely, more formalised economic interaction is seen to be facilitated through 
agribusiness institutions and supermarkets because these institutions govern and regulate trade. 
Another reason is that the informal market is often seen to be an ad-hoc, transitory collection of 
enterprises that has sprung up as a means to survival, and that will eventually give way to 
‘serious’ economic linkages. Colin Leys’ Confronting the African tragedy (1994) on the informal 
economy in Africa is perhaps the most brazen example of this perception:  
Contrary to the wishful thinking of some observers, this [the informal economy] is part of 
the pathology of Africa’s collapse, not a seed-bed of renewal. Anyone who believes that, 
for example, carrying sacks of cocoa beans on bicycles along devious forest tracks to sell 
them illegally across the frontier is more promising for the economy than taking them 
directly to the port by truck, is not to be taken seriously. People resort to the second 
economy for survival, to escape the predations of the corrupt and parasitic state 
machinery, that is all.  
 
As I argue elsewhere, (Abrahams, 2010:122), the idea that informal markets will eventually give 
way to more formal modes of food provisioning assumes a natural process of economic 
evolution, or as Porter et al put it, ‘that economic institutions will automatically appear and 
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market economies will be structured along the lines of European or North American capitalism’ 
(Porter et al., 2007:116), a quote I alluded to earlier. Instead, where informal economies have 
dwindled in the south, it is typically the result of state removal of funding for state storage 
facilities and public distribution centres, and not their ‘natural’ demise. Indeed the removal of 
state funding for informal markets often went hand-in-hand with the idea that in promoting and 
protecting the formal economy the country would progressively transition into a more 
‘sophisticated’ economy (see Simone, 2005:3).  
 
But given the definition of an institution as a constraint that structures, influences or drives 
particular forms of political, economic and social interaction, the informal economy is certainly 
an institution. And the crucial next step is examine how this institution governs or 
mediates/regulates economic interaction. Although the importance of informal markets was not 
always recognised in Zambia, it is an interesting case given an increase in state investment to 
develop and to formally regulate informal urban retail markets. The case shows that instead of 
demising, informal retail markets in Zambia are becoming increasingly formalized at other levels 
of the supply and management chain.  
 
The changing informal market institution in Zambia 
In Zambia, the Markets and Bus Station Act46
                                                 
46 The Markets and Bus Station Act, 2007: Number 7 (157-180). Lusaka Municipal Government, Government 
Printers, Church Road, Lusaka, 12 April 2007 
 was instituted in 2007, as mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. The Markets and Bus Station Act formally regulates the management of the 
market and insists on a board of representation in market management that includes traders, 
marketeers, municipal actors and customers for the protection of all traders, and transparent 
financial accounting for levies and infrastructure developments in the market. Under the Act, 
private trader associations are prohibited to operate in markets, ensuring that the vulnerable 
traders are protected from the kind of opportunism often evident in markets.  
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As mentioned before, the market manager of the Lusaka City Market indicated that the Act 
effectively gave marketers a sense of ownership of markets and the developments in those 
markets. (Like it said to marketeers, this is yours - the board and the reinvestment for 
improvements of markets. Interview with the manager of Lusaka’s City Market, November 2007, 
Lusaka). 
Local politicians, keen to distance themselves from ‘questionable’ trade association alliances also 
support the new market regulation: The Act, they claim ‘will certainly enable consumers, vendors 
and other stakeholders to participate actively in making decisions that have a bearing on their 
welfare’ (Kyambalesa, 2007).47
That the Act has been institutionalised seems to point to broader transitions in Zambia toward 
local economic growth, accountable and transparent good governance, but also to the 
pervasiveness of neoliberal governing principles. The Act can therefore be seen as a mechanism 
that will re-govern informal markets. This institutional regulation raises questions about what 
now constitutes an ‘informal’ market since the assumption that informal markets are 
characteristically ‘ungoverned’ does not hold true in this case.  
 
The formalization of erstwhile unregulated forms of governance in markets has meant that trader 
associations have ceased to ‘disrupt’ market enterprise, and traders feel free of the political 
pressure that was linked to the often-exorbitant ‘market’ fees they would have to pay the 
associations (personal communication, Lusaka, November, 2007). The transparency in 
management, sanitary infrastructure, representation of traders’ rights, and the opportunity to 
voice their needs, according to many traders, make the market levies they pay justifiable 
(personal communication). But the turnaround in management represents more than just 
efficiency in the market retail enterprise, but has significant long-term economic potential in 
terms of being the harbinger of transformation in what is often seen as a flailing informal 
economy. The new informal market is a prototype of sorts that is poised to guide the development 
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and reconstruction of all the other markets in Lusaka. As a result of its apparent 
accomplishments, the Lusaka City Market has secured further donor funding and support from 
the state municipality. The manager of the Soweto (and BH wholesale) markets in Lusaka puts it 
this way:  
It’s part of development, because we are moving from that scenario, like at BH 
[unregulated wet market] to this one, in Zambia, I think the government is going into 
modernising the market. You see the new developments with the construction at the 
Soweto market; two other markets are being built in the Copperbelt. So in Zambia there is 
some sort of development, a new change, a new culture. The government now is quite 
alert on how these markets have to be managed and has come up with the new market 
Act…Right now you see people scattered, operating along the road, we have plans so the 
structure will not remain like this. We are on course to change Kamwala, Lusaka City and 
central markets, Soweto markets; we are going to develop this place. We are going to fix 
this road, tar it, the problem is our government is struggling a little bit; you can see the 
poor buildings. We need to make sure that the structure you see here will be upgraded. So 
that when you come back you will see a different Lusaka. We need to compare with 
Joburg especially this 2010 World Cup we are going to attract people and small 
businesses… 
Although I do not discuss the apparent ‘modernisation and progress’ undertone in the thesis, it 
bears pointing out that formalising the market also represents a shift in how these markets are 
perceived – as disorganised and ad hoc to increasingly organised. The model of informal market 
development has begun to inform market management practices of other markets, including 
training market managers and publicising the Markets and Bus Station Act.  
The Lusaka City Market is not only active in maintaining a good ‘image’ in terms of cleaning up 
otherwise disarrayed areas, but the market managers, with consent of the board, have also begun 
                                                                                                                                                           
47 Henry Kyambalesa, 2007: 9-10. Party Presidential Address, Henry Kyambalesa, President, AfC Party   
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to invest in the infrastructural upgrading and formalization of other markets even those outside 
the Lusaka region.48
The market is not going anywhere. People misinterpret the extent to which the market is 
transforming, even though it is informal. This market is becoming…more sophisticated, 
especially in terms of how it is managed. This is just starting. It's not to revitalize a city 
market that is dying; it is to better manage a very successful one. There is evidence that 
supermarkets may be stealing some of our consumers, but there will never come a day 
where this market will have to close because the supermarket has taken over (Interview 
with Lusaka’s City Market Manager, November 2007, Lusaka).  
 The formalization of the informal market is obviously a process, according 
to the managers, and includes future plans such as the formation of new wholesale areas and the 
development of existing areas, the provision of cold-storage facilities, and investment into local 
sourcing for the market that may for the moment address transportation. While all of this is yet to 
happen, the institutional support of the informal food economy and traditional forms of retailing 
through processes of formalization and commercialization have important implications for the 
strength of the informal economy, for linking farmers to markets and for making higher quality 
food more accessible urban consumers (see McCullough et al., 2008). And of course this has 
implications for the perceived dominance of supermarkets in African cities: 
The changes in informal market institutions signal profound ‘symbolic’ transitions in urban food 
systems in Africa. In this context, the changing market represents the inclusion of the urban poor 
(given increased access to food), and small-scale farmers into in urban food markets or value 
chains, thereby signalling an economy in transition. Small-scale farmers, under this new Act are 
in theory less vulnerable to unscrupulous traders who are in turn less vulnerable to corrupt trader 
                                                                                                                                                           
<http://www.agenda123.com/html/Message.pdf > 
48 ‘We have had only part of the local authority budget in the past, now we can redistribute our own takings 
entirely. Since 1997, the government gets part of the profit from the market enterprise, now we can contribute 
more to the coffers of the national or local authority, so now there is the real potential for markets to contribute to 
the government’s economic growth. In the Chinolia Market, the water system was done by us, Lusaka City 
Market, we invested 40 Million (ZKwa - £5130) to Chongwe Market, and 40 million to the Kauma Council, 20 
Million to the Kawambwa market in the Northern Province and 100 Million to the Nyumbayanga Market in 
Woodlands [Lusaka]’ (Interview with the manager of Lusaka’s City Market, November 2007, Lusaka).  
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associations since urban markets will progressively be managed by representative boards made 
up of traders, community members, and farmers.  
For instance, in theory, the new management of urban markets will mean that trader associations 
will cease to disrupt market enterprise, guarding against the kinds of problems in 2009. In 2009, 
President Rupiah Banda faced severe criticism for his decision to issue the title deeds of the 
Chisonke Market in Kitwe to a marketeers association (ZANAMA), which was a similarly 
questionable alliance that had initially promoted the institution of the Act (see the Zambian 
Chronicle, 2009). Political 'interference' in markets and the recent Chisonke debacle is a further 
indication that informal markets are recognisably lucrative and that because they are governed, or 
appropriated, to political ends, they are a vital part of the urban economy. 
In sum, these changes in the food system will also have implications for further state investment 
in informal markets, perhaps along the lines of informal markets in Asia, where for instance, 
supermarkets in China have a large space for wet markets in the supermarket, cold-storage 
facilities are installed in Thai markets, or the Indian state institutes protection of informal markets 
through policy (see Reardon and Gulati, 2008). This section demonstrates that just as work on 
supermarkets has shifted from looking at the intricacies of commodity chains, even though 
certain scholarship still does, to looking at how a shift in regulations and regulatory mechanisms 
profoundly affect economic interaction. I reflect on some of the implications flagged up here in 
the conclusion. 
The Zambian National Farmers’ Union 
The Zambian National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) is an agribusiness association at the forefront of 
agricultural growth and development. It mediates between government and the agricultural 
community (including agricultural service providers e.g., veterinary services). As outlined below, 
the ZNFU has its roots in colonial agricultural administration in Northern Rhodesia. The union 
now brands itself as the frontrunner of preserving and encouraging the local agrifood economy. 
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More recently, it has received international donor funding from the European Union to promote 
good governance of extra-state institutions (see DED, 2008).  
 
While there are a few secondary sources in the agricultural archives of the ZNFU,49 the history of 
the institution is best narrated by the (now) President of the ZNFU,50 Mr J. Zimba, who was at 
the time drafting a formal document that was to later provide information for the ZNFU 
webpage.51
 
  The interview is quoted here at length. 
The Zambian National Farmers’ Union as it is known today was founded in 1905 as a 
Commodity association that was started by tobacco farmers. The European settlers were 
tobacco farmers in Northern Rhodesia’s Eastern Province. The driving factors then were 
issues of market and trade; they used to grow tobacco here for the Southern Rhodesia 
market, which was the Salisbury market. But they were complaining of poor prices, lack 
of representation at tobacco floors. So this is how they formed the Northern Rhodesian 
Farmers’ Union. It used to lobby for better prices and other issues that would scale up the 
tobacco industry. From 1905 it continued as a small commodity association, right until the 
1940s or 1950s. This is when it became more like for the country but for commercial 
purposes [representing Northern Rhodesia as a whole]. That means it was dominated by 
settlers.  
 
Then at independence, they Union changed its name, it became, the Commercial Farmers' 
Bureau after 1964. The CFB, by this time, had only one or two black farmers, the rest was 
still commercial white farmers, and the focus still was to lobby for the farming 
community, for better prices, good policies and incentives. By 1992, the Commercial 
Farmers’ Bureau was losing influence and one of the factors that were identified was that 
                                                 
49 Mostly World Bank documents and press releases.  
50 At the time of the interview (July 2007), Mr Zimba was the deputy president of the ZNFU, and the president, Mr 
Guy Robinson was abroad.  
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it had no national character; it just handled one category of farming. Starting in 1980 the 
bureau was limited to commercial farmers only and that meant that there was even a 
colour divide, and that meant that government didn't take them seriously even when they 
were lobbying for genuine things, they'd say 'it’s just a corporate club' they're just trying 
to foster their own interests and success. So from 1990 [the CFB] tried to encourage 
small-scale farmers to join the union. It was still called the CFB, but the name was 
misleading.  
 
So it was in 1993 that the Commercial Farmers’ Bureau changed its name to the Zambian 
National Farmers’ Union and also they changed the constitution to include all categories 
of farmers – small scale farmers, large scale and commodity associations. [The body] 
became more national. It had captured a number of small-scale farmers who by then had 
no proper representation. To ensure more farmer affiliation, they also made their 
membership subscriptions not restrictive. What they did was, the member was asked to 
pay according to his or her capacity. The commercial farmers would declare how they are 
doing that year and they would discuss an agreeable amount, maybe 0.002 percent, the 
small scale farmers had to pay a flat fee or maybe two or three dollars, so that means we 
had a lot of small-scale farmers coming on board, and at the same time as that we are 
giving the farmers' union the numbers they needed to start lobbying effectively’ 
(Interview with the deputy president of the ZNFU, July 2007, Lusaka). 
 
While the Commercial Farmers’ Bureau was a new body formed at independence, it still 
consisted of a larger majority of settler commercial members, and the transformation of 
agricultural institutions was still very much at the forefront of the Kaunda Zambianisation project 
 
in the early years of Zambia’s independence, as noted in an earlier chapter.  
                                                                                                                                                           
51 See www.znfu.org.zm 
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Zambian agriculture was internally and politically transforming, and because of the on-again, off 
again economic reforms for almost two decades, the ZNFU came to embody the priorities of the 
agribusiness community. Also, because of constant upheaval with the state marketing boards, the 
ZNFU – as a less politicised business association – began to take over the crucial role of 
agricultural development. The task was daunting, to be sure, because the agricultural sector was 
highly fragmented. Yet the ZNFU quickly became a trusted institution because it also seemed to 
have a strong nationalising focus, demonstrated in part in its commitment to small-scale farmers.  
 
As an agricultural institution, the ZNFU brings agribusiness, small-scale farmers, agricultural 
cooperatives, and commodity associations together to enable it to, in political economy terms, 
‘capture the apparatus of the state and make it serve their own political and economic interests’ 
(Gilpin, 1991:425). More than just ‘bring them together’, for this suggests a more romantic role, 
the ZNFU is concerned with the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, and, to bring this 
about, it takes on a strong capacity-building/developmental role. While the Ministry of 
Cooperatives and Agriculture (MACO) presides over issues of land, fertilizer subsidies and 
import/export restrictions, the ZNFU, is concerned with competitiveness, and the growth and 
development demands of the agricultural sector.  
 
…Give us ten years, you will see a very structured agricultural industry, and that's what we 
striving for at ZNFU that's why we are bringing together all major players in the industry so 
that there is rational investments and development, otherwise, if we are doing things on our 
own and they are doing things on their own, that will delay the restructuring of the 
agricultural industry in reaching a level where it will be very competitive. And it delays 
other objectives, like contribution. We contribute between 24 and 28 percent to our national 
economy…it could be more (Interview, D. President of the ZNFU, Mr. J. Zimba, July 2007, 
Lusaka). 
 
In keeping with its historic legacy, the ZNFU is comprised of a number of commodity 
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associations, and one such is the Poultry Association of Zambia (PAZ) that was established in 
2000 (personal communication, PAZ director, Mr M. Ngosa, March, 2007). PAZ is seen as the 
mouthpiece of the entire poultry industry in Zambia (Poultry Bulletin, 2001:148), and aims to 
tackle ‘head-on, the difficulties faced by the poultry industry by liaising with government through 
the ZNFU to power input costs and to drive demand to enable growth and diversity’ (SADC 
Poultry Liaison Committee, September 2006). It represents more than half the districts in Zambia, 
and of this over 75 percent are small-scale farmers. PAZ is ‘driven to enhance the capacity of 
members through measured production, improved marketing and access to technical information, 
lower input costs and lobbying government’ (PAZ Brochure, 2007). It focuses specifically on the 
poultry industry and its objectives are: to maintain disease-free status in Zambia (a rare, and 
highly valued status for the region and other developing countries); to ‘support, promote, develop 
and protect’ the interests of members and the industry; and to foster a ‘sustainable internal trading 
mechanism’ in Zambia (Poultry Bulletin, 2002:40). 
 
As an intermediary institution, the ZNFU facilitates this through circulating knowledge and 
providing targeted knowledge services, and more specifically, through regular surveys, biannual 
agricultural trade fairs (sector networking), needs analyses, workshops, SMS (text messaging) 
pricing services for commodities, and publications for specific commodity associations.  
Agricultural trade fairs and workshops are perhaps the most structured and extensive strategies of 
‘cultivating’ and nurturing the capacity of the agricultural community. Trade fairs attract 
producers, and network technology providers, seed producers, millers, supermarket buyers, and 
visitors from the region interested in leasing land for agriculture in Zambia. In sum, these 
measures are designed to support and ‘upgrade’ the agricultural sector and in particular those 
small-scale farmers who are looking to expand and enter what is now termed as the ‘emerging 
farmers’ market. This resonates well with both systems and institutional approaches where the 
ZNFU is concerned with improving cultures of innovation, and knowledge and information 
sharing (Amin, 2004; Smith, 2005). Below is a brief example of how the ZNFU circulates 
knowledge through the food system.  
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ZNFU and knowledge circulation: The “SMS Trade/Market Information 
System” 
In June 2008, the Food Reserve’s Agency announced a new round of purchases from maize 
growers. The price was agreeable to the ZNFU, whose only concern what that the FRA only had 
two collection depots per district, which means that farmers would have had to travel anywhere 
up to 100km to the depots. The ZNFU knew that traders would fill this transport need, but were 
concerned that they would also take advantage of small-scale farmers. This had been a huge 
problem in the past, and had adversely affected maize prices. Since 2007, the solution was to 
implement a short messaging service (SMS) that would be jointly run by the ZNFU and two 
mobile phone operators, which would make commodity prices instantly available to small-scale 
farmers, provided the farmer had access to a mobile phone. The FRA depots debacle is just one 
of many examples where commodity price information would curb the tendency for traders to 
take advantage of farmers. A press release was issued and circulated by the ZNFU to urge 
farmers to make use of the SMS service.  
 
The ‘SMS Trade/Market Information System’ is updated bi-weekly, and takes global market 
prices for maize, any Zambian price stabilisation mechanisms (import/export bans), and transport 
costs into consideration in calculating prices. Farmers can SMS for up to nine commodities, 
including maize, sorghum, millet, beef and pork, in each Zambian districts. They can also gather 
information about traders operating in that district and, subsequently, buyers. An examples of the 
kind of information available from the Market Information System website is included below (see 
Figure 4).  
 
According to a recent report for the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation 
(CTA), which coordinates trade between African Caribbean and Pacific countries and the 
European Union,  
Farmers told ZNFU, in a user survey at the end of 2007, that they had more confidence 
when dealing with traders and that they increasingly saw themselves as serious partners in 
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their transactions. Traders, although many were sceptical at first [sic], also benefit as they 
now deal directly with farmers avoiding the need to share profits with middlemen. In the 
short time the project has been running there are already definite signs that relationship 
between farmers and traders is greatly improving.52
 
 
                                                 
52 Goudappel, 2009: Issue 47: Market information systems, ICTUpdate. The body is also part of the (Internet and 
Communications Technologies for Development) ICT4D Community of the Development Gateway Foundation. 
See <http://ictupdate.cta.int/en/Feature-Articles/Sending-the-right-message> 
The messaging service is also in place in other contexts, most notably India, and is becoming 
increasingly accessible in Zambia because the ZNFU together with other corporate sponsors and 
mobile phone operators intermittently arrange discounted mobile phone drives (personal 
communication; see also Goudappel, 2009).  
 
What is happening in Zambia is part of a larger move to incorporate mobile phone technologies 
into agricultural development in Africa (see Molony, 2009), and symbolises the shifting nature of 
knowledge or commodity circulation in agricultural systems in the global south because of 
technological innovation (see Smith, 2009). Most importantly for this section, is that the ZNFU, 
not the agricultural ministry, is pivotal in driving the initiative. This suggests that the agribusiness 
association is a key institution in circulating knowledge by supplying the necessary market 





Figure 6: SMS/Agricultural Information System showing commodities and traders 
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Source: http://www.farmprices.co.zm/index.php [Accessed 2010]
The agricultural ministry, MACO, in an attempt to become more proactive in supplying 
information to the agricultural community in Zambia, has recently launched its partnership with 
an Agricultural Information Systems project, funded by the international development 
community. The eRails ‘African Portal on Agriculture’ is meant to provide the agricultural 
community in various African countries the opportunity to share and gather information for users 
in the country, put up a website or provide information and feedback to donors.53  The larger 
eRails project is still in the pilot phase, and is being used extensively by Mauritius and Uganda, 
for instance, but as yet, MACO has not even created a country profile on the site.54
                                                 
53 The initiative is jointly developed by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), the ISICAD 
working group at the (German) Federal Agency for Agriculture and Food (BLE). 
 Given the 
centrality of the ZNFU in innovation in the agricultural sector, it is surprising that the recent 
partnership, between the Ministry (MACO) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation on 
creating information systems for African agriculture does not include the ZNFU, but is a 
‘Ministry-led’ initiative called ‘Zambia Agricultural Research for Development Information 
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Network (ZAR4DIN)’.55
                                                                                                                                                           
54 See 
  
www.erails.net by date March 2010. 
55 Following Smith (2009) there is opportunity to think this through in regards to ‘Science and Technology for 
Development’ (the title of Smith’s book) for future research. 
ZNFU and its state lobbying role 
A second important role of the ZNFU is its role as a ‘watchdog’ or ombudsman of the 
agricultural sector in Zambia (see Zambian Farmer, 1998a-c). It is concerned with the 
agribusiness aspect, and this suggests that the institution is central to formulating or regulating 
Zambia’s national investment policy in agriculture: 
The focuses for these associations are information, production technology and the third is 
research and development. Basically those are the major issues. [But] we actively are 
involved in investments, in particular investments in the agricultural sector, by giving 
position papers, policy advisory notes. On specific points we are a watchdog, working to 
protect the interests of the farming community, be it small farmers, companies and 
everything (Interview, D. President of the ZNFU, Mr. J. Zimba, July 2007, Lusaka). 
As suggested in the above quote, because the ZNFU represents farmers and businesses in the 
agricultural industry, it also firmly lobbies the agricultural ministry on the behalf of its 
constituents, and in this sense acts as a watchdog of the agrifood economy. An example of this is 
a case in 1996, where the state Agricultural Sector Investment Programme funded by Japanese, 
Swedish, German donors faced formalised outcry from Zambian farmers for the ASIP’s planned 
support of non-indigenous farmers (The Zambian Farmer, 1996). The strength of the ZNFU and 
the key reconciliatory role it played in the Zambian food economy was one of the key reasons 
this programme fizzled out in the first year of its existence. In fact it was the lobbying prowess 
and the membership integration of agribusiness and small-scale farmers of the ZNFU that 
fundamentally challenged the Agricultural Ministry. Had the ministry and the ASIP forged ahead, 
it would have ‘drive[n] a wedge between commercial and small-scale farmers within the ZNFU 
ranks and would [have] shatter[ed] the image painfully cultivated by the ZNFU of being Southern 
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Africa’s most racially integrated farmers’ union’ (The Zambian Farmer, 1997:10). In the view of 
many, this was the defining moment that made the ZNFU a more trusted institution with regards 
to agricultural matters than the Ministry had been, and also fundamentally restructured the 
ministry (The Zambian Farmer, 1997, Editorial).  
 
Another, more recent example was when a new Value-Added Tax on agricultural inputs and 
outputs was overturned when the Poultry Association of Zambia, among other commodity 
divisions of the ZNFU, presented projections of how those sectors would be affected (personal 
communication, Head of PAZ, March 2007, Lusaka). The head of the Poultry Association of 
Zambia (PAZ) later added: 
As a result it's much more difficult for our government to look the other way and ignore the 
problem. Our strength is the unity we have. If we wanted to, we could bring agriculture to 
its knees. 
Despite this self-assertive position, the ZNFU does keep the ministry in check and often publicly 
calls the government to account (through the media and open meetings) when it makes decisions 
that disadvantage the local economy.  
New institutional economics (NIE) literature allows us make sense of the position of the ZNFU. 
An institution is often ‘called upon’ or it takes on responsibility to perform a crucial intermediary 
function between the state and society (Alence, 2004:163). In the case of the ZNFU, it functions 
as an intermediary institution, often facilitating growth as a proxy for state incapacity, or in 
challenging the state when it does not act in the best interests of the agricultural community. And 
furthermore, it is ZNFU, not the state that is seen to work in the best interest of the sector, thereby 
fulfilling a quasi-developmentalist role.  
 
Second, Fligstein (2002:671) notes that intermediary institutions between ‘market-building and 
disciplining state decisions’ have a fundamentally political role, and institutions that appropriate 
this role ‘drive a ‘compelling vision’ of national/sectoral competition’. In this way, the ZNFU as 
an institution is particularly powerful because it serves a political function, and appropriates 
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developmental and neoliberal rationalisations to both assert its importance in the agrifood 
economy and to challenge the state’s policies that ironically often do not seem to support the 
agricultural community.  
 
Another interesting dynamic added to the complex nature of the ZNFU is that it functions 
through funding support of the EU. Thus while it is veritably a local institution, its centrality in 
the Zambian food system is maintained by funds from the international donor community, and 
one that governs (in GVC terms) value chains through agricultural regulation. While the ZNFU is 
pivotal in the domestic economy, it is also presumably a key intermediary institution that 
facilitates Zambia-EU trade through those commodity associations that are linked to GVCs, 
particularly tobacco. Although a comparative analysis of this is not within the scope of this thesis, 
it opens up important areas of research worth investigating in future studies.  
 
In sum, governance of the agricultural sector between the ZNFU and the agricultural ministry 
means that they each have a common agenda of local/domestic economic growth. Where the 
ministry reacts to neoliberal demands, the ZNFU keeps it in check and ‘disciplines’ its behaviour. 
And ironically, as mentioned in a previous chapter when the state’s announcement that the Food 
Reserves Agency was to massively cut down on its intake to stimulate private sector growth, the 
ZNFU will sometimes assert a strong position against neoliberal courses of action despite it being 
an agribusiness.  
 
The extra-state business association oversees how policy decisions are made and implemented, 
and is to this extent political. Alence (2004:165) argues that this type of intermediary institution 
curbs the kind of neo-patrimonialism that is increasingly evident in other emerging market 
economies and that inevitably damages their development progress. Also, an institution between 
the state and society has a crucial role to play in ‘influencing the alignment between 
governments’ immediate political incentives and the requirements of longer-term economic 
development’ (Alence, 2004:165).  
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In sum, as seen in the ZNFU case, because the institution is deeply rooted in the domestic 
political economy, it is able to appropriate developmental, political and neoliberal rationalisations 
at various times to benefit the business sector. Even though there are complex linkages with EU 
donor funding, this extra-firm, extra-state institution is central to the food system in Zambia. It 
mediates between the state and agribusiness firms, and facilitates greater cohesion and 
competitiveness in the agricultural sector.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter draws attention to two non-firm institutions. In answering the second research 
question – in addition to agribusiness firms, which other institutions are central to the food 
system, and what are their roles? – this chapter points to multiple sites of power in Zambia's food 
system. While the role of the informal economy is noted in previous chapters, this chapter drew 
attention to one recent change in the governance of the market. In particular, though, the chapter 
concentrated on the Zambian National Farmers’ Union.  
What does this suggest for Africanist research?  
The changes in informal markets have profound implications also for scholarship on urban 
African economies. First, the institutionalization of state regulation onto markets changes the 
‘ungovernable/unregulated’ image of markets, and there is evidence to suggest that this will be 
a growing trend elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, given the existing and growing 
recognition of the importance of the informal economy, there is further opportunity for 
challenging dualist accounts of economic development in Africa, and as I reflect on the Chapter 
7. Third, and most importantly, there are important developments that will ultimately benefit 
small-scale farmers, traders, and urban consumers. The changes at an institutional level in 
markets are precisely how agribusiness firms have developed – as the result of changing 
institutional governance. And as noted in Chapter 3, these changes are seen to fundamentally 
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restructure economic interaction. The key difference here is that urban consumption is at the 
centre of transitioning informal markets.  
 
Reflecting on the changes in the institutional system that supports informal modes of food retail 
leads to a more accurate assessment of transitions in local food economies. Institutional support 
(or, conversely, protracted repression) of informal markets has direct implications for resilience 
or decline of informal markets. This means that the ‘traditional’ market as an increasingly 
higher-value end-retail opportunity is not impossible. Upgrading of the market infrastructure 
has the potential to create profitable economic exchange where local producers may find a 
preferred market. It thus not only tempers the enthusiastic claims of the supermarket revolution, 
or the normalizing power of firms, in regard to linking farmers to profitable, modern markets, it 
also has implications for them primarily related to urban food consumption. Urban consumers 
have other choices about where to buy food. Accurate assessment of the extent to which 
supermarkets and agribusiness firms have transformed or will transform the region can only be 
undertaken when these other sites of power are made visible. Using the case of Lusaka’s food 
economy, this chapter shows that agribusiness firms and supermarkets are not the only players 
in Africa’s food economy, neither are they the most dominant. Institutional support for the 
informal food economy and traditional forms of retailing enhances its strength and resilience. 
These institutional interventions have implications for the future potential of the retail 
enterprise, as for the progressive development of informal market economies.  
 
The case of the ZNFU also suggests that where extra-state, extra-firm agrifood institutions exist 
in African countries, they may be more influential in those food systems than initially thought. 
That an institution such as the ZNFU is so proactive in developing the domestic agricultural 
sector in Zambia, and is supported by the international donor community, suggests that it is a 
prototype of sorts in African food systems. It is therefore surprising that the ZNFU rarely features 




 If we see these transitions in light of the work on global production networks, 
where there is a greater emphasis on the agency of domestic institutions, and the way that 
Economic Geography scholarship, as it pertains to the literature on supermarkets, currently views 
governance,- as driven by supermarkets and agribusiness firms –  then it is not presumptuous to 
say that an omission of this sort seriously skews academic research on African agrifood systems. 
This case, in conclusion, demonstrates the importance of domestic intermediary institutions in 
food systems in Africa, and compels a rethinking of academic scholarship on agricultural value 
chains/networks/systems.  
The transformation of food economies must be based on an accurate assessment of local 
consumption demands and existing forms of power such as the ZNFU and urban markets. 
Reorganization of the local food supply system essentially must be the factor that signals 
transformation in Africa’s food economy, as seen through these cases. In sum, the resilience of 
urban markets and increasingly formalized processes that govern transformation in these 
markets, together with the strength of an institution such as the ZNFU, compel a more critical 
reading of the changes in African agrifood economies. And this has implications for how we 
think about the food system and the forms of governance that shape, influence and regulate 
certain priorities and political economy interaction. This chapter has provided an empirical 
examination of two institutions integral to Zambia's food system that would be overlooked in a 
more normative account of economic development in Africa which is based on the vision of 
supermarket as the vector for economic transition. The next logical step in understanding 
Zambia's food system is to build on our understanding of multiple sites of power, but 
considering how factors in Zambia’s political economy influence agribusiness firms. 
Examining governance, in its changing forms from multiple sites of power in a dynamic and 
changing political economy context, is bound to highlight interesting and perhaps unexpected 
interactions. ‘Firms and Embeddedness’ is the theme of the final empirical chapter of this 
thesis. The chapter suggests that there is a turn to the local in the sense that various institutions 
                                                 
56 See Dorosh et al, 2009; Jayne, 2008; Haantuba, 2007; Haantuba and De Graf, 2008; Hichaambwa and Tschirley, 
2006; Hichaambwa et al, 2007a, 2007b).  
 162 
in the food systems, including international agribusiness firms, increasingly prioritise Zambia’s 
economic development and strengthening the domestic food system.
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Roadmap 
The previous chapter looked at two kinds of institutions that do not typically feature in the 
Economic Geography literature. In the case of Zambia, these institutions – the national farmers’ 
union and the urban market – are both integral to the food system.  
Thus far, we have systematically gone through the following stages:  
(1) A ‘system’ is understood to be the most appropriate approach for understand the 
agrifood ‘sector’ in Zambia;  
(2) The political economy that underpins the agrifood system in Zambia is shown to be a 
crucial consideration in Africanist agrifood research; and  
(3) The importance of non-firm, non-state institutions, which are integral to the food 
system, is highlighted. 
The next chapter is concerned with how the context profoundly governs firms that are embedded 
in that context – not primarily the other way around. Since it is outside the scope of this thesis to 
look at how each of the institutions or actors in the food system govern and how they are 
governed by factors in the context, I have chosen four cases which each demonstrate different 
factors in the context that govern the functioning/growth/objectives of the firms. 
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CHAPTER 6: FIRMS AND EMBEDDEDNESS IN ZAMBIA: THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ECONOMY  
Ultimately…when undertaking research on production networks, it is 
necessary to steer a delicate path between overemphasizing the 
transformative effects of transnational corporations in economies where 
they invest and overstressing the extent national conditions shape their 
operations in particular countries. Instead the aim should be to explore 
the…mutual transformation of both the firms and places in which they are 
embedded  (Coe and Lee, 2007:66 citing Dicken, 2000).  
 
Introduction  
Until now, the thesis has presented a conceptual framework that places importance on the 
domestic political economy and demonstrates an awareness of the ‘system’ that shapes the food 
system as we know it and accounts for the eclecticism in it. I have argued that without an 
awareness of those institutions that are central to the food system both in terms of food 
provisioning, and those institutions’ roles in governing the food system, scholarship on African 
agrifood systems is lacking. Yet the overarching assumption in Economic Geography that 
agribusiness firms transform African economies still dominates academic scholarship. The 
chapter following weighs up this assumption by looking at agribusiness firms and assessing the 
extent to which they transform economic interaction in Zambia’s food system, and the extent to 
which they, themselves, are transformed by embedding in this context. The quote above, which is 
also mentioned earlier in the thesis, provides the rationale for this inquiry. What is the mutual 
transformation of the firms and the places in which they are embedded? One of the most 
important findings in this chapter relates to how the domestic political economy determines how 
firms govern economic interaction in the food system.   
The Influence of the domestic political economy: Strategically ‘localised’ 
agribusinesses 
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The four cases highlighted in this chapter show how the domestic political economy context 
profoundly impacts on firms that are embedded in Zambia. These firms adapt to the local context 
in interesting ways in an aim to enhance the competitiveness of the industry, and in so doing, they 
unexpectedly fulfil the role of growing the domestic economy: 
 
1) The National Milling (NM) Corporation has a strong commitment to sourcing local maize   
from small-scale farmers as the input for stock feed for the poultry industry. While this has 
historical roots, as shown in Chapter 4, it also the most logical supply base because more than 
70 percent of farmers are smallholders.  
2) Hybrid Poultry Solutions supplies day-old chicks to its outgrower farms linked exclusively to 
Hybrid - a typical model for agrifood theorists that are concerned with linking farmers to 
high value chains through outgrower schemes. Even though this firm represents high value 
economies of scale, socioeconomic factors in the context mean that there is a limited 
consumer market to supply to. 
3) Ross Poultry Breeders is also a highly industrialised agribusiness firm, yet its business model 
centres on informal marketing through agents or traders. Ross also runs training workshops for 
small-scale poultry farmers providing support to the fledgling industry while growing its 
customer base. As such it adapts to the Zambian context in unexpected ways.  
4) The retailer Shoprite is perhaps most candid about its role as ‘businessmen, not politicians’ in 
its defence of its sourcing practises (which often are criticised for not supporting the local 
economy). Yet, in light of work done by other scholars, the supermarket’s role in the economy 
appears to be tempered or disciplined by the state.  
 
Ironically, these cases allow us to see how the local political economy environment constrains or 
influences the firm, thereby determining the form of economic interaction it is involved in, and 
not primarily the other way around. They also point to an increasing trend toward informalisation 
in these larger economies of scale. The industrialised part of the food system in Zambia is, as yet, 
still limited; its consumer market for processed food is small, and this has implications for the 
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agribusiness community, and in particular, for how firms concede that the socio-economic 
context ‘governs’ how they do business. This suggests that there are political and local 
developmental factors in the local context that transform and often profoundly circumscribe the 
way agribusiness functions in those areas. 
 
The chapter concludes with a fifth and final case on the ‘Proudly Zambian’ campaign. It is 
included because it raises critical questions about how we consider the context of intersecting 
governances. Whether the negotiations of power and interacting governances should be read as 
the ‘growing pains’ of a transitioning economy, or as intangible forms of governance that reflect 
the nature of the domestic or localising food system, is a question that is explored in greater detail 
in the thesis conclusion. 
Supporting the agrifood system: The case of the National Milling 
Corporation  
The National Milling (NM) Corporation was a parastatal entity until 1996, and is one of the two 
larger stock feed companies in Zambia. It is now owned by a multinational corporation (Seaboard 
Kansas) that invests in agribusinesses in emerging markets with the potential for high 
consumption growth. National Milling buys maize from commercial and small-scale farmers and 
processes it into maize meal for human consumption, and maize grain stock feeds for livestock 
production. The company has three depots, two of which are also processing plants, located in a 
central area of the Zambian capital, Lusaka (apart from almost 60 depots nation-wide). The main 
Lusaka plant has a daily turnover of, on average, 30 tons. Lusaka is often the most accessible 
point for farmers and intermediary traders.  
 
This is not a linear input-output chain, however. Small-scale farmers are offered a preferential 
rate for the smaller quantities they bring in, and this encourages them to expand production and 
keep the quality consistent. This is termed ‘upstream supply’. The company also gives incentives 
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to medium scale maize producers – credit, packaging and transport provision – so that the 
company has efficient, quality downstream supply chains for the grain feed.  
 
Maize meal and grain feed is generally sold directly to other processing companies, maize 
wholesalers, and poultry farmers. The downstream supply chain occurs through ‘agents’ that have 
firm orders to buy a certain quantity, and then privately resell. Besides being customers of the 
NMC, they are not contracted to the company. They are however, given a substantial discount if 
they are reliable customers. These agents (or intermediaries) often are also targeted by suppliers 
of chicks and other inputs, so that those suppliers can piggyback on the networks of 
intermediaries to sell their products widely. NMC often makes transportation available to 
intermediaries, as do other chick suppliers. This benefits the company so that it has a captive, 
well-supported market, while still maintaining a ‘development ethic’:  
We have developed arrangements with hatcheries that distribute day old chicks. One of 
our strategies is to transport both the feed and the chicks. The main reason for this is to 
add or to encourage development to the area. They are like our agents of development so 
we take care of the needs of the area (Interview, Managing Director of the National 
Milling Corporation, Lusaka, July 2007). 
 
Despite the fact that the NMC is ultimately a business, it has a strong commitment to developing 
the local economy. In part, this is because the Zambian managing director is a ‘stalwart’ of 
Zambia’s agri-industry and was involved in national agricultural union development long before 
Seaboard takeover of the NM, and has been involved, for over thirty years, in Zambia’s food 
economy in nutrition, policy development, and agriculture-industry publication. The MD opposes 
the image of a corporate social responsibility, and asserts that the company is interested in 
building the national economy and investing in development locally 
… to build capacity, networks and infrastructure. Because of the small volumes that are 
sometimes bought or sold by us, there is the potential of it being commercially feasible. I 
see this as a future investment. We’ve had, over the past five years, a minimum of 50 
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percent growth in sales, and most of the growth has been seen in just the last three years 
(ibid). 
 
One particular farmer, who has recently begun to expand his smallholder poultry business, 
affirms the supportive role  NM plays in agribusiness. He notes that the NMC has recently 
changed its supply and support policy to meet some of the challenges that small farmers face, in 
particular the provision of credit and the accessibility of agricultural extension services that 
extends to coupling supply inputs for farmers (personal communication, Owner of Tasheni 
Poultry Farm, Lusaka, November 2007). 
 
The case of National Milling suggests that the agribusiness firm may not appropriate a 
‘developmental rationalisation’ for the sake of gaining profit, although this may well be the case. 
More importantly, it appropriates a developmental rationalisation because it is in the firm’s best 
interest to do so. National Milling’s future growth is bound to the local context, and its operations 
are reliant on the forms of interaction at work in that context. The model of buying and selling 
feed, and the way the company makes credit, transport and other services available is not so much 
that it supports the local economy necessarily, but that it is governed by forms of interaction in 
the domestic political economy context that circumscribe how the company operates. What we 
see is that, in practice, the rationalisations that make a firm a neoliberal subject and those that 
underpin development are woven together. Development, and support for small-scale farmers is 
tied to economic growth, the competitiveness of a firm and successful business practise.  
 
As we see in the next case, the domestic pole context also appears to determine the behaviour of 
other agribusiness firms. And this has implications for the food geography literature and its 
enthusiasm that agribusinesses and supermarkets revolutionise African economies.  
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Limited consumer markets vs. agribusiness growth: the case of Hybrid 
Poultry Solutions 
Hybrid Poultry Solutions supplies day-old chicks either to its own processing firms or to other 
producers, businessmen, farmers and processors. The company, and the poultry industry at large, 
is influenced by domestic and regional political economy changes, and has noticed 
…substantial growth in the last three years because of the copper boom in the Copperbelt 
in terms of new miners therefore more money on the street; government investment in 
infrastructure [roads]; and the demise in Zimbabwe … investment found its way to 
Zambia (Interview with the manager of Hybrid Poultry Solutions, July 2007).  
 
Even though this high-value supply chain suggests success as a large industrialised poultry 
agribusiness, Hybrid’s manager is hesitant to conclude that this points to the ‘transformation’ of 
Zambia's food economy because the consumer market for high value foodstuff is limited. He 
argues that expansion of the poultry industry will be ultimately ineffective in a broader economic 
environment that cannot absorb increased production, despite the growth in agribusiness:  
If you look, there’s already four major plants [processors] here, ZamChick, Verino, Eureka 
and Crest. All of them are sitting on stock except Verino which means that even with 
today’s production of dressed chicken, we’re overproducing at the moment. If I have to 
double the capacity here, I’m not going to sell more locally, I’m just going to pinch market 
share from the other competitors. I’m not going to create massive growth in sales (ibid).  
 
Tempered with massive growth in sales, is the recognition that for the vast majority of urban 
consumers: 
spending power is growing but isn’t growing enough. There [are] still a lot of people 
below the poverty line. If we grow by 1kg per person per year it’s seen as phenomenal 
growth but that only pushes it to 5kg [per person, per year], and average in South Africa 
in 22kg, Brazil is 36kg and the UK is 38kg  (ibid). 
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Hybrid’s growth is limited because it recognises that competing with other agribusinesses for the 
same market share is in fact counterproductive in a context where the consumer base is growing 
slowly.  
 
In the case of Hybrid, while there are certain drivers that encourage the expansion of the firm, in 
reality, these firms can expand only so far as the market is able to absorb the product. One of the 
premises of the value chains approach is that linking farmers to markets through outgrower 
contracts will decrease poverty and increase food security. This of course assumes that the high 
value product is consumed elsewhere, because it is too high value (expensive) for the vast 
majority of local consumers to afford. Little mention is made about domestic consumption. In 
Zambia, the market for the consumption of high value produce is not big, and export chains are 
limited to speciality produce. Therefore, in practice, the local market tempers the power of 
agribusiness firms in the food economy.  
Cultivating the food industry: the case of Ross Breeders 
According to many in the poultry industry in Zambia, Ross Breeders is a key player in the region 
(Poultry Bulletin, 2000). The company is part of Country Bird Holdings in South Africa, but 
unlike other South African subsidiary companies, Ross buys all inputs that are available locally in 
Zambia, and ‘ploughs 90 percent of the profits back into development in Zambia’ (personal 
communication, Director of Ross Breeders Zambia, Mr C. Lindsay, August, 2007).  
 
Of the 800 000 day old chicks Ross produces per month, more than half go to small-scale 
producers and the rest to commercial broiler production firms. The supply chain is therefore 
pivotal to Ross’s enterprise, and while there are a few large lorries that arrive from large firms 
such as ZamChick, thousands of day old chicks make their way from production plants to small-
scale farmers through intermediary traders or ‘agents’ as they are called by Ross’s Director. One 
such agent is the ZNFU’s veterinarian who receives around a hundred boxes of day-old chicks 
(ten per box) at the ZNFU’s show grounds. From here, small-scale farmers from the Lusaka area 
fetch as many boxes as they have purchased and transport them home (see Preface).  
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Ross’s Director, Mr Lindsay explains: ‘when we first came we had a few guys on a bike and 
slowly we invest in that and our business has grown’. Ross’s supply network relies primarily on 
agents who either contact Ross or are approached by Ross to sell day old chicks to small-scale 
farmers outlying areas. Agents, are middlemen who themselves buy from Ross and resell, and the 
transaction is based very much on the agent’s ability to pay Ross upfront upon delivery. They 
also get a five percent commission from the chicks sold. A verbal commitment to buy has to be 
firmed up three weeks in advance by the agent, and agents are given three months to demonstrate 
that they have the ready market to sell on the chicks they buy from Ross. Ross, as an incentive, 
delivers consignments to certain areas four to five times per week. The remarkable span of Ross’ 
network is very much dependent on intermediaries.57
 
  
The main rationale for increasingly employing agents as a preferred network strategy is related to 
Ross’s plans for expansion, and protection of the existing production base:  
when your production gets to the stage when you actually now need market, that's what 
you need to expect…so …we'll expand out until we have enough volumes to make 
expansion feasible. [Points to an outlying area eastward] We've got a good population 
here, a good growing area; you've got nice towns set up here, not just farming populations 
…so basically to get your product down there [where there is little development]the cost 
is going to be obscene (Ibid.).  
 
Interestingly, Ross projects expansion of the industry based on urbanisation trends and the 
transition of planning in various municipalities from agriculture to other economic trade-related 
                                                 
57 Ross has a number of agents in Lusaka and other provinces in Zambia, and two in the DRC: ‘[Points to a map, 
northward from Lusaka. We have] 12 agents in Lusaka, two in Kabwe, one in Kapri Mposhi, two in Ndola, two in 
Luacha, two in Kitwe, one in Chingolo, one in Chilabongwe, two in Lubumbashi, that's the DRC, but we drop the 
birds here [points to the border town], they come to fetch it, the border post, that's a bit like the wild west’ 
(personal communication, Mr C Lindsay). 
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activity. The future of the poultry industry is an important consideration for Ross, as noted in the 
following example.  
 
Ross hosts a number of road shows or on-site training days to provide a service to small-scale 
farmers and agents. At these events, poultry industry suppliers or upstream processors provide 
guidance, samples and show-and-tell advice centres to emerging farmers to access the inputs and 
information for markets. The Ross event, hosted in August 2007 at the parent breeding facility 60 
kilometres from Lusaka city, attracted a large number of emerging farmers and included a day-
long series of workshops where farm experiments were used to teach broiler growers the 
intricacies of poultry farming. Ross Breeders’ motivation for providing this type of service was to 
establish a ready market that would be profitable and would grow with the company by 
cultivating supportive relationships with loyal agents and customers. The rationale is that if 
farmers are provided with inputs without experience in how to rear chicks, Ross will always have 
a future market and at the same time it will enhance capacity and ensure success of small-scale 
farmers so that Ross remains competitive and continues to contribute to development:   
We have a formal side, and large economies of scale, but at the same time it's a growth 
economy (ibid.).  
 
Ross’s model of business is influenced by priorities in political economy  to such a degree that its 
projected growth follows patterns of local consumption and urbanisation closely. Its dual concern 
with economic success of the firm is indivisible from activities that may be considered 
‘developmental’. The Ross case is a good example of where a firm has a concerted 
developmental rationalisation while at the same time recognises that growing the business relies 
very much on informal supply chains. In this case, Ross’s territorial embeddedness is guided by a 
contextually sensitive knowledge of the local economy and its growth path. In short, it adapts to 
the Zambian context so efficiently that the firm is seen as an exemplar to other agribusiness 
industries in Zambia (personal communication with Mr M. Ngosa, director of the Poultry 
Association of Zambia). The case of Shoprite demonstrates that far from the supermarket 
 173 
revolutionising Zambia’s economy, there are certain factors in the domestic context which 
circumscribe its business. 
Domestic challenges to the supermarket revolution: the case of Shoprite 
Shoprite opened its doors in Zambia in October 1995. Before this time, the state-owned company, 
called the Zambian Import and Export Company, was the only formal-format outlet in the 
country. Shoprite bought the Zambian Import and Export Company (NIAEC) in 1995 and 
absorbed all of the senior managing staff, which included my main respondent, Mr C. Bota, now 
the Head of Shoprite’s operations in Zambia. Mr Bota narrated the series of events that resulted 
in Shoprite move into Zambia in the 1990s, and went on to provide an account of how the 
supermarket impacted the Zambian economy and the aspirations of people.58
By this time, just post liberalisation, the second regime post independence, things had 
dwindled down to a halt trade wise. This was a combination of issues, nepotism being 
one. For instance NIAEC had an ex-army officio as its head. At the same time there was 
massive economic decline, plus the world ethos was changing given that just five years 
before this was the massive capitalist turnaround in government. Post-1994 was an era of 
wholesale privatisation, and naturally the trade sector was one of those to be changed, 
entirely. There was no recapitalisation and no continuation of products and services 
particularly in the retail environment. It was quite chaotic. There were food shortages, and 
even basics like cooking oil was very scarce. People used to get up early in the morning 
and queue for basics. Sometimes you'd queue for three days and nothing. if you notice 
  
                                                 
58 Excerpts from this interview are quoted here in length in part because researchers had been refused interviews 
with any Shoprite staff since 2003, particularly with domestic, Zambian staff because of a critical appraisal of 
Shoprite’s impact on the labour sector in Zambia – Darlene Miller’s research (personal communication, the Head 
of Shoprite’s African Operations, Mr G. Fritz, Cape Town, January 2007). Thus the interview is a rare example of 
personal communication with Zambian staff. I was quizzed at length in South Africa by Mr Fritz about the 
intentions of my research, which, at the time was geared more toward a narrative of the modernising Zambian food 
economy. Mr Fritz refused permission for me to speak with Zambian staff, asserting that it was not company 
policy for researchers to speak with local staff (because of Miller’s research) but instead had speedily made 
arrangements for me to meet with his South African counterpart in Zambia. I gained access to Mr Bota through 
personal contact with a Zambian bureaucrat, and later found out through conversation with Mr Bota that he was 
the anonymous primary contact of Darlene Miller’s research about Shoprite’s labour policy. This accounts for the 
way the interview seems to shift from being accidentally critical of the company, to providing a PR message. 
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people getting into a queue everyone would run to join it. It sounds funny now, but you 
know if there was a queue there was the opportunity to get some or other needed 
commodity.  
 
So before ’95 there were shortages, price controls and scarce basic commodities. In June 
’95 people who could afford it would get their families to buy goods from outside and 
bring them in cross border. Come October 26 1995, it was unbelievable. Shoprite SA 
came in international fashion, not as a minor enterprise coming to help out a poor 
economy build itself; it came in with international style. …Shoprite had transplanted itself 
into the Zambian market. First development was along the line of rail, and they covered 
all nine provinces.  
 
As I noted earlier the success of supermarkets in urban Africa and their dominant status in the 
food economy are based on a number of factors: rapid urbanization and the growth in urban 
incomes and higher consumption aspirations of the urban middle class or indeed perceptions of it, 
the partial demise of the informal/traditional food economy, an increase in foreign direct 
investment of retail multinationals, and their role in fast-tracking commercialization of 
production and processing to meet their demands. 
 
As a general trend in urban Africa, the openness of economies and the aspirations of the urban 
middle-class consumer offer considerable profit potential and high investment yield for retail 
companies who look to expand their enterprise on the continent. A recent finance-media 
publication notes that:  ‘Africa is the last emerging market . . . [and African growth] is one of the 
most interesting parts of the market at the moment.’ This is primarily because of the ‘more 
interesting opportunities in the consumer space [where retail] firms could be beneficiaries of an 
expanding middle class’ (Reuters UK, 2007). 
 
The shift in aspirational consumption based on higher urban incomes is seen to be the pull factor 
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for retail investment and the exponential growth success of supermarkets in emerging markets 
(Miller, 2008). While rapidly expanding urban populations and increasing incomes provide the 
necessary environment for convenient, accessible, and varied food choices, the presence of 
upwardly mobile consumers with changing consumption patterns is seen to be a necessary 
condition for supermarket share growth. As the head of Shoprite’s operations in Zambia explains, 
while this was indeed the case in Zambia, the supermarket did not cater for everyone, and was 
inaccessible for the majority of the population:59
People became accustomed to this lifestyle, their habits started changing. They began to 
trust the prices and they became used to the standardization of quality, branding. . . .You 
could trust the product; it wasn’t going away, so people’s lifestyles changed. They filled 
their lives with Shoprite. The buying mentality of the housewife, and everybody, got 
accustomed to that international standard. Before this, people couldn't care less about 
quality, when the product was actually there, "who cares; it was a parastatal". But that's if 
you could afford it.  
 
 
Haantuba and de Graaf (2008:210) note that in Zambia ‘supermarkets still account for an 
insignificant proportion of produce sold’. Mr. Bota also comments on the tendency for Lusaka-
based supermarkets to cater for the higher-income consumer. He notes that Shoprite did not 
initially anticipate the fact that the food sales needed to be accessible to local consumers: 
Mongu, [does] not have this range; this range is for people like you and me, the traveller, 
tourist; the high income bracket. The Mongu range only included basics like oil, sugar, 
flour, maize meal, soaps; the basic range. The guy that could afford a wider range was 
probably rich enough to drive to Lusaka for it anyway. The lower income provinces, we 
knew we weren’t going to sell him snoek or prawns; we'll sell what's caught in the river. 
We made the silly mistake of not studying the ethos of the people and sold fish, but they 
could get fish from the river, and it was free.  
                                                 
59 Elsewhere in Africa, as I showed in previous chapters, only a small percentage of the urban population 
purchases food stuff from supermarkets.  
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In the Zambian case, Shoprite, the South African supermarket prefers not to procure in Zambia 
because local production (in)capacity and quality, or lack of it, often falls short of meeting the 
participation demands by supermarkets (personal communication, Head of Shoprite’s African 
operation, January 2007, Cape Town). This is put down, simply, ‘to the issue of quality’. Yet it 
has political implications because, as Miller (2008:4) notes, exclusionary standards based on low-
quality and quantity claims are often used to justify exploitative business practices even when 
capacities and quality are present.  
 
Is it a logistical business issue, or is it political? This rather amusing quote tells one side the story 
– that it is logistical:  
People look at us and want us to be the saviours of Africa in terms of small-scale farmers 
… we can't. ... We can't. In a [social responsibility] programme, a hundred people 
growing onions tomatoes and beans, it's a small community, they give their tomatoes to 
their family and friends and they also sell in the street, whatever's left, Shoprite must buy. 
How do we do it? Firstly who do we sell it to, the whole community's growing tomatoes? 
(Interview with the head of Shoprite’s African operations, January 2007, Cape Town) 
 
There is another contradiction here: on the one hand the struggle between local producers and the 
supermarket giant is an isolated, depoliticized transaction based on quality or logistical sale. On 
the other, in much of the international development literature, supermarkets are now seen as the 
transformative force in local economies, and as ‘partners’ in social development to increase the 
capacity of small-scale farmers to be included in supermarket supply chains (see Haantuba and 
De Graf, 2008; Timmer, 2008). Clearly, in Zambia, the supermarket does not see its role as 
particularly developmental – beyond its corporate social responsibility projects. And beyond its 
foreign retail expansion, the comparatively few urban consumers, and the limited markets for 
small-scale farmers, claims that supermarkets ‘revolutionise’ the food economy in Africa are 
substantially exaggerated. 
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Another side of the story, though, is that domestic institutions in Zambia, together with the state, 
are determined to coerce Shoprite to adhere to legislation about sourcing.  According to Mr Bota,  
In 1995, we were importing something like 85 percent of our fresh fruit and vegetable. At 
that stage, Shoprite's attitude was, the quality is not good enough for us; [but] it's still 
good enough for the market. It's just you and your husband growing in their back yard 
somewhere…now, twelve years later, and this may shock, or surprise, but not altogether 
overwhelm you; 12 years on, we source around 95 percent of our fresh produce locally. 
What we import is what we cannot get, or we don't grow locally. Other processed 
foodstuff, we have increased to around 60 percent local supply. 
 
Mr Bota at this stage may have been giving me the classic public relations line here from 
Shoprite, also on its Freshmark website (Freshmark is the procurement label of all Shoprite’s 
fresh produce), often contradicting other evidence that shows that the supermarket sources most 
processed foodstuff from South Africa (see Kenny and Mather, 2008; Miller, 2008). Indeed a 
later conversation with Mr Bota suggested that he, in his own capacity and not speaking for the 
company, thought quite differently, but his position soon shifted.60
My personal position… Yes, come and invest in my country, take your benefit as a 
corporate entity, but buy from my people. On the record, in terms of government 
regulation on international retail, these companies are quietly pressured to do so [source 




…but we cannot just accept anything, it's like “we understand you're poor, but we've got a 
business to run”. Mostly, we have grown with suppliers, we've asked some to 
move/relocate, and others, we've gone the distance for up to the twelve years we've been 
here to train, inspect, state regulations about branding, bar-coding, packaging etc. But we 
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still have Big Brother government that are checking up on whether we are meeting 
regulations about local sourcing…. 
 
61 
Kenny and Mather (2008:1), and Saunders (2008) argue that Shoprite faces increasing pressure 
from the Zambian government to adhere to national regulations about sourcing and labour 
practises, and in this way, the state ‘disciplines’ the supermarket. As Kenny and Mather (2008) 
note, there are efforts in Zambia in place to compel supermarkets to conform to domestic 
sourcing. Mr Bota also notes that this is increasingly the case, even though Shoprite appears on 
the surface to be ‘doing its bit’, but in his capacity as a Shoprite manager, he reflects the platitude 
of the company when he asserts that it is ultimately a business (‘we cannot just accept anything, 
it's like "we understand you're poor, but we've got a business to run"’).  
  
The above excerpts indicate that Shoprite is embedded in the Zambian context and its activities 
are part of a much broader set of transitions in the local context. Indeed, as Jayne argues   
Far from being an irreversible tsunami…supermarkets are one of many forces affecting 
the evolution of food systems in developing countries. The evolution of food systems and 
their distributional effects are also being fundamentally driven by local demographic, 
institutional and technical change, as well as by history (Jayne, 2008:109). 
While the local context and transitions within it influence the supermarket, to suggest that the 
context erodes the power of the supermarket would be an overstatement, because supermarkets 
prove to have an edge.  
                                                                                                                                                           
60 On this point, he added that I could use the information in my thesis, but was to keep my sources anonymous in 
other publicly accessible reports (and to send him a copy).  
61 At the time of interviews, Freshmark, Shoprite fresh produce procurement wing were hosting a conference in 
Zambia to showcase its existing and planned local sourcing initiatives, many of which were corporate social 
responsibility initiatives that Shoprite management at HQ felt invariably had led to bad publicity when the project 
was over (referring to the tomato project above). Mr Bota noted, off the record again, that even though he was the 
local spokesperson for the campaign, he was not included in any of the campaign planning and consequently could 




Because supermarkets in Africa are also predominantly large foreign investors, their ability to 
fast-track processes in the broader environment (upon which they symbiotically exist) are not 
only limited to the actual commodity supply chain. Supermarkets are also engaged with political-
economy processes through which they may induce the supermarket revolution by taking 
advantage, as they have done, of political-economy opportunities like deregulation and 
liberalization projects in order to gain a greater foothold in the economy. More recently, players 
in the agro-food industry have become more heavily represented than ever before in regional 
trade negotiations, and this is not surprising because the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) has recently ratified its free trade area (2008). Retailers and other regional 
investors drive a hard bargain to make sure that the trade negotiations happen in their favour. In 
Zambia, the presence of South African supermarket management at SADC trade negotiations 
often outweighs that of the Zambia’s foreign trade contingent. The head trade negotiator of 
Zambia’s Foreign Trade Department in the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry confirms: 
Retailers have a huge stake in this whole thing. It’s all about export credit guarantee from 
the side of the retailer. They are powerful players in this whole process. In fact we can say 
that the process is driven by South African retailers. Wherever Shoprite goes it tries to 
open up the markets and become a very strong bargaining voice in these meetings. And 
they have more strength because they are also of course tied to the investment side. At 
these negotiations, South African retailers come in their number to these meetings and 
they fight hard so that commodities where they don’t have market hold are relaxed. 
 
Although the Zambian state intermittently controls trade barriers, this strategy is not conducive to 
steady growth of the agrifood sector. Increasingly, as GVC scholars note, there are factors in the 
‘global market’ that influence, for instance, the cost of fuel and global commodity prices that 
states have little control over. In addition, there are regional influences at work that likewise are 
difficult to overcome. Shoprite, for example, in regional trade meetings, lobbies in favour of more 
open liberalization policies in Sub-Saharan Africa for its further expansion plans.   
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Preliminary conclusions on the ‘local turn’ and the influence of the domestic 
political economy  
Agribusinesses that are based in Zambia, particularly those that are subsidiaries of larger 
international food conglomerates, are clearly important players in the local food economy, as they 
are elsewhere. In Zambia, many of them have tailored their enterprise to meet local parameters 
and have targeted both their retail and supply at smaller scales. For instance, larger and 
increasingly more economically successful enterprises in the poultry sector have hybridized 
conventional agribusiness with a particular form of informalised supply and/or distribution. 
Conventional out-grower schemes linked to contracted poultry farming have developed very 
localized distribution networks that rely on smaller-scale distribution networks to areas in and 
around Lusaka, even where supermarket purchases are possible.  
 
This is mirrored by ‘strategic territorialisation’ of international agribusiness outside the poultry 
industry: Parmalat, the dairy conglomerate, is another example. Parmalat Zambia has so localized 
its supply chain that it now sells single-use sized sachets (25 ml), and has a central depot where 
vendors with little refrigeration, if any, can buy between 20 and 100 sachets to sell informally. 
The point is that large agribusinesses rely on local contextualization, and that in this case, they 
recognize the dominance of lower value retail opportunities.  
 
At the same time, there seem to be a shift toward the local – strengthening, nurturing and 
developing the local food system. For instance, domestic institutions such as the Zambian 
National Farmers’ Union recognize that integrating the large percentage of smallholder farmers-
cum-entrepreneurs in the agribusiness sector is an important strategy for growth of the domestic 
industry. The ZNFU proactively allocates funds to develop the capacity of small-scale farmers 
and to support the growth of the domestic industry so that it is increasingly self-sufficient and 
competitive in the region. Agribusinesses that are now embedded in the local economy also 
appropriate this kind of developmental rationality and see building the domestic economy as their 
 181 
foremost priority. The Markets and Bus Station Act, discussed in the previous chapter, can also 
be seen as an organizing strategy to upgrade and build up the domestic (informal) food economy 
making it a more accessible and competitive market for consumers and farmers.  International 
agribusiness investment has been met with an organized strategy to upgrade the domestic food 
economy (both formal and informal), to invest in it, and to integrate it with local production and 
processing enterprise. Researchers suggest that local food economies in Africa ‘discipline’ 
foreign retail capital to align with domestic economic growth, and that while changes have 
occurred in the local food supply economy because of the impact of supermarkets, they have not 
entirely shaped the nature or direction of the local food economy. While these appear to be 
isolated incidents, we can see a set of rationalizations at work here: growing the economic 
competitiveness of the country; protecting and re-regulating local markets; and investing in 
capacity building for small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs. In some ways this can be seen as a 
concerted effort by various commercial and small-scale players in the agro-food sector to ‘keep it 
local’ in terms of sourcing, supply, and retail. But is there a real trend toward localisation?  
 
Perhaps a more overt example of localization in Zambia is the Proudly Zambian campaign. Even 
though this institutionalized campaign is only in its beginning stages, and is yet mired in red-tape 
in regarding an effort to acquire Zambian Bureau of Standards approval, the rationale of the 
campaign resonates strongly with other evidence in Zambia that point to the localization of the 




The Proudly Zambian Campaign 
‘Buy Local’ advertisements in Zambia have, until recently, been used by private firms for 
marketing purposes. There are a number of examples of this local-looking marketing efforts in 
Zambia for products and services attached from anything from enamel paint, maize meal, 
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Zambian mobile phone services and livestock sales with a variety of different labels: ‘Proud to be 
Zambian’, ‘A Product of Zambia’, ‘Proudly Zambian’, ‘A Truly Zambian initiative’, ‘Be 
Zambian, Buy Zambian’. And this is not limited to ‘indigenous’ Zambian firms alone. Even some 
international agribusiness investors add a ‘Truly Zambian’ label to their brand. 
 
In the case of other food commodities, there are a number of brands that hope to attract 
consumers to choose foodstuff (or beer) that is familiar or national. Some of these signifiers link 
to identity, cultural or national consumption and others are linked to supporting or building the 
national economy. For instance, Dar Beef Company’s brand is ‘Let Zambia Grow’. Another 
example a local fermented maize-meal drink (shake-shake) brand whose slogan is ‘Drinking the 




Figure7: The Dar Beef brand: 'Let Zambia Grow' 
                                                                                                                                                           
62 I have written about the localisation trend in other contexts on the African continent (see BBC Focus on Africa 




Figure 8: A local shake-shake brand's slogan 'Drink the one you know' 
But there is a recent formal Proudly Zambian campaign that began in 2007. According to the 
manager of Proudly Zambian:   
[The campaign] will encourage and support both the supply and demand side of enterprise, 
supported by state financial intervention, through, a statutory body called the Zambian 
development Agency housed in the Department of Industry.  One of the main reasons for 
this campaign is to encourage discernment of consumers who, at present, do not seem to 
have a choice. The one thing the campaign tries to fight against is compromises on quality. 
More recently, in fact last month [October 2007], a consignment from Zambia travelled to 
South Africa to attend workshops etc with the Proudly South African think-tank. That [the 
Proudly South African campaign] is the model we are using, wholesale [sic]. … [We want 
to] make Zambian products that will be attractive to the local market: quality, able to 
withstand competition from export markets, and cater for domestic demand. (Interview with 
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Economist at Ministry of Domestic Trade, Ms M Lungu, Manager of the Buy Zambian 
Campaign, Lusaka, November 2007).  
 
The project is modelled after South Africa’s Proudly South African brand, a collaborative 
between the public and private sectors. In Zambia the project is state-driven, and not without its 
controversies. There are two incentive schemes planned for the ‘buy-in’ of the project. One is 
access to the marketing strength of the campaign through labelling and quality certification linked 
the Bureau of Standards. The second is preferential access to government procurement, and 
perhaps a guise for state control of enterprise and the potential for opportunism. Also there is the 
problem of ideology versus implementation; the project does not have a fixed deadline for its 
rollout, and will depend on an intensive capacity building drive for the state Bureau of Standards 
and government staff. Despite this, the project manager was optimistic: ‘supporting local 
business, that's our focus as well as nation building’ (ibid). 
 
The cases above all highlight that ‘territorial embeddedness’ as a concept does not fully capture 
what is happening in the Zambian context. A range of actors and institutions are situated in the 
Zambian political economy, appropriate a shared set of priorities and rationalizations in order to 
grow and protect the local economy. It can therefore be seen as much as a political process as an 
economic one.  
 
Conclusion  
Drawing attention to cases where the domestic political economy context determines or 
influences the shape of the food system, it is possible to make sense of apparent contradictions in 
Zambia's food system and to think critically about the issue of economic development. With an 
awareness of the food ‘system’, a greater appreciation of the mutual transformation of 
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agribusiness and retail firms and the local place in which they are embedded is also made 
possible.  
But the cases and analysis presented in this chapter also raise a number of questions? How should 
we conceptualise governance? And what is the importance of understanding governance in the 
context of food studies research? Given that firms and other institutions do not act in isolation in 
the food system, the interaction between different actors and institutions are profoundly 
interconnected, and reliant on each other. But as institutions change, as small-scale farmers 
expand, or the socio-economic environment improves, what will this for how the food system and 




Thus far, the thesis has answered the three main research questions:  
1) What are the domestic political economy  influences of the urban food systems in Lusaka 
Zambia?  
2)  In addition to agribusiness firms, which other institutions are central to the urban food 
system, and what are their roles?  
3) Does the domestic political economy  and non-firm institutions influence firms? And if 
so, how? 
  
The key arguments as drawn out in the thesis are that:  
1) We are best able to examine the economic growth pathways, and ongoing, interconnected 
processes of change (or trajectories) in Zambia's urban food system through an 
examination of the domestic political economy. 
2) Multiple sites of power in the food system, particularly those institutions that would be 
ignored in more normalising agrifood research approaches, constitute an integral part of 
the food system because they govern it; and 
3)  Given that there are multiple sites of power, the various firms and institutions in Zambia’s 
food system clearly do not govern in isolation, but instead, intersecting forms of governance 
circumscribe and often profoundly influence agribusiness institutions.   
 
The final chapter of this thesis discusses the implications of these findings and reflects on the 
research process.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to a broader research agenda concerning agrifood systems in 
Africa. In the thesis I argue that we are best able to examine the trajectories and ongoing, 
interconnected processes of change in food systems through an examination of those aspects in 
the domestic and regional political economy that have influenced the food system. Second, I have 
argued here that are multiple sites of power in the food system, and examining the roles of 
domestic institutions – particularly those institutions that may be ignored in conventional 
agrifood research approaches – and their role in the food system, are central to agrifood 
scholarship. And third, in a phase of globalised economic interaction, agribusiness firms and 
supermarkets are seen to govern all functions along commodity value chains down to producers. 
But given that there are multiple sites of power, the domestic political economy determines the 
economic interaction that agribusiness institutions engage in. In this chapter, I elaborate on each 
of these dimensions by summarizing the analysis in preceding chapters and linking key findings 
to other approaches in the literature. I sketch out how these interpretations both relate and 
contribute to research on agrifood systems in Africa, and I detail a revised conception of 
governance. I conclude this section by reflecting on the research methods, expressing the 
limitations of my research methods, and outlining future areas of research.  
 
Zambia's food system: a product of its domestic political economy  
Agrifood scholars who were concerned with the wider political economy system in which food 
supply and provisioning occurred urged a study of food systems. Looking at food systems, as 
opposed to commodity supply networks or the intricacies of the chain of food trade, while a 
worthwhile pursuit, yielded little in terms of why certain interaction occurred. Indeed looking at 
food systems in Africa and how these systems of interaction and exchange were embedded in 
broader political changes was a similar focus of Africanist scholars. Taking my cue from these 
scholars, the thesis presented the multifaceted and often eclectic nature of urban food systems in 
Africa as seen through the case of Zambia. Where the literature was weak in appreciating the 
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political economy context, the multiple sites of power in the food system and the mutual 
transformation of firms and the places in which they embed, an awareness of the ‘system’ 
provided the justification for challenging the literature and filling its gaps. In sum, the thesis 
shows that food system is the product of political economy processes and the regulation that 
accompanied those transitions. For instance, during the early years of independence, nationalizing 
and developing domestic agriculture was the major part of the political process. While this is 
interesting to know as background, understanding the extent of what was an essentially state-
driven undertaking, as a deeply rooted 'national development' rationalization in Zambia, allows us 
to recognize a similar rationality it in present day state policy, and in the efforts of other non-state 
institutions in Zambia's food system. An important difference is that it is not so much 
‘nationalist’ as it is protective or supportive of the domestic economy and committed to making 
food accessible to the urban poor. And this rationalisation still has implications for the way, for 
instance, the state enforces and removes trade restrictions intermittently, or how the business 
association supports and protects a growing economy. 
 
Related essentially to World Bank instituted structural adjustment programmes, neoliberal 
reforms are a second important aspect that has influenced Zambia's food system, as it has in the 
global south more generally. Economic reforms account in part for the dominance of South 
African agribusiness and retail firms in Zambia, and for neoliberal changes in the domestic 
economy such as growing economies of scale in agribusiness and efforts to increase the 
competitiveness of the food sector in the region. I show that neoliberal priorities do not circulate 
in the food system in isolation, as if they have replaced or subsumed priorities to develop and 
nurture the domestic economy. In turn, these twin priorities account for the way international 
agribusiness firms adapt or localise to meet the demands of the domestic context, particularly in 
the way it supports small-scale farmers – the dominant percentage of Zambia's population. 
Importantly, supporting (and appeasing) the large population of small-scale farmers was a key 
priority of Kenneth Kaunda's government. That an agribusiness association is a trustee of 
agricultural development suggests that the priority is as much a political and developmental 
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priority as it is a neoliberal one that is about to 'cash in' on the productive capacity of Zambia's 
large small-scale farmer population. 
 
The informal economy is the third aspect that has shaped Zambia's food system. Informal markets 
in Lusaka have their roots in colonial time urban planning, and over time have been seen both as 
an urban nuisance and as a vital source of economic growth to the city. There are recent changes 
in Lusaka’s markets that point to the increasing ‘formalisation’ of the so-called ‘informal’ 
economy in terms of the infrastructural running of the market. These changes mean that the urban 
market is a more permanent feature of the domestic food economy and should not be seen as ad 
hoc, survivalist or transitory.  
 
While the network transactions within the markets may have not changed in decades, another key 
change in the food system is the ‘informalisation of economic engagement, which is increasingly 
prevalent in Zambia's economy and the food system is no exception. Take for instance the way 
large agribusinesses rely on causal procurement, marketing or sale of produce, and more 
crucially, traders. The ‘informalisation’ strategy works firstly because of the large percentage of 
smallholders able to supply grain or buy day old chicks to rear and sell in outlying villages 
without contractual arrangements, for example. But it is also linked to a rationalisation that 
circulates in the agribusiness community, related to the imperative to grow slowly with a slowly 
growing consumption base, and with the forms of interaction that exist. Rapid growth through 
larger economies of scale would require more investment and not as much return on the higher 
value product because there is a limited consumer market for formally marketed foodstuff. 
Agribusinesses often cannot afford to transport commodities from/to out-lying areas, and thus 
rely on informal economic networks of traders.  
 
There appears to be a shared rationalisation that since the majority of the country's farmers are 
small-scale, and informal modes of transacting are best suited to this context, making use of 
trader networks and encouraging these networks by linking small-scale farmers to agribusiness 
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enterprise will inevitably grow the economy and have a knock-on effect on the consumer market. 
This scenario seems to suggest that developmental, neoliberal and informalising rationalisations 
circulate in the food system to contribute to contextually specific agribusiness strategies and a 
‘shared’ imaginary of where the food system is going. The chapter on Zambia’s agrifood context 
concludes by restating the importance of understanding the domestic political economy in food 
studies. Without this understanding, agrifood research remains dualised, and efforts to think 
through policy implications may subsequently be one-sided. 
 
Multiple sites of power in Zambia's food system and the impact of 'context' 
Since the 1980s, there have been significant changes in the global economy that have restructured 
the way food economies are governed in Africa. In part this is related to increased investment by 
international agribusiness firms as part of a worldwide shift to consolidate trade. As countries 
liberalised and progressively deregulated control over agricultural enterprise, production systems 
are increasingly seen to be controlled by agribusiness firms.  
 
That global economies have been restructured over the past few decades is indisputable. 
However, although international agribusiness investment, particularly in retail, signals a new 
phase in global economic interaction, agribusiness firms do not replace existing modes of 
economic agrifood transaction, nor do they nullify existing governing structures. Instead given 
the inherent hybridity of the system, the 'governances' of agribusiness firms, the Zambian 




The ZNFU, as an intermediary institution, represents agribusiness firms and producers, advises 
and supports agribusiness innovation strategies, influences the circulation of knowledge in the 
food system, and acts as an ombudsman of government agricultural policy. Another of its key 
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priorities is providing expertise, training and opportunities for productive market chain 
integration for small-scale farmers, and as such, it plays a crucial developmental role in the 
agrifood system. Although the ZNFU is funded in part by international donors, it is very much a 
custodian of the local food economy. The centrality of ZNFU in the domestic food system relates 
to its rootedness in the country's political economy, and the way, as an institution, it has changed 
over time to represent actors and firms in and reflect the priorities of the food system. Crucially, 
the priorities of the institution are not related to neoliberal rationalisations alone. Instead, the 
ZNFU's concern for cultivating and strengthening the food economy reveals a developmental 
rationalisation, as does its determination to lobby the state on its policies that challenge the 
growth and protection of the sector. In addition, the way the ZNFU governs also reflects both the 
resultant hybridity of the food system, and its trajectory of change, a point of discussion in a 
subsequent section. 
 
The ZNFU case has a number of implications both for understanding the food system, and for 
rethinking governance. First, the role of the ZNFU underscores the hybridity and 
interconnectedness of the food system through its mediating role between agribusiness firms, 
farmers and the state. Integrating farmers to markets or creating high value chains for 
development, is not as seamless as 'linking' producers to markets or 'kick-starting' value chains. 
Instead, the engagement between actors in the food system is part of a much larger interconnected 
set of priorities, rationalisations and political economy processes as seen in this case. Second, the 
case also points to the dexterity of the food system: the ZNFU responds to the needs and 
priorities of the food system and reflects the changing political economy of the country as it 
relates to the agrifood sector. Third, the lobbying role of the ZNFU, as an intermediary 
institution, shows that there are determined political engagements that relate to the domestic 
agrifood sector, and this engagement has implications for the functioning and growth trajectory of 
the food system. And the dexterity of the system suggests that as the agrifood system/economy 
strengthens, the role of the institutions in the system will adapt in accordance. But is this rather 
fluid system conducive to stability in the long term? The supermarkets literature suggests not, but 
that instead, these modes of economic interaction will eventually give way to economic 
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interaction governed and regulated by supermarkets and agribusiness firms, and that this 
‘modern’, supermarket-driven food system ultimately is what will benefit African economies.  
 
A fourth contribution of the case study relates to the literature. In the case of Zambia, a relatively 
typical growing African economy, both the engagement between the state, agribusiness and 
farmers, and the dexterity of the systems of governance challenge the normative economic 
geography approach that uphold a vision of supermarkets and large economies of scale as the 
vector for developing a “modern” urban food system. In contrast, what we see is an ongoing, 
fluid engagement that relates to changing priorities while maintaining existing rationalisations. 
And because this type of economic engagement is shaped by processes and regulation in the 
domestic political economy environment,, and advances the priorities of this context, institutions 
act in ways that will strengthen the domestic food economy. And finally, forms of governance 
that are geared toward strengthening the domestic food economy have an important impact on the 
food system because they facilitate creative interaction between members of the agribusiness 
community, resulting in capacity building investment, and, as far as possible, reduce risk for 
small-scale farmers or protect farmers from the kinds of price and resource risks they might 
otherwise face because of erratic state policy. 
 
‘Informalisation’  
Urban markets in Zambia, likewise, are an important part of the food system because they link 
farmers to markets and make food accessible to urban consumers. By all accounts the informal 
economy should be giving way to more 'sophisticated' modes of retail, and its centrality in a 
growing African economy should be dwindling. However, the recent changes in Zambia's urban 
market, in particular the institution of the Markets and Bus Station Act of 2007, point to the 
revitalisation of the urban economy. In the literature, informal forms of governance are seen to 
shape markets or informal transaction. In the case of Zambia's food system, 'informal institutions' 
such as trust and social networks exist as they have for decades, but two more recent changes 
disrupt the informal-formal dualism. Urban markets which are generally considered ‘informal’ 
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because of the lack of regulation, now have formalised sets of governance practises in the market 
through the new markets Act. Larger economies of scale, on the other hand, typically considered 
formal, and highly regulated, now employ sometimes un-contracted traders and intermediaries to 
effectively run the enterprise.  
 
On the first point, at the time of fieldwork in 2007, the Markets Act had been introduced in only 
one of Zambia's larger markets, and more recently the model as been used elsewhere in the 
country (in the Copperbelt and Kitwe). Representative management boards (including traders, 
marketeers, farmers, consumers and the local municipality) are seen as a first step into what 
politicians and market managers term the 'modernisation' of the market even though the changes 
predominantly affect the market infrastructure. For instance, changes in urban markets 
encompass the building of formal market spaces, the collection of levies and the provision of 
water and electricity. As a future strategy, markets managers also foresee the building of cold 
storage facilities that would reduce producers’ and traders' risk associated with intermediary 
transactions. Changes to the infrastructure means that urban markets are not a transitory part of 
the city. On the contrary, they are seen as strategic zones of investment that are part of urban 
planning. 
 
Moreover, the Act represents the increasing governance of the second economy,  most often 
termed the ‘informal economy’. While interactions between traders often are difficult to regulate, 
formalised governance of the market suggests that support for the second economy is 
increasingly seen as a legitimate and necessary means to economic growth and food security in 
the city. Formalised institutional governance in this case also represents the 'space' for informal 
enterprise to thrive, for farmers to find markets for their produce, for urban traders to operate 
locally, and ultimately for urban consumption demand even though there are still significant 
challenges. And, finally, this has implications for how we think about urban food systems in 
Africa. Urban markets in Africa do not represent a passing phase of economic growth, but 
instead, they represent the dynamism in the food system, and this compels a revisiting of food 
systems research that takes note of the institutional changes in these spaces.  
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The second aspect of ‘hybrid’ forms of governance in Zambia's food system has to do with the 
way agribusiness firms integrate intermediary traders into high value chains without contractual 
arrangements, but on the basis of reciprocal trust relationships (personal communication). The 
key difference with this kind of hybrid governance, as compared to the case above, is that it 
appears to be a temporary mechanism that is used to grow the domestic food economy. Implicit, 
therefore, is the idea that once the domestic economy develops, there may be less need for large 
agribusiness firms to make use of ‘informalised’ networks through traders. And what does this 
suggest about the trajectory of the food system and the ‘structures’ of governance? In this case, 
firms employ informal supply chain arrangements as a stopgap solution to ensure that their 
enterprise also meets the demands of the domestic economy in this phase of its growth.  
 
On the point of the trajectory of the food system, given the way high value chains are seen to 
develop, stopgap informalising measures may indeed progressively give way to more formalised 
supply chains as firms grow and consumption demands increase. However, as McKenzie (2006) 
notes, comparatively stronger economies, in which there are more established commodity 
exchange systems such as financial trading markets, have relied and continue to rely on informal 
forms of interaction that are often tacit. Similarly the study of Innovation Systems and GVCs, 
shows that knowledge (or commodities) circulates through tacit interactions which are not 
captured by formal contract. Furthermore, as institutionalist theorists in Economic Geography 
and Sociology return to Granovetter’s work on the strength of weak ties, ‘informal institutions’ 
such as social networks are recognised as a growing trend in economic development. Thus while 
research on urban markets shows a trend toward formalisation, we can expect that the 
‘restructuring’ or development of food systems in Africa will not follow the same trajectory as it 
has in Europe or North America where ‘informal’ modes of food provisioning gave way to 
‘formal’ ones. But when it comes to how economic interaction happens, and how it is governed, 
the dualised terms are obsolete. Taken together with the set of interacting influences and 
rationalisations in the food system in Zambia, the multiple sites of power, and the inherent 
hybridity of the food system, governance cannot be the domain of a particular set of firms 
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through a specific set of interactions. Instead, forms of governance are shaped by the context, 
perhaps most overtly seen in the case of agribusiness firms.  
 
Agribusiness firms  
Given the interacting agrifood system in Zambia, firms govern in unexpected ways because their 
behaviour and interactions are determined or influenced by the political economy environment 
and other players in the food system. In the case of Zambia's food system, agribusiness firms that 
are primarily concerned with profitability also appear to be interested in the economic 
development of the country they invest in because the growth of the firm is bound up with the 
growth of the local economy. This is primarily because of the domestic consumption capacity, 
but it is also because of the large number of small-scale farmers in Zambia. In this sense, other 
institutions and other political economy influencing factors constrain the influence of firms, and 
challenges the assumption that firms transform African economies as if those economies are 
impressionable blank slates. While firms indeed can and do adopt certain strategies in order to 
gain a foothold in the economy, some of the strategies appear counterproductive to their growth.  
 
As a second set of findings, firms do not necessarily ‘territorialise’ or embed in the local 
economy as if firms are independent of that context. Instead, agribusiness firms are part of the 
domestic food economy, and they make concerted efforts to ‘invest’ in the food sector through 
training programmes and locally appropriate supply chain practises. The strategy here is therefore 
not one of territorial embeddedness. Indeed to think so suggests that productive enterprise is 
always the ‘global’ penetrating the ‘local’, and that economies only progress because of this kind 
of intervention – a point that Gibson-Graham (2002) makes incisively.  
 
While it is clear that agribusiness firms have often emerged as the result of international or 
regional merges and acquisitions, these firms operate as domestic firms, aligning themselves to 
the country’s needs and priorities, and taking over some of the developmental functions that are 
associated with the state. In this case we can appreciate, perhaps more overtly than in other cases, 
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the shared rationalisations that circulate in the food system and the impact of the context on 
firms. The shared priority of nurturing and growing the local economy in Zambia's food system is 
thus intertwined with a profit making rationalisation, and within this system, firms and the 
influencing political economy context are mutually constituted. In the case of Shoprite, they are 
strong-armed by the state to do it, and they do not romantically adopt the priorities of the place in 
which they are embedded by are coerced to do so, as mentioned below.  
 
Third, the domestic political economy environment does not just influence the behaviour and 
economic prowess of firms; there are other governance structures that circumscribe the power of 
the firms, seen most evidently in the case of the South African supermarket Shoprite. Shoprite 
faces increasing pressure from the state to source locally, or as seen in the work of Miller (2005; 
2008), to adhere to domestic labour regulations. The supermarket’s power is circumscribed 
because it is not a free or autonomous institution that is disembedded. Quite the opposite, 
supermarkets are embedded firms, which ‘territorialise’ because of particular rationalisations, and 
the political economy in which they are embedded (or territorialise), such as Zambia, regulates, 
or as Kenny and Mather (2008) argue, disciplines the supermarket. Whether it is territorial 
embeddedness, localisation or the strong arm of political will, the fact that agribusiness firms and 
supermarkets adapt to the demands and priorities in the domestic political economy, has 
implications for the dominant contention about supermarkets as revolutionising local economies 
and for how governance is conceptualised.  
 
Governance reconsidered 
Economic geographers note that governance is perhaps the most important consideration in 
agrifood research in Africa. The conception of governance has shifted over time as debates have 
progressed in the Economic Geography literature, from how production/processing is controlled 
or regulated by supermarkets or international agribusiness firms to the allocation of costs and 
rewards following the division of labour in value chains, to how discourses of quality have come 
to shape expectations of value and meeting regulations. But while there has been a shift in 
concept over time in the globalisation economic geography literature, the literature on 
 197 
supermarkets and agribusinesses in Sub-Saharan Africa – most notably outputs from the project 
‘Regoverning Markets’ – retains a concept of governance that has to do with how supermarkets 
and firms transform economies and dominate trade because of increasingly stringent regulations. 
Furthermore, governance here fails to consider important changes in the domestic political 
economy and the role of domestic institutions pivotal to agrifood systems. For example, the 
ZNFU’s overseeing and nurturing role in the food system widens our view of governance. The 
ZNFU represents producers and agribusinesses, lobbies the state, and is at the forefront of 
developing the agricultural sector in Zambia. It is also pivotal in the circulation of knowledge in 
the food system. The ZNFU as an intermediary institution influences the governance of 
agribusiness firms and the state, and enables particular interactions while responding to 
immediate domestic priorities. Yet it is ‘governed’ from below, by a ‘voting’ constituency of 
farmers and agribusinesses that legitimise the role of the ZNFU. In addition, The ZNFU functions 
in part from donor funding and has to constantly demonstrate ‘good governance’ mechanisms.  
The richness of the above case would be missed in a conventional view of governance. Indeed 
not recognising other sites of power in the food system renders the focus on governance is static 
and limited. A limited conception of governance, in turn, has implications both for how economic 
interaction and economic development are seen to happen, and for related policy 
recommendations that result (as is often the case).    
 
Indeed conceptions of agrifood system governance have changed over time, at an obvious level, 
as a result of actual changing forms of governance as economic restructuring has occurred in the 
1980s-1990s. It is therefore perplexing that these conceptions present a frozen view of African 
agrifood economies as if these economies only transition in response to the governance of 
economic restructuring through agribusiness firms and supermarkets. On the one hand, the way 
the food system is governed reflects a particular time and a particular set of priorities. They are 
the material outcomes of changing priorities and needs, and they are governed differently at 
different times. This of course is nothing new. On the other, however, the notion, in the literature 
that governance of agrifood economies is the domain of agribusiness firms and supermarkets, is 
not necessarily because it is ‘true’, but because this era of neoliberal discourse shapes the way 
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economic development is constructed/read in the literature. Economic development is seen to be 
driven by the demands of ‘the market’, as if this is some primordial entity that inevitably leads to 
the retreat of the state and other non-firm institutions in regulating or governing capacities. Our 
understanding of governance must therefore attempt to move beyond a neoliberal economic 
discourse and highlight other forms of power. In the case of urban food systems in Africa this 
would mean a shift away from the dominant conception of supermarkets and agribusiness firms 
as transforming local economies.  
 
For instance, in this era, the state is caught between integrating into a global economy, pleasing 
donors and nurturing the domestic economy, the form of governance by the state encompasses 
intermittent trade barriers, prescriptions to international investors about labour or sourcing 
practises, or devolving power to agribusiness associations. Our reading of governance must 
therefore respond to those interactions in the food system which are determined by domestic 
political economy motivations and outside dominant conceptions of governance. The present era 
mentioned above must shift our conception of governance so as to recognise the priorities that 
prompt certain forms of governance, and not the other way around.  
 
From the analyses in the thesis, it is clear that in the dominant economic geography approach, 
power is situated or embodied in certain firms or certain interactions. However, in the case of 
Zambia's food system also presented in the thesis, I have shown how there are multiple sites of 
power in the food system that act in the food system simultaneously. Looking at the food system 
as a ‘system’ allows us to both recognise these sites of power, and to begin to understand how 
they interact. And it is this conception of governance I wish to take forward.  
 
Intersecting governance(s)  
Domestic institutions and agribusiness firms govern the food system in distinct ways, and so 
constitute multiple sites of power. Governance here is defined as the tendency for an institution to 
further particular priorities or to oversee and promote particular economic interaction, or 
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otherwise influence or regulate the way economic interaction happens. In this view, the way firms 
or other institutions govern the food system determines the success of the food system, and vice 
versa. If therefore there are multiple sites of power, it stands to reason that different actors govern 
in different ways. That this happens simultaneously is more complex to understand.  
 
Institutions advance certain priorities or goal, drive the direction of economic growth and pursue 
certain ends. The way these institutions or actors achieve this aims is a mode of governance. In 
the supermarket literature, the goal or priority of the supermarket or agribusiness firm is to gain 
profit from retail, provision foodstuff, and maintain a level of quality. The mode of governance 
will obviously fit the priorities of that firm. And since the goal of the supermarket is not 
economic development, the forms of regulation or governance will not automatically result in 
economic development. Yet it is ironic both that the spread of supermarkets is so strongly related 
to economic development in the literature, and that supermarkets are seen to be the panacea for 
rural development in the way they link small-scale farmers to high end markets. It is therefore 
unrealistic and quite surprising that growth of agribusiness firms and supermarkets is expected to 
solve the growing needs of the urban poor – particularly in terms of food provisioning.  
 
Other institutions, such as the agricultural unions and urban markets, on the other hand, advance 
other priorities, such as nurturing the domestic food economy, supporting small-scale farmers, 
facilitating adequate markets for farmers and contributing to food provisioning and economic 
growth. If these are the goals of these two institutions, it also stands to reason that the way they 
will govern will relate to meeting those goals. Expecting these institutions, together with state 
institutions to solve some of the developmental problems faced in African countries would be 
more appropriate. And it would be a more judicious use of donor funding as opposed to linking 
farmers to supermarkets or high value chains.   
 
Why then, do some firms appear to share similar priorities as the agricultural union, for instance, 
in their aim to nurture the economy? Given the above discussion, it is not only about romantic 
benevolent impulses. Since they are each embedded in the local context, they each wield power 
within the broader food system, and they each drive particular goals – why the need to share 
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priorities and advance aims that are often not in that institution’s best interest? On the surface it is 
about growing the economy so that each institution will eventually share in the rewards of 
economic development. In actuality it is because firms, the state and other institutions do not 
govern the food system in isolation. Indeed since each institution is embedded in the domestic 
political economy, it means that there are a common set of priorities, needs and rationalisations 
that are also ensconced in that context. An institution cannot govern a particular ‘domain’ as if 
that domain can be neatly demarcated from the rest of the domestic political economy. The 
juxtaposed and interconnected nature of the food system means that governance must also be 
interconnected, or it must intersect.  
 
It is not simply ‘who governs whom’ here. Although the form of governance is shaped by the 
particular priorities of that institution, it is ultimately and determined by other intersecting modes 
of governance. So for instance, the supermarket’s power is circumscribed by state regulation 
about sourcing, destabilised by producer and supermarket labour riots, and also influenced by 
changes in urban markets, and changes in the regional political economy.  
 
Governance of the food system, therefore, is not the domain of one institution, or set of firms, and 
indeed intersecting governances are operationalised to meet multiple priorities. Thus while 
governances intersect, they often implicitly contribute to a shared goal, which in contradicting the 
laissez faire assumptions of a free market economy, also has certain implications for how the 
agrifood system is thought to progress. The messy assemblage of different forms of governances 
confirms that the food system is not one “thing” transitioning to another “thing”. It is an 
interconnected system of oversight, regulation, support and drivenness of the food economy. as a 
policy outcome, if governance is indeed one of the most important factors that ensures economic 
development or that farmers link to markets, or that food security is achieved, then these 
institutions must each be included, not only in facilitating value chains, but as pivotal to meeting 




‘Where to? ’: Trajectories of change in Zambia's food system and future 
research 
While it is difficult to speculate how Zambia's food system will ‘look’ in the few decades, there 
are trajectories of change that are visible now. And given the last point that governance is time-
bound, these foreseeable changes open up important areas of future research.  
 
The first foreseeable change in Zambia's food system relates to increasingly localisation of the 
economy most explicitly suggested by the Proudly Zambian campaign. Indeed this relates to 
securing adequate food supplies for the domestic economy, protecting and nurturing the local 
food system, and ‘keeping it local’ as a strategy to build the competitive ability of the agrifood 
industry. Nurturing domestic economies is particularly important in an era where global trade is 
increasingly insecure, but is not necessarily a ‘popular’ solution. The recent economic downturn 
caused by the property market slump in the north has resulted in states bailing out companies and 
caused researchers and analysts alike to rethink the idealised ‘free market economy’. Issues such 
as protectionism, localisation and strengthening the domestic economy, often associated with 
more left-leaning economies, are increasingly taking centre-stage. In tandem with other research 
from the global south, an important area of future research will be rethinking the perceived 
insularity of African economies in the global economy as a strategic solution to future crises. 
Indeed this research will also contribute meaningfully to debates about African economic 
development. Another important inquiry for future research is the idea of ‘localisation’, and 
whether, and in what ways ‘localising processes’ might challenge assumptions of ‘the global 
economy’.  
 
The second foreseeable development in the food system relates to the concerted strategy by firms, 
producers and the ZNFU to integrate the domestic food economy by linking farmers to markets. 
But this will not necessarily encompass linking local farmers to distant markets, or disembedded 
value chains, but rather, it will encompass making immediate domestic markets more accessible 
to small-scale farmers and traders, and by continuing to foster a greater sense of cohesion in the 
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already interconnected food system. A future area of research might include more ethnographic 
accounts of how farmers are linked to markets in Zambia and how these interconnections relate to 
how the food system is governed.  
 
I anticipate finally, that the most formidable challenge that faces the Zambian food system relates 
to changes in the regional political economy and in the global economy. Regional changes 
include regional trade agreements, such as the SADC free trade area mentioned above. A critical 
future area of research concerns the changes in Zambia over the past two years after the free trade 
area came into effect. This research will have implications for assessing South Africa’s role in the 
region and, more generally, understanding the complexity of regional trade arrangements in 
economies that are seen to be developing or emerging. This is an important link to make because, 
not only are regional economies the trend in the global south, there is also greater south-south 
coordination and ongoing north-south trade agreements between individual countries.  
 
Less related to changes in the Zambian context, but instead to the outlined findings of the thesis, 
a final future area of research will be examining governance, as contoured in the thesis, through a 
postcolonialist lens. This would include a more discursive interpretation of the findings, to 
consider productive ways of rethinking the global-local or informal-formal dualisms, and 
challenge the normativeness of existing approaches. 
Reflections on the research journey and methodological approaches 
In reading over the conclusions and insights drawn in all the chapters, the importance of the 
research design is paramount, in particular, the interpretative approach inherent in content 
analysis and the adoption of a systems approach at every level of the research inquiry. 
 
First, and most importantly, the systems approach was a useful device to delineate the conceptual 
position in this thesis, by prioritising the domestic political economy as the central theme in the 
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research endeavour. Had I not made use of the systems approach in this thesis, while I may have 
been able to, for instance, convey the complexity of a poultry chain; map out how South African 
capital has resulted in large economies of scale in Zambia; or precipitate interesting meanings for 
the quality of a certain breed of chicken – the analysis would tell me little about the changes in 
the domestic economy that profoundly influence what is happening in Zambia. As a final reverse 
scenario, had I looked at value chains or trade networks in urban markets, while I would have 
gained other insights such as being able to trace complex economic interactions and social 
relations, I would not have been able to see those interactions as a more inter-temporal outcome 
of various influences, rationalisations and changes in the food system. Second, thinking of the 
‘system’ has allowed me to more clearly outline the methodological approach in the thesis. The 
rationale is not to examine smaller networks but instead to explain the way the system ‘works’ 
and, in so doing, to make different interactions in the system visible.  
 
Third, adopting the approach has also enabled me to consistently communicate the analytical 
meaning of the ‘food system’ through the term ‘system’, and to draw a distinction between value 
chains and other network approaches, which as heuristic devices are less able to capture 
influences, institutions and processes of change outside the chain/network. The food ‘system’, 
then, can account for the smaller interactions implicit in the system, and also the changes that 
occur in the system. While the smaller transactions and networks (the ‘what’) are an important 
focus in thinking about the food system we can link this to broader political economy processes at 
the national, regional or global level (the ‘why’), and also consider trajectories of change (the 
‘where to’).  
 
Content Analysis underscored how important it is to appreciate the context within which one 
works, in this case the Zambian agrifood context. It also aided credible source gathering, use of 
sources and research analysis. It allowed me to have greater sensitivity to those factors in the 
domestic political economy that created confusion and complexity so that in unpacking the 
complexity, I would maintain credibility in the inferences that I made about certain 
texts/interviews.  
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There are of course also methodological limitations of this research project. The first relates 
specifically to the systems approach. While I was able to capture a number of institutions and 
influencing aspects, the conceptual approach also inadvertently creates a blind spot because, for 
instance, policy instruments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives are not explicitly 
dealt with, neither were the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers on Zambia 
included in the analysis although these formed part of my larger background reading. Another 
blind spot relates also to the scale of the analysis. While the insights gained from the governance 
aspect of the thesis are significant, ‘governances from below’, for instance the way traders, 
supermarket labourers and producers reappropriate power, is not overt. A third oversight, which 
relates to food studies research in general and is not specific to this thesis, is that consumers are 
not included in the analysis, and consumption is implied.   
 
There are also a few conceptual difficulties or limits of this project. The first is that the analysis 
here is less about generalising the findings in the Zambian case to other African countries, than it 
is about replicating a similar methodological or conceptual approach. My initial assumption was 
that the Zambian case would tell us something about economic development in Africa. Given the 
analysis in the thesis, Zambia's food system is, instead, a useful case study to draw out 
methodological approaches to the study of African economies. Thus the thesis does not explain 
what African food systems ‘are’, ontologically speaking, but rather, how we can understand the 
range of influences and governances that comprise and shape those food systems. The hesitance 
in the thesis to draw out theoretical nuances that would challenge more discursive accounts of 
African economic development, or grapple with questions of modernity, relates to the fact that 
the purpose of the thesis is not a postcolonialist critique – often the only conceptual space for this 
kind of discussion. The research presented in this thesis is, however, clearly applicable and 
generalisable to other contexts as a methodological approach, and contributes to work on African 
food economies by offering an in-depth case study on Zambia’s political economy context as it 
relates to the agrifood sector. 
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Second, using such terms as ‘African economies’, ‘urban Africa’ or ‘African food systems’ risks 
essentialising the variety of economic interactions in different countries and regions, and 
suggesting there is a single economic interaction or set of governances in the continent, which is 
a struggle faced by other African Studies scholars who also work within disciplines that do not 
explicitly problematise such generalisations.  
 
Third, the limit of this project is that in suggesting the ‘time-boundedness’ of governance, where 
the analysis itself is a time-bound product. A revised framework, as set out in this thesis, which is 
drawn from a closer examination of the context, perhaps best encapsulates the zeitgeist of 
present-day agrifood systems. But it is also time-bound, reflecting a particular snapshot reality. 
Furthermore, and related to the limits of content analysis where the context is constructed, the 
context from which Zambia's food system emerges has a limited lifespan, and the context, is 
inherently a malleable and transforming space. The difficulty is that given such language as 
‘transition’ and ‘trajectories of change’, the Zambian food system as theorised in this thesis, 
based on research in 2007, is a different system three years on.  
 
In this thesis, in sum, instead of focusing on value chains that link farmers and production 
networks in Sub-Saharan Africa to high value markets in the north, which is the dominant 
approach in the literature, I examine the more localized urban food systems in Zambia’s capital, 
Lusaka, and from this basis I examine the trajectories of change in the food system. I also 
weighed up the assumptions of the other substantial body of work that dominates academic 
scholarship – the transformation of African economies by supermarkets. Instead, I showed how 
even the spread of supermarkets is dependent on the domestic and regional political economy 
environment that facilitates it. A systems approach allowed me, to make sense of the political 
economy context; to appreciate how this context influences firms; and to recognize both multiple 
sites of power at work in the food system and intersecting patterns of governance that result in an 
increasingly localizing economy.  
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By asking about the Zambian food system, in the ways that have been done here, the findings 
lend to a more robust research agenda on food studies and economic growth in Africa, and are 
well-placed to contribute to work on food security. I argue that there are aspects in Zambia’s 
broader political economy that profoundly influence its food system. The case of Zambia's food 
system points to tacit rationalisations that investing in and strengthening the local or domestic 
economy is ultimately what will grow firms and transform African economies. Finally, once we 
are able to appreciate both the complexity of domestic political economies in Africa in which 
agribusiness firms, agricultural unions and urban markets are embedded,  and the trajectories of 
change and intersecting governances at work in the food system as I have done in the Zambian 
case, we may be better able to find solutions to the challenges which relate to food crises and 
economic development in African countries. 
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